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Abstract 
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Introduction 
Cases of suspected serious physical abuse of a young child are uncommon, but present a 
challenge to clinicians who work with children. A medical opinion on the cause of injury is 
central to the management of such cases. Scientific understanding in the area is, however, 
still being developed, and the task of inferring cause from the appearance of an injury can 
be difficult. Medical practice in the area is conducted in a complex socio-legal setting 
where legal and social science professionals each pursue the child’s best interests with 
approaches specific to their discipline. Adding to, and sometimes overshadowing, both of 
these approaches are concerns of criminal justice, and the danger of a serious injustice 
arising from flawed medical evidence. Cases are typically emotionally charged and 
powerful biases may impact on clinical decision-making. All the risks associated with 
expert evidence in the administration of justice arise in this jurisdiction also. Children’s 
Courts are “not bound” by the rules of evidence, but in many matters the Court must still 
be mindful of the principles of those rules in the reception of expert evidence. 
!
Methods 
Semi-structured interviews of seven magistrates and six paediatricians were conducted, 
on medical evidence given in child protection proceedings in Queensland, and related 
topics. 
  
Results 
Strictly legal or forensic medical issues are not as prominent in the management of cases 
of suspected physical child abuse in Queensland as in other jurisdictions, especially in 
comparison to family justice in the United Kingdom. Features of both the statutory child 
protection system and the Children’s Court in Queensland lead to relatively few cases of 
this nature being seriously contested or coming to trial. It appears possible that critical 
decisions in such cases may be determined through less rigorous means than 
i
paediatricians and other clinicians might assume. Specific issues which arose in interviews 
included: 
 • Concerns regarding medical reports, routinely provided for child protection        
investigations. It is possible that these documents may be interpreted or put to use 
in ways which the clinician providing them would not expect or be comfortable with.  
 • Less rigorous testing of medical opinions in the child protection jurisdiction than that        
routinely encountered in criminal trials. 
 • Significant value seen in children being legally represented, but lack of universal        
access to this. 
 • Inadequate briefing of legal representatives, to the detriment of the expert’s        
assistance of the court. 
 • Lack of prominence or attention given to the child protection jurisdiction in        
comparison to criminal justice. 
!
 
Discussion 
 
In cases of suspected physical child abuse in Queensland, it is difficult to be sure what 
factors most often determine the outcome of a case. Cases of serious injury to very young 
children do not routinely come under the close scrutiny of a superior court, as occurs in the 
United Kingdom, and medical opinions on the cause of injury often pass unchallenged. 
One avenue to improve the current circumstance in this regard would be to establish 
stronger links between clinicians who work with children, and lawyers who work in 
children’s law and child protection. 
Scientific knowledge regarding injuries to children is currently somewhat limited, but is 
growing quickly. More precise understanding of accidental mechanisms of injury, along 
with foundational biomechanical understanding of the behaviour of living infant tissue, hold 
promise for the future. 
!
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Chapter 1: The scientific basis of medical opinions given on the cause 
of a child’s injury 
!
!
1.1 Diagnosis and clinical reasoning in medical practice 
!
1.2 The logical basis of injury interpretation in children 
!
1.3 Representational theories in the study of childhood injury 
!
!
Outline of Chapter 
!
“Diagnosis” may refer to the identification of a disease where the cause and mechanism of 
disease is well understood, or may refer merely to recognisable patterns of presentation. 
Clinical reasoning can be described using concepts which include deductive, inductive and 
abductive reasoning, and the hypothetico-deductive approach to diagnosis. The same 
strengths and limitations of each of these methods as described in standard clinical 
practice are apparent when used in the clinical assessment of an injury to a young child for 
a forensic purpose. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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Chapter 1
1.1 Diagnosis and clinical reasoning in medical practice 
!
“Very often they say ‘Oh he’s got ADHD’, and I go ‘Stop it will you’. Give me 
the medical definition of it. The first thing I say is ‘Have you got that diagnosis 
from a paediatrician?’…. ADHD can be, you can get poor attention because 
you don’t get enough food, you can also have poor attention at school 
because your mother is being bashed every night of the week or they’re 
having an all night grog party at your house and they don’t get proper 
school.” (Magistrate informant 3) 
!
* * * * * 
!
Diagnosis 
!
Dorland’s Medical Dictionary defines “diagnosis” as “the determination of the nature of a 
case of disease”.  In clinical medicine the term is most often used when the underlying 1
cause of a patient’s presentation is known. There is however no formal or more specific 
definition of the word. The word “diagnosis” is also often applied to cases where the 
underlying cause of symptoms or signs is unclear. Thus paediatricians routinely speak of a 
“diagnosis of autism”, despite the cause of this condition remaining obscure. 
!
The purpose of a clinical assessment varies according to the patient’s presentation and 
the context of the consultation. When a child presents with a fever, and bacterial meningitis 
is suspected, that diagnosis must be established or excluded with certainty. Performing the 
diagnostic investigation of lumbar puncture, in which cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) is drawn for 
examination, can provide this certainty. Specific treatment- intravenous antibiotics- is 
required if the results indicate bacterial meningitis. 
!
In contrast, the assessment of a child who presents with difficulty socialising at school may 
encompass the possibility of autism, without requiring an initial formal diagnosis. No single 
biological investigation exists which alone establishes or excludes the diagnosis of autism. 
 Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary (32nd ed, Elsevier, 2012).1
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The management of a child with socialisation problems does not rest completely on 
whether the diagnosis of autism is ultimately made.  2
!
These observations are intertwined. The necessary precondition for the development of a 
diagnostic test for bacterial meningitis was the detailed understanding of its cause 
(bacteria invading the CSF). This understanding was built on earlier scientific discovery: 
discovery of the existence and nature of bacteria, and of the normal anatomy and 
physiology of the human body. No diagnostic investigation for autism which delivers an 
answer with equal certainty will be developed, until the fundamental cause and 
pathophysiology of the condition is better understood. 
!
In the philosophy of science the distinction between scientific theories which explain 
observed phenomena in depth, and those which do not try to, has long been recognised. 
Explanatory scientific theories which include descriptions of cause and mechanism have 
been called “representational theories”.  An example is William Harvey’s 17th century 3
description of the cardiovascular system.  Modern understanding of bacterial meningitis 4
fits fairly well into this category of representational theory. 
!
A type of theory which can be distinguished from representational theories are “black box” 
theories.  These are theories which describe only a correlation between the input into an 5
event or circumstance, and the subsequent outcome. To a degree, the “diagnosis” of 
autism falls into the latter category. The observation that a six year old child’s behaviour 
matches the diagnostic criteria for the condition can be thought of as the “input” into the 
black box of a “disordered child social development” theory. Past observation of a large 
number of children who manifested the same behaviours (were diagnosed as being 
autistic; had the same “input”) helps a clinician predict the presence of other important 
clinical issues, and consider specific interventions beneficial to this patient group. In reality 
few scientific theories fall neatly into either category of entirely “representational” or 
entirely “black box”. 
 See Coon ER et al, “Overdiagnosis: How our compulsion for diagnosis may be harming 2
children” (2014) 134 Pediatrics 1.
 Johansson I and Lynoe N, Medicine and Philosophy: A Twenty-First Century Introduction (Ontos 3
Verlag, 2008) Ch 6.2.
 McKechnie MDJ and Robertson C, “William Harvey” (2002) 55 Resuscitation 133.4
 Johansson and Lynoe, n 3, Ch 6.2.5
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The early history of medical science’s desperate endeavours to identify the cause of 
autism provides a lesson for doctors today. This includes doctors who feel pressed to 
provide a conclusive opinion about whether a child has sustained an accidental injury, or 
has been abused by a parent. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, many parents of autistic 
children were advised by doctors that the parents’ own emotional rejection of the child had 
caused the disorder- the “refrigerator mother” theory.  The period is recalled by some as 6
an era benighted by “the tyranny of expertise”.  Many experts now say that there is no 7
single cause of autism.  8
!
Just as the aim of any clinical consultation is “fit for purpose”, the objective of a medical 
assessment of a child in a case of suspected physical child abuse varies according to 
context. In some of these cases the clinical exercise might be best considered to be purely 
diagnostic (is the mark on the infant’s back a Mongolian spot, or is it a bruise?). In some 
cases diagnostic questions feature, but are not the only important questions (the infant has 
definitely sustained a simple linear skull fracture, but is that injury consistent with the 
history given of how it occurred?). And in some cases the most important questions are not 
diagnostic at all (how can I phrase this medical report to convey my opinion without 
inadvertently leading to a miscarriage of justice?). 
!
!
Medical clinical reasoning 
!
The study of “clinical reasoning”, i.e. the formulation of clinical questions and the methods 
used to answer those questions, is a topic of increasing interest in the medical literature.  9
In only a small proportion of children presenting with fever is a lumbar puncture required to 
exclude meningitis. The doctor must decide whether this test is required, basing their 
decision on elements of the history, examination, and other investigations. Their thinking 
 Baker JP, “Autism in 1959: Joey the mechanical boy” (2010) 125 Pediatrics 1101.6
 Baker, n 6, p 1102.7
 Happé F, Ronald A and Plomin R, “Time to give up on a single explanation for autism” (2006) 9 8
Nature- Neuroscience 1218.
 See Croskerry P, “A universal model of diagnostic reasoning” (2009) 84 Academic Medicine 9
1022; Norman G, “Building on experience- The development of clinical reasoning” (2006) 355 New 
England Journal of Medicine 2251.
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will be directed towards a particular end, and will to some degree work within a structured 
framework, of “medical problem-solving”.  10
!
One well-described (although contentious and variably-defined) model of clinical reasoning 
is the “hypothetico-deductive” method used to reach a diagnosis. By this method the 
clinician, when confronted with certain symptoms and signs, generates a number of 
diagnostic hypotheses. Further information is then sought to confirm or refute each of the 
hypotheses.  11
!
This model begs the question of what process is used by a clinician to arrive at a 
hypothesis-confirming or a hypothesis-rejecting conclusion. In the case of a child 
presenting with fever, what information does a clinician seek in order to reject the 
hypothesis that bacterial meningitis is present? How is that information handled? 
!
The mechanics of clinical reasoning can be described using concepts from the study of 
logic. Most pertinent are three different types of reasoning by which a conclusion may be 
inferred from information at hand. These are deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, 
and abductive reasoning. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
 Elstein AS, “Thinking about diagnostic thinking: a 30-year perspective” (2009) 14 Advances in 10
Health Science Education 7.
 Elstein AS, “What goes around comes around: The return of the hypothetico-deductive 11
strategy” (1994) 6 Teaching and Learning in Medicine 121.
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Deductive reasoning 
!
“If a bag contains red marbles and you take out one marble, you may infer that the marble 
is red. This is deduction.”   12
!
Deductive reasoning is conventional, formal “logic”, as first expounded by philosophers of 
ancient Greece. It is a pattern of arguments which transmit truth with certainty.  A 13
celebrated example of a deductively valid argument is: 
!
 Premise 1:  All men are mortal. 
 Premise 2:  Socrates is a man. 
    ———————— 
 Conclusion:  Socrates is mortal. 
!
Simple examples of deductive logic can appear trivial or self-evident, but these are only its 
building blocks. More complex instances of deductive reasoning are essentially 
mathematical in nature. 
!
In clinical practice, deductive reasoning may comprise one link in a chain of problem-
solving. The element of a clinical problem which is answerable through deductive 
reasoning is usually not the element which requires or rewards clinical expertise. 
Deductive reasoning requires premises which are clear and indisputably true for its 
conclusion to be true, features often lacking in clinical information. 
!
Deductive reasoning is applicable to truly diagnostic investigations: 
!
 Premise 1:  In all cases of bacterial meningitis, bacteria are   
    present in the CSF. 
 Premise 2:  This child’s CSF does not contain bacteria. 
    ————————————————————— 
 Conclusion:  This child does not have bacterial meningitis. 
 Mans D and Preyer G, “On contemporary developments in the theory of argumentation” (1999) 12
13 Protosociology 1, p12.
 Godfrey-Smith P, Theory and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science (University of 13
Chicago Press, 2003) Ch 3.2.
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The complete certainty of deductive logic is often “built in” to a diagnostic investigation, as 
in this example. Detailed scientific understanding of bacteria and the human body provides 
the authority of Premise 1. A clinician is still left with the task of determining which child 
with a fever should undergo the diagnostic investigation (lumbar puncture). 
!
On a separate note, the framework of deductive reasoning best illuminates the fallacy of 
“circular reasoning. “An argument is circular if it presumes the truth of what is to be 
proved.”  The fallacy can be represented thus: 14
!
 Premise 1:  If A is true then B is true. 
 Premise 2:  If B is true then A is true. 
    ——————————— 
 Conclusion 
 (invalid) :  A and B are both true. 
!
Mastery of formal (deductive) logic was once considered essential to the decision-making 
of lawyers and judges.  Although more recently out of favour, illustrations of its use in 15
legal reasoning, which also reflect some methods of clinical reasoning, are provided 
throughout this thesis. 
!
!
Inductive reasoning 
!
“If you do not know the colour of the marbles in the bag, and take out one marble, and it is 
red, you may infer that all marbles in the bag are red. This is induction.”  16
!
Inductive reasoning refers to an inference being made from particular observations, to 
support a generalisation.  A traditional example is that of white swans. The observation of 17
a large number of white swans, and no swans of any other colour, can be reasonably 
presented as support for the theory that all swans are white. 
 Gensler HJ, Introduction to Logic (2nd ed, Routledge, 2010) p 56.14
 Lind D, “Basic categories of argumentation in legal reasoning” (2014) 11 Judicial Review 429.15
 Mans and Preyer, n 12, p 12.16
 Godfrey-Smith, n 13, p 42.17
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Inferences drawn this way are commonplace in scientific theorising, clinical problem-
solving, and everyday life. The previously described “black box” type of scientific theory is 
based on inductive reasoning. Conclusions drawn from epidemiological research (which 
primarily reports associations between exposure and outcome at a population level) are 
generally based on inductive reasoning. Thalidomide use in pregnant women was 
identified as the likely cause of severe limb defects in their children through observation of 
the association between this exposure and outcome in 1961.  The mechanism of how it 18
causes limb defects- through inhibition of the formation of new blood vessels- was not 
discovered until 1994.  The randomised controlled trial, acme of the modern edifice of 19
“evidence-based medicine”  is premised on the validity of inductive reasoning. 20
!
In clinical practice, a well established rule is that a child who appears alert, interactive and 
well, to an experienced clinician, does not have meningitis. This rule has been inductively 
derived from the past observations of innumerable cases of children with fever over 
centuries, and seems very reliable. 
!
The fallibility of inductive reasoning is however easy to spot. Observation of a single black 
swan wrecks the theory built up from the observation of a thousand white swans. 
Philosopher Bertrand Russell famously wrote of an inductivist chicken, who learns to 
expect to be fed when they see the person who feeds them, until the day the chicken has 
its neck wrung instead.  21
!
!
Abductive reasoning 
!
“But if a bag of red marbles is standing at some place and a red marble lies in the vicinity 
of the bag, you may infer that the marble is from the bag. And that is abduction.”  22
 McBride WG, “Thalidomide and congenital abnormalities” (1961) 278 Lancet 1358.18
 D’Amato RJ et al, “Thalidomide is an inhibitor of angiogenesis” (1994) 91 Proceedings of the 19
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 4082.
 Guyatt G et al, “Evidence based medicine: A new approach to teaching the practice of 20
medicine” (1992) 268 Journal of the American Medical Association 2420; Davey Smith G and 
Ebrahim S, “Editorial: Data dredging, bias, or confounding” (2002) 325 BMJ 1437.
 Russell B, The Problems of Philosophy (Home University Library, 1912) VI.21
 Mans and Preyer, n 12, p 12.22
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Abductive reasoning is “a kind of guessing by a process of forming a plausible hypothesis 
that explains a given set of facts or data.”  It can be described as a reasoning process 23
which goes “backwards”, from known facts to the explanation for those facts. This 
contrasts with deductive reasoning, which leads inexorably from premises to conclusion. It 
also contrasts with inductive reasoning, where past observations form the basis of a theory 
de novo which can then be generalised to present and future cases. “Abductive reasoning” 
has been described under other names, especially “inference to the best explanation”.  24
This model of reasoning does seem to accurately represent the steps by which a clinician 
will often arrive at a provisional diagnosis in practice. It is however less amenable to a tight 
summary definition, and requires consideration of other concepts, such as plausibility and 
probability.  25
!
Abductive reasoning begins with the postulation of a hypothesis which can explain the 
facts observed. But this does not complete the process. The postulated hypothesis is also 
compared to other competing hypotheses which could also explain the same observations. 
One example of abductive reasoning arises from the observation that fossils of fish have 
been found far inland.  The hypothesis that a body of water once covered that area of 26
land could explain the observation. Other hypotheses, such as a theory that ancient 
creatures with the form of fish lived on dry land, appear implausible. 
!
In other instances, however, several hypotheses might be able to adequately explain those 
observations which require explanation. Otitis media (middle ear infection) might be found 
in a child with fever. If the child is also found to have neck stiffness, however, then the 
alternative explanatory hypothesis of bacterial meningitis must still be addressed. And if 
the child also appears toxic and obtunded then the hypothesis of bacterial meningitis 
becomes both more important and more likely to be confirmed, than the hypothesis that 
otitis media is the sole cause of the fever. 
!
 Walton DN, “Abductive, presumptive and plausible arguments” (2001) 21 Informal Logic 141, p 23
143.
 Harman GH, “Inference to the best explanation” (1965) 74 Philosophical Review 88.24
 Walton, n 23.25
 Peirce CS, “Illustrations of the logic of science VI” (1878) 13 Popular Science Monthly 470.26
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The structure of abductive reasoning has been represented thus:  27
!
 D is a collection of data. 
 H explains D. 
 No other hypothesis can explain D as well as H does.  
 ———————————————————————— 
 Therefore H is probably true. 
!
Since it was first described, abductive reasoning has been proposed as the method by 
which scientists infer novel theories, such as the existence of subatomic particles.  It also 28
appears to capture major elements of real-life clinical reasoning, as in the example of fever 
and otitis media. True scientific discovery, where an infinite number of theories might 
explain mysterious phenomena, is generally the more creative undertaking of these two. 
Clinical reasoning merely requires the selection of a diagnostic hypothesis from a finite 
database to explain findings.  These two different types of inference have also been 29
called “abduction to an unknown kind” (a novel scientific theory), and “abduction to a 
known kind” (preferring one of several possible diagnoses).  30
!
From the time of its first being described, abductive reasoning has also been posited as a 
representation of legal reasoning. Philosopher Gilbert Harman’s 1965 paper includes three 
examples of the use of “inferences to the best explanation”.  One is the theory of 31
subatomic particles mentioned above; the other two are the identification of an offender by 
a detective, and the credibility of a witness in court. Expert evidence in court has also in 
recent years been scrutinised, within a framework of argumentation which encompasses 
abductive reasoning.  32
 Josephson JR and Josephson SG (eds), Abductive Inference: Computation, Philosophy, 27
Technology (Cambridge University Press, 1994) p 14.
 Harman, n 24.28
 Magnani L, “Basic science reasoning and clinical reasoning intertwined: Epistemological 29
analysis and consequences for medical education” (1997) 2 Advances in Health Sciences 
Education 115.  
 Johansson and Lynoe, n 3, Ch 4.6.30
 Harman, n 24.31
 Walton, n 23, pp 157-160. 32
See also Walton DN, “Visualization tools, argumentation schemes and expert opinion evidence in 
law” (2007) 6 Law, Probability and Risk 119.
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Long before the role of abductive reasoning in legal arguments was elucidated in 
theoretical terms, courts of law determined decisions based on consideration of competing 
hypotheses.  The High Court in Peacock v The King [1911] 13 CLR 619 spelt out the 33
correct approach in a murder trial where the Crown case relies on circumstantial evidence: 
!
it is the usual practice to direct the jury that it is their duty to acquit the prisoner if there is 
any reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence. [620] !
The force of circumstantial evidence being exclusive in its nature, and the mere 
coincidence of the hypotheses with the circumstance being in the abstract insufficient, 
unless they exclude every other supposition, it is essential to inquire with the most 
scrupulous attention what other hypotheses there may be which may agree wholly or 
partially with the facts in evidence… Such is the complexity of human affairs, so infinite 
the combinations of circumstances, that a true hypothesis which is capable of explaining 
and reconciling all the apparently conflicting circumstances may escape the acutest 
penetration… [629] !!
Confirmation and falsification: Popper 
!
The ideas of philosopher Karl Popper revolutionised the understanding of science and the 
scientific method in the mid-20th century.  He argued that the feature which distinguishes 34
science from other fields of human enquiry is that it produces theories which can be 
“falsified”. A truly scientific theory is specific and concrete enough that if certain real-world 
observations are made then the theory will be disproved. This definition leads to an 
inevitable conclusion, which Popper embraced: that no scientific theory can ever be 
completely verified as unassailable truth. All scientific theories are useful theories until 
such time as they are falsified. 
!
Popper contrasted “unscientific” theories of psychoanalysis with Einstein’s scientific 
theories of relativity. He argued that any observation of any sort was easily interpreted as 
conforming with a psychoanalytic theory of his day by its advocates, and were often 
presented by them as further evidence to confirm their theory. Adherents of these theories 
never specified any potential future observations which, if encountered, would falsify their 
 Gardner-Medwin T, “What probability should a jury address?” (2005) 2 Significance 9.33
 Popper KR, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Routledge, 1959). 34
See also Godfrey-Smith, n 13, Ch 4.
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theory. He used the examples of a man intentionally drowning a child, and a man risking 
his life trying to save a drowning child; both actions could be explained with equal ease 
and conviction by psychoanalytic theories of the day.  35
!
Few philosophers or scientists today would argue that all of Popper’s analysis on all 
aspects of scientific discovery were accurate and complete. But the influence of this 
central idea, the “falsifiability” of a scientific theory, endures. In 1993 the Supreme Court of 
the United States handed down a landmark ruling on scientific evidence, Daubert v Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals 509 US 579, defining the standards by which expert scientific 
evidence should be admitted in US federal courts.  A central plank of that standard is a 36
theory’s “falsifiability”. Few common law jurisdictions have adopted a uniform approach to 
scientific evidence in this way.  37
!
Clinical reasoning benefits from Popper’s insights without necessarily replicating the 
scientific method in entirety. Clinicians probably generally follow parallel processes of 
trying to confirm one or more hypotheses while trying to falsify others.  The conclusions 38
reached are most often probabilistic and not outright verification or rejection of a diagnostic 
hypothesis. A clinician does not need to conclude that the probability of a child with fever 
having meningitis is 100% in order to proceed with lumbar puncture. 
!
Notwithstanding clear differences between bedside clinical reasoning and panoramic 
scientific theories, one axiom from the Popperian model of scientific understanding is also 
critical in clinical practice. “Confirming” a hypothesis to a clinician’s satisfaction does not 
itself disprove an alternative hypothesis. In a child with fever, otitis media and bacterial 
meningitis may both be present. 
!
 Popper KR, Conjectures and refutations: The growth of scientific knowledge (Routledge, 1963) 35
pp 34-35.
 See also Foster KR and Huber PW, Judging Science: Scientific Knowledge and the Federal 36
Courts (MIT Press, 1999) Ch 3.
 See Edmond G, “Specialised knowledge, the exclusionary discretions and reliability: 37
Reassessing incriminating expert opinion evidence” (2008) 31 UNSW Law Journal 1; Bourke J, 
“Misapplied science: Unreliability in scientific test evidence, Part II” (1993) 10 Australian Bar 
Review 183.
 Kyriacou DN, “Evidence-based medical decision making: Deductive versus inductive logical 38
thinking” (2004) 11 Academic Emergency Medicine 670; Federspil G and Vettor R, “Clinical and 
laboratory logic” (1999) 280 Clinica Chimica Acta 25.
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Again it can be seen that legal reasoning has been imbued with these concepts from long 
before clinical reasoning became a subject of academic discourse. In 1911, while Karl 
Popper was attending school in imperial Vienna, the Chief Justice of the High Court of 
Australia was spelling out the essential importance of inquiring with the most scrupulous 
attention what hypotheses, other than the guilt of the accused, might agree wholly or 
partially with the facts in evidence: 
!
The effect may be on the one hand to suggest a view of the case which consists 
with the innocence of the accused, and which might otherwise have escaped 
observation. On the other hand its effect may be to narrow the question to the 
consideration whether that statement be or be not excluded and falsified by the 
evidence.  39!
In doing so, Griffith CJ quoted from the “undoubted authority” Starkie on Evidence, 
published in 1842. 
!
The best known miscarriage of justice in Australia’s history is the conviction of Lindy 
Chamberlain for the murder of her infant daughter in 1982.  In 1988 her conviction was 40
quashed, after a Royal Commission  was held into her conviction and that of her 41
husband. Among other questions, the Royal Commission examined the consistency of the 
sum of the evidence with “the dingo hypothesis” (p 329): 
!
It is impossible in the above summary to capture the whole effect of the voluminous 
evidence given on the matters which bear upon the dingo hypothesis but, taken in 
its entirety, it falls far short of proving that Azaria was not taken by a dingo. Indeed, 
the evidence affords considerable support for the view that a dingo may have taken 
her. To examine the evidence to see whether it has been proved that a dingo took 
Azaria would be to make the fundamental error of reversing the onus of proof and 
requiring Mrs Chamberlain to prove her innocence. (pp 338-339) !
On the strictest application of a falsification approach, only evidence which falsified the 
“dingo hypothesis” in the minds of the jury should have led to a conviction. No amount of 
 Peacock v The King [1911] 13 CLR 619 at [628].39
 Chamberlain v The Queen (No 2) [1984] 153 CLR 521.40
 Morling TR, Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Chamberlain Convictions 41
(Commonwealth of Australia, 1987).
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evidence which “confirmed” the hypothesis of murder should have circumvented this 
requirement. 
!
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1.2 The logical basis of injury interpretation in children 
!
“I think in cases of physical injury the court relies heavily on the medical 
evidence.” (Paediatrician informant 5) 
!
* * * * * 
!
The following analysis is primarily related to forensic medical opinions, i.e. opinions 
provided to assist in the investigation of suspected child abuse by a state authority, or to 
assist a court of law. This clinical exercise must be distinguished from the question of 
whether a clinician who treats a child for their injury should notify authorities of a suspicion 
of child abuse. Many points in this analysis are equally applicable to either exercise, but for 
some issues the distinction between these exercises is important. 
!
!
Plausibility of stated mechanism of injury 
!
Officers of a state child protection agency, police officers, and lawyers will at times seek a 
medical opinion regarding a child’s injury. The doctor may be asked “Has this child been 
physically abused?”, or “Is this injury ‘innocently’ explained?” 
!
To address questions of this sort, the hypothesis that “The child’s injury was caused in the 
accidental manner described by the child’s caregiver” may be tested.  The exercise is an 42
archetypal instance of abductive reasoning. The phenomenon observed (the inescapable 
pathology of the child’s injury) requires an explanation. 
!
At the outset at least two competing hypotheses present themselves. The first is the one 
stated above, that the injury occurred in the way the caregiver has stated, accidentally. An 
alternative hypothesis is that the injury has been inflicted by an adult, and that the account 
 See Skellern C and Donald TG, “Suspicious childhood injury: Formulation of forensic 42
opinion” (2011) 47 Journal of Paediatrics and Child Health 771; Hobbs CJ and Bilo RAC, 
“Nonaccidental trauma: Clinical aspects and epidemiology of child abuse” (2009) 39 Pediatric 
Radiology 457; Mok JYQ, “Non-accidental injury in children- An update” (2008) 39 Injury 978; 
Dubowitz H and Bennett S, “Physical abuse and neglect of children” (2007) 369 Lancet 1891, p 
1892.
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given of an accidental mechanism is false. The hypothesis that the “injury” is actually a 
manifestation of a medical disease must always be carefully considered. 
!
Published guidance for forensic clinicians recommends the early generation of a multitude 
of hypotheses, if a clinician is not to jump to a false conclusion. A 2012 article by Australian 
paediatricians, which defined standards for the forensic evaluation of childhood injury, 
included the recommendation that report writers address 
!
Why the physical findings are not considered the result of an underlying disease 
condition or predisposition but secondary to injury; and 
Other possible mechanisms of injury that would normally be associated with the 
production of such an injury and the relevance or otherwise of such considerations 
in the particular case.  43!
Similarly, in regard to expert evidence given in child protection proceedings, the Family 
Division of the High Court of England and Wales, in A Local Authority v K, D, L [2005] 
EWHC 144 (Fam), issued guidance that medical experts should be asked to 
!
i) identify possible causes of the relevant death, injuries or harm setting out in 
respect of each the reasons why it might be a cause and thus why it should be 
considered, 
ii) state their views as to the likelihood of each possibility being the cause of the 
relevant death, injuries or harm and the reasons why they include or reject it as a 
reasonable… possible cause, 
iii) compare the likelihood of the cause (or causes) identified as reasonable 
possibilities being the actual cause of the relevant death, injuries or harm, 
iv) state whether they consider that a cause (or causes) is (are) the most likely 
cause (or causes) of the relevant death, injuries or harm and their reasons for that 
view, and 
v) state whether they consider that a cause (or causes) is (are) more likely than not 
to be the cause (or causes) of the relevant death, injuries or harm and their reasons 
for that view. [89] !
Most often a clinician’s conclusion regarding the plausibility of a reported accidental 
mechanism causing the injury seen will rely heavily on inductive reasoning. The clinician’s 
own experience, or their familiarity with the medical literature regarding such mechanisms 
 Skellern C and Donald TG, “Defining standards for medico-legal reports in forensic evaluation of 43
suspicious childhood injury” (2012) 19 Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine 267, p 268.
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and injuries, will form the basis for the inference they draw about a particular case before 
them. 
!
Perhaps the least contentious inference which an expert could make is in regard to any 
type of injury which is commonly sustained accidentally. A hairline spiral fracture of the 
distal tibia is sustained accidentally so often by children between the ages of one and 
three that the injury has its own medical nickname, the “toddlers’ fracture”.  It would be 44
unusual for this injury to lead to concern if any accidental account of it was given. The 
hypothesis that the fracture was caused by the accidental mechanism described would 
appear plausible for a wide range of possible histories, commensurate with the wide range 
of previous accidental histories which have been accepted as causing a similar fracture in 
the past. 
!
Some authors have argued that this general starting point is most appropriate even for the 
most complex cases. A clinician should first scrutinise whether the injury could plausibly 
have been caused by the reported accidental mechanism. If the clinician concludes that it 
could have, then that opinion completes the assessment. By this approach, concerns of 
psychosocial adversity in particular should be kept out of the clinician’s mind until the 
injury-mechanism plausibility has been decided.  45
!
This approach can be distinguished from other hypothesis-testing options available. A 
clinician could try to confirm the hypothesis that a child’s injury was caused by abuse. This 
may be most tempting when a type of injury is found which has often been found in cases 
of definite child abuse and rarely found in cases of definite accident. This approach has 
repeatedly been found wanting. 
!
Another approach which historically has not served children well is one starting from the 
premise that a clinician, faced with a child’s injury, has only two hypotheses available to 
 Dunbar JS et al, “Obscure tibial fracture of infants- The toddler’s fracture” (1964) 15 Journal of 44
the Canadian Association of Radiologists 146.
 Donald TG and Byard RW, “Correspondence: The risk of child abuse in infants and toddlers with 45
lower extremity injuries” (2005) 40 Journal of Pediatric Surgery 1972 ; Skellern and Donald, n 43, p 
268.
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explain it: that the injury was caused accidentally in exactly the way reported by the 
caregiver, or that the injury was inflicted by that caregiver or some other adult.  46
!
This false dichotomy was addressed by the Court of Appeal (Crim) of England and Wales, 
in R v Cannings [2004] EWCA Crim 01. In that matter a mother was charged with the 
murder of two of her own infant children. At trial a number of medical witnesses had given 
evidence that the infants’ deaths were not readily explained by a medical cause. The 
mother was convicted. The convictions were subsequently quashed by the Court of 
Appeal, after hearing new medical evidence. In doing so the Court recorded this reflection 
regarding the rare occurrence of multiple infant deaths in the same family: 
!
One approach is to examine each death to see whether it is possible to identify one 
or other of the known natural causes of infant death. If this cannot be done, the rarity 
of such incidents in the same family is thought to raise a very powerful inference that 
the deaths must have resulted from deliberate harm. The alternative approach is to 
start with the same fact, that three unexplained deaths in the same family are indeed 
rare, but thereafter to proceed on the basis that if there is nothing to explain them, in 
our current state of knowledge at any rate, they remain unexplained, and still, 
despite the known fact that some parents do smother their infant children, possible 
natural deaths. [10] !
!
Injury interpretation: Inductive inferences 
!
Concluding that a toddler’s “toddler’s fracture” occurred by accident would be a 
straightforward task, were clinicians ever asked their opinion on the cause of one. More 
severe, complex, and uncommon injuries are expected to arise from accidents involving 
very high force (e.g. motor vehicle accidents, falls from 10 metres or more). No forensic 
medical opinion is needed in these cases either. It is the assessment of less spectacular 
injuries which are not seen as often and which do not arise as routinely from accidents, 
which poses the real clinical challenge. And it is in the case of a less typical pattern of 
injury that a medical opinion is most likely to be sought. 
!
In Table 1 examples are provided of inferences which clinicians might make, from their 
own experience or published reports, and how those inferences might be applied to a 
 Skellern and Donald, n 42, p 772.46
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specific case which they assess. It is far from comprehensive; the protean nature of 
accidental injury defies systematic order. 
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Table 1. Examples of inferences made from past experience or reports of childhood 
injuries
Past observation(s) Generalising inference
Application of 
inference to 
individual new case
Examples
A specific type of injury 
has often been caused 
by a distinctive 
accidental mechanism
A particular distinctive 
accidental mechanism 
can cause this 
particular type of injury
Strongly supports the 
hypothesis of 
accidental cause in a 
case with similar injury 
and similar distinctive 
mechanism
Soft tissue injury to 
head in 7 month old 
infant caused by infant 
rolling and falling from 
change table
A specific, commonly 
occurring accidental 
mechanism has only 
rarely or never caused 
serious injury
Any one instance of 
the particular 
mechanism is unlikely 
to cause serious injury
Modestly undermines 
the hypothesis of 
accidental cause in a 
case with serious 
injury and that 
particular mechanism
Serious injury caused 
by a fall from bed
A specific type of injury 
has uncommonly been 
caused by various 
accidental 
mechanisms
Some accidental 
mechanisms can 
cause this specific 
type of injury, but one 
instance of a similar 
accidental mechanism 
will only rarely cause 
this injury
Modestly supports the 
hypothesis of 
accidental cause in a 
case with a similar 
specific injury and one 
of a number of 
particular accidental 
mechanisms
Retinal haemorrhages 
in child <18 months 
age caused by 
household accident 
(fall from height, 
television fall on 
child)
Abuse has caused a 
distinctive type of 
injury many times
Abuse can cause this 
distinctive type of 
injury
Strongly supports the 
hypothesis of abuse 
as the cause in a case 
with this distinctive 
type of injury
“Classic metaphyseal 
lesions” of long bones; 
posterior rib fractures 
in an infant
An accidental 
mechanism has never 
or only rarely caused a 
distinctive type of 
injury
Any one instance of an 
accidental mechanism 
cannot or will only very 
rarely cause this 
distinctive type of 
injury
Strongly undermines 
the hypothesis of 
accidental cause in a 
case with this 
distinctive type of 
injury
“Classic metaphyseal 
lesions” of long bones; 
posterior rib fractures 
in an infant
Chapter 1
    47 48 49 50
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
 Pickett, W et al, “Injuries experienced by infant children: A population-based epidemiological 47
analysis” (2003) 111 Pediatrics e365, e368.
 Helfer RE, Slovis TL and Black M, “Injuries resulting when small children fall out of bed” (1977) 48
60 Pediatrics 533; Nimityongskul P and Anderson LD, “Likelihood of injuries when children fall out 
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For a contrary view see Hennrikus WL, Shaw BA and Gerardi JA, “Injuries when children 
reportedly fall from a bed or couch” (2003) 407 Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research 148.
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Additional occult injuries: Abductive inferences 
!
If, in a case of suspected child abuse, an additional injury is found which appears 
unrelated to the index injury, this finding may constitute supporting evidence that the index 
injury was caused by abuse.  The inference appears especially compelling if the 51
additional injury, which would otherwise not have come to light, appears to be of a different 
age to the index injury, or is an injury which is considered specific to abuse. The potential 
significance of the finding of additional injury is such that screening examinations or 
investigations may be conducted for this very purpose. An example is the radiological 
"skeletal survey”, in which an infant's entire skeleton is imaged in a series of specific 
radiographs performed to detect bony injuries associated with abuse.  52
!
The reasoning which underpins this exercise is essentially abductive reasoning. If a 
second injury is found then the clinician must consider what hypothesis best accounts for 
the presence of both injuries. The first hypothesis to be considered is that both injuries 
were caused by abuse, during either the same or separate episodes of abuse. This is an 
application of “Occam’s razor” (the law of parsimony).  By this principle, if two separate 53
phenomena can be explained by one cause then that cause should be preferred over the 
postulation of two separate causes for them. This principle follows common sense and is 
also routinely applied in clinical practice. 
!
It is however also fallible. It has failed clinicians often enough that medicine has responded 
with a principle of its own, “Hickam’s dictum”. This is the principle that “patients can have 
as many diseases as they damn well please”. Sarcoidosis may be a very uncommon 
disease, and histoplasmosis, which can present with similar signs, even more rare. But if 
enough patients suffering histoplasmosis come under the care of a doctor in the 
information age, one of them will eventually be found to have also separately developed 
 Laskey AL, Sheridan MJ and Hymel KP, “Physicians’ initial forensic impressions of hypothetical 51
cases of pediatric traumatic brain injury” (2007) 31 Child Abuse and Neglect 329; Mok, n 42, p 979.
 Wood JN et al, “Development of guidelines for skeletal survey in young children with 52
fractures” (2014) 134 Pediatrics 45.
 Mani N, “What Three Wise Men have to say about diagnosis” (2011) 343 BMJ d7769.53
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sarcoidosis, without a ready explanation from modern medicine for this conjunction of 
oddities.  54
!
The relevance of some findings in some contexts will be indisputable. One can consider a 
hypothetical case of a 3 month old infant who is brought into hospital with a sore and 
swollen arm, and is found to have a fresh spiral fracture of the humerus. The history given 
by the parents to explain it sounds improbable but not impossible. A skeletal survey is 
undertaken and this demonstrates seven posterior rib fractures, with healing changes of at 
least one week's age. It would be difficult to argue that the presence of the old rib fractures 
should in no way influence the clinician’s opinion as to the likely cause of the humeral 
fracture. 
!
Many cases are not as clear-cut as this, however. Awareness of the possibility of child 
abuse, in both clinicians and the general public, is now wider than in previous decades. In 
1969 South Australia was the first Australian state to introduce legislation which mandated 
members of certain professions to report any case of suspected child abuse to 
authorities.  The frequency of actions taken in response to these concerns, such as the 55
notification of a state child protection agency, has skyrocketed in recent years.  Medical 56
expertise, along with associated investigative technology, is now more widely accessible to 
child protection agencies, just as it is to the public. 
!
A relatively new development has been the recognition of occult head injury in very young 
children who show evidence of physical abuse but no signs of head injury.  This has led 57
to the recommendation that clinicians consider neuroimaging in such cases, a practice 
which was not previously undertaken. Meanwhile, research programmes quietly set out on 
 Gupta N et al, “Occam’s Razor or Hickam’s Dictum?” (2012) 19 Journal of Bronchology and 54
Interventional Pulmonology 216.
 Harries M and Clare M, “Report for the Western Australian Child Protection Council- Mandatory 55
reporting of child abuse: Evidence and options” (University of Western Australia, 2002).
 Carmody T, Taking Responsibility: A Roadmap for Queensland Child Protection (Queensland 56
Child Protection Commission of Inquiry, 2013) p 4.
 Rubin DM et al, “Occult head injury in high-risk abused children” (2003) 111 Pediatrics 1382 ; 57
Laskey AL et al, “Occult head trauma in young suspected victims of physical abuse” (2004) 144 
Journal of Pediatrics 719.
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the logical next leg of the scientific journey- the detection of occult head injury by means of 
a single blood test.  58
!
An interesting parallel to this circumstance is provided by the growing body of literature on 
“incidental findings” from medical investigations.  Harm which may potentially arise from 59
over-inclusive screening has recently led to vigorous controversy in the scientific 
discussion of screening for breast cancer,  and for prostate cancer.  60 61
!
A skeletal survey cannot be strictly characterised as a screening procedure, since it is not 
conducted across an entire population. An injury which is found on skeletal survey is not a 
truly “incidental” finding. Skeletal survey is however a screening test insofar as it looks for 
pathology which has not given clinical cause for concern. Scientific understanding of the 
significance of finding a number of uncommon and distinctive injuries in children has 
changed over time. The detection of an occult injury may still be incidental to the purpose 
of the overall clinical exercise, if it cannot be confidently said that the injury detected was 
caused by abuse. 
!
The more cases of childhood injury in which additional occult injury is sought, and the 
more widely the net is cast in those searches, the more a clinician might bump up against 
“the prosecutor’s fallacy”.  62
!
This fallacy is the invalid inference that an event which occurs only rarely in a particular 
setting has an alternative explanation for its occurrence which is more likely than the mere 
explanation of its rare occurrence in that setting. It can be illustrated with this example. 
The Attorney-General of an Australian state lives on the same street as an electrician, who 
 Berger RP et al, “Multiplex assessment of serum biomarker concentrations in well-appearing 58
children with inflicted traumatic brain injury” (2009) 65 Pediatric Research 97.
 Pierce SR et al, “Incidental findings during functional magnetic resonance imaging: Ethical and 59
procedural issues” (2009) 88 American Journal of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation 275.
 Gotzsche PC, “Mammography screening: truth, lies, and controversy” (2012) 380 Lancet 218.60
 Gomella LG et al, “Screening for prostate cancer: the current evidence and guidelines 61
controversy” (2011) 18 Canadian Journal of Urology 5875.
 See Fenton N and Neil M, “Avoiding probabilistic reasoning fallacies in Legal practice using 62
Bayesian networks” (2011) 36 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 114; Westreich D and Iliinsky 
N, “Epidemiology visualized: The prosecutor’s fallacy” 179 American Journal of Epidemiology 
1125.
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he knows is also a member of a bikie gang. One morning he sees the electrician drive off 
to work in a Lamborghini rather than the old motorcycle on which the Attorney-General is 
accustomed to seeing the tradesman ride. The Attorney-General knows that it is rare for 
an electrician to drive an elite performance vehicle, and thus concludes that the car was 
purchased from the ill-gotten gains of bikie gang criminal activity. In his own car driving to 
work, however, the Attorney-General hears a news report that the winner of the weekend’s 
lottery prize of several millions dollars was the very same electrician. The prosecutor’s 
fallacy refuted, the Attorney-General realises that the tradesman’s new wealth does not 
constitute new evidence of “bikie gangs out of control”. 
!
It is exceedingly rare for an electrician to win the lottery. It is however also exceedingly 
rare for any individual in any occupation to win the lottery. But every few weeks an 
occurrence as rare as this does occur, and will for as long as the lottery runs. 
!
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1.3 Representational theories in the study of childhood injury 
!
“I think it can be adequately explained. I think people generally think about 
injuries to heads… they just think about impact and they don’t think about the 
other forces that are involved and what that actually does to the brain. You 
can explain it, like it is something that you can explain if you use the right 
words, and it needs to be explained because the general public don’t 
understand the forces…”  (Paediatrician informant 6) 
!
* * * * * 
!
Representational theories: Inflicted head injury 
!
Medical opinions given on the cause of a child’s injury will not rely solely on inductive or 
abductive reasoning. Medical opinions are not sought only because doctors have read 
more published research on childhood injury, or are authorised to order medical 
investigations. Medical opinions are sought partly because the knowledge which some 
doctors possess regarding children, their bodies and their behaviour, is deep and detailed. 
Biomechanical understanding of a child’s living tissue, and the typical response of it to 
mechanical trauma, is an area in which many doctors who work with children are likely to 
hold genuine expertise. 
!
An example of a biomechanical model or theory which is often referenced during a medical 
assessment of suspected child abuse is that of inflicted head injury in an infant. A 
commonly used but controversial name for this entity is “Shaken Baby Syndrome”.  This 63
“syndrome” is generally invoked on detection in a critically ill infant, of the triad of: 
!
• encephalopathy (a clinical finding of depressed mental state) 
• subdural haemorrhage (bleeding between the brain and the skull), and  
• retinal haemorrhages !
 Duhaime A, “Calling things what they are” (2009) 3 Journal of Neurosurgery- Pediatrics 472; 63
Narang S and Clarke J, “Abusive Head Trauma: Past, Present, and Future” (2014) Journal of Child 
Neurology 0883073814549995.
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Like many medical syndromes this distinctive combination of pathologies was recognised 
(often alongside bony injury) for decades, before plausible theories were advanced to 
explain what types of forces could cause this constellation of findings, and why they were 
more typical of inflicted than accidental injury.  The development of this theory over time 64
has followed stages which are typical of scientific progress. 
!
The explanatory model which Dr Ann-Christine Duhaime set out in 1998  prevails in 65
mainstream clinical and forensic medical understanding today.  The crucial insight which 66
this representation incorporates is that a force applied to an infant’s brain which is 
“rotational” or “angular” will cause much more material damage and clinical disturbance to 
an infant than a force which is “translational”. Rotational/angular forces are those “applied 
to the head that result in a rotation of the brain about its center of gravity”. Translational 
forces are those which result in a “straight-line movement of the center of gravity” of the 
infant brain.  This understanding is underpinned by the findings of experiments conducted 67
on squirrel monkeys and chimpanzees in the 1960s and 1970s, in which the different 
effects of these forces on the primate brain were studied.  68
!
The devastation caused by rotational forces, as compared to translational forces, is 
believed to be mediated through their “shearing” effect on living brain tissue:  69
!
It is the sudden angular deceleration experienced by the brain and cerebral vessels, 
not the specific contact forces applied to the surface of the head, that results in the 
 Al-Holou WN et al, “Nonaccidental head injury in children: Historical vignette” (2009) 3 Journal of 64
Neurosurgery- Pediatrics 474.
 Duhaime A et al, “Nonaccidental head injury in infants: The “Shaken-Baby Syndrome” (1998) 65
338 New England Journal of Medicine 1822.
 Christian CW and Block R, “Policy statement: Abusive head trauma in infants and 66
children” (2009) 123 Pediatrics 1409; Pinto PS et al, “The unique features of traumatic brain injury 
in children: Review of the characteristics of the pediatric skull and brain, mechanisms of trauma, 
patterns of injury, complications, and their imaging findings- Part 2” (2012) 22 Journal of 
Neuroimaging e18, e37.
 Duhaime, n 65, p 1822.67
 Ommaya AK and Gennarelli TA, “Cerebral concussion and traumatic unconsciousness” (1974) 68
97 Brain 633.
 Case ME, “Inflicted traumatic brain injury in infants and young children” (2008) 18 Brain 69
Pathology 571; Pinto, n 66.
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intracranial injury. This angular force is distinct from the forces generated in most 
cases of accidental trauma in infants.  70!
The effect of these forces is to cleave one layer of tissue from that below it: “Differential 
motion between the brain skull interface” can tear bridging veins and cause subdural 
haemorrhage (a histopathologically imprecise term).  The same forces cause catastrophic 71
“diffuse axonal injury” to neurons throughout the brain, often followed by neuronal death. 
Cerebral oedema (swelling of brain tissue) and hypoxia (low blood or tissue oxygen level) 
due to central respiratory depression can complicate the initial injury, just as in severe 
accidental head trauma.  72
!
Although incomplete, this is an extraordinarily specific and sophisticated representation of 
the mechanism by which forces inflicted on an infant’s body might cause the brain injuries 
seen. It is the product of conjectures and inferences made by practitioners accustomed to 
“getting their hands dirty”, whose foundation of knowledge is built out of their daily work 
and scientific discussion conducted on the same “material” for other purposes, in line with 
the service demands of the general public. To date this understanding has relied heavily 
on the study of real-life cases of children who have been injured, many fatally, through a 
range of accidental and inflicted mechanisms. Notwithstanding a few macabre 
exceptions,  traditional scientific experimentation in the area remains impossible. 73
!
One troublesome question which remains unresolved is that of the proposed mechanism 
of shaking alone. How often or easily can shaking on its own lead to this pattern of 
catastrophic brain injury? Do most or all cases involve some impact also (an impact which 
in some way generates a high rotational force, unlike most accidents)? Biomechanical 
studies using anthropomorphic dolls have generally failed to demonstrate that shaking 
alone can generate forces which are as high as shaking with impact.  It is difficult to 74
 Duhaime, n 65, p 1822.  70
See also Case ME, “Accidental traumatic head injury in infants and young children” (2008) 18 
Brain Pathology 583.
 Case, n 69, p 572.71
 Case, n 70.72
 Miltner E and Kallieris D, “Quasi-static and dynamic bending tests of the infantile thigh in order to 73
produce a femur fracture” (1989) 102 Zeitschrift für Rechtsmedizin 535.
 Duhaime A, “The shaken baby syndrome: A clinical, pathological, and biomechanical 74
study” (1987) 66 Journal of Neurosurgery 409.
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square this lack of evidence with the many accounts given over many years by 
perpetrators who have confessed, in which they have only described shaking of the infant 
victim, often vigorously denying any impact injury.   75
!
Further theories have been postulated to explain this anomaly, such as the conjecture that 
an infant’s head may alternately strike his or her own chest (chin) and back (occiput) when 
he or she is shaken, so weak is the infant neck musculature.  Another proposed theory 76
which would link the mechanism of shaking alone to the typical severe pathology seen is 
that shaken tissue, due to inherent mechanical properties, generates its own “harmonic” 
amplification of the shaking force, resulting in higher destructive forces overall than one 
shake alone could generate.  77
!
“Auxiliary hypotheses” such as these are characteristic of the evolution of scientific 
theories and understanding. Imre Lakatos, philosopher of science and protégé of the 
Popper, used this phrase to describe this type of modest post hoc theory, postulated in 
order to explain findings which would otherwise threaten to falsify the “hard core” of an 
overarching theory.  78
!
It is of course possible that there is no actual anomaly which requires explanation. The 
basic science of biomechanical study of the infant brain may currently be so preliminary 
that researchers have not yet succeeded in designing an anthropomorphic model with 
sufficient “biofidelity” (close enough in its physical properties to the reality) to behave as 
living tissue does. Some current biomechanical research programmes endeavour to lay 
 Adamsbaum C et al, “Abusive head trauma: Judicial admissions highlight violent and repetitive 75
shaking” (2010) 126 Pediatrics 546; Starling SP, “Analysis of perpetrator admissions to inflicted 
traumatic brain injury in children” (2004) 158 Archives of pediatrics and adolescent medicine 454.
 Bell E, Shouldice M and Levin AV, “Abusive head trauma: A perpetrator confesses” (2010) 35 76
Child Abuse and Neglect 74, pp 75-76.
 Dias MS, “Abstracts for the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Society of Pediatric 77
Neurosurgeons, Paper 7: The case for shaking in shaken baby syndrome” (2006) 104 Journal of 
Neurosurgery- Pediatrics A217; Isaac R and Jenny C, “Shaken Baby Syndrome” (Encyclopedia on 
Early Childhood Development, 2004).
 Lakatos I, “Criticism and the methodology of scientific research programmes” (1968) 69 78
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 149.
 Pierce MC and Bertocci G, “Injury biomechanics and child abuse” (2008) 10 Annual Review of 79
Biomedical Engineering 85.
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those basic science building blocks,  reminiscent of William Harvey constructing his 79
theory of human blood circulation from the ground up. 
!
What is no longer questioned by experts in mainstream clinical and forensic practice is 
whether this pattern of injury has usually been inflicted by an adult, or whether it might 
sometimes be caused unwittingly in the course of normal care of a child. On this almost all 
the medical profession agrees: almost always it has been inflicted by an adult, and it is 
never caused by routine domestic activities.  80
!
In 2001 this view was seriously challenged by the publication of research findings which in 
the contention of their author, Dr Jennian Geddes, demonstrated an alternative 
explanation to inflicted trauma, for the signs seen in the brain of children post mortem.  81
The research received more serious attention from both scientific experts and courts of law 
than previous critiques of the theory; Geddes was an experienced neuropathologist who 
led a team of distinguished medical researchers. They argued that the primary pathology 
in most of these children was hypoxia, possibly due to trauma to the cervical (neck) spinal 
cord leading to cessation of breathing. Based on that hypothesis, Geddes proposed that to 
cause the findings typical of inflicted infant head injury “it may not be necessary to shake 
an infant very violently” and that “it is possible that the severe acceleration-deceleration 
injury that is so often cited does not in fact occur in shaken-baby syndrome”.  These 82
studies were followed in 2003 by a report which became known as “Geddes III”, in which 
the author proposed that “Hypoxia with brain swelling would…provide a unified hypothesis 
for the clinical and neuropathological findings in cases of infant head injury, without impact 
or considerable force being necessary.”  83
!
 Christian and Block, n 66; Case, n 69; Duhaime, n 65.80
 Geddes JF et al, “Neuropathology of inflicted head injury in children I. Patterns of brain 81
damage” (2001) 124 Brain 1290 ; Geddes JF et al, “Neuropathology of inflicted head injury in 
children II. Microscopic brain injury in infants” (2001) 124 Brain 1299.
 Geddes “II”, n 81, p 1305.82
 Geddes JF et al, “Dural haemorrhage in non-traumatic infant deaths: does it explain the bleeding 83
in ‘shaken baby syndrome’?” (2003) 29 Neuropathology and Applied Neurobiology 14, p 14.
Chapter 1
Two years after the publication of “Geddes III” however, her research on the question 
came under the scrutiny of the Court of Appeal (Crim) of England and Wales, in R v Harris 
and Others [2005] EWCA Crim 1980: 
!
early on in the hearing it became apparent that substantial parts of the basis of the 
unified hypothesis could no longer stand. Dr Geddes… accepted that the unified 
hypothesis was never advanced with a view to being proved in court. She said that it 
was meant to stimulate debate. Further, she accepted that the hypothesis might not 
be quite correct; or as she put it: 
‘I think we might not have the theory quite right. I think possibly the emphasis on 
hypoxia- no, I think possibly we are looking more at raised pressure being the critical 
event.’  
And later in her evidence: 
‘Q. Dr Geddes, cases up and down the country are taking place where Geddes III is 
cited by the defence time and time again as the reason why the established theory 
is wrong.’ 
‘A. That I am very sorry about. It is not fact; it is hypothesis but, as I have already 
said, so is the traditional explanation. …. I would be very unhappy to think that 
cases were being thrown out on the basis that my theory was fact. We asked the 
editor if we could have ‘Hypothesis Paper’ put at the top and he did not, but we do 
use the word ‘hypothesis’ throughout.’ [58] !
In our judgment, it follows that the unified hypothesis can no longer be regarded as 
a credible or alternative cause of the triad of injuries. [69] !
The Court of Appeal in R v Harris directed the attention of the legal profession to the 
Family Division of the High Court of England and Wales (substituting “jury” for “judge”): 
!
Wall J… sitting in the Family Division also gave helpful guidance for experts giving 
evidence involving children (see Re AB (Child Abuse: Expert Witnesses) 1995 1 
FLR 181). Wall J pointed out that there will be cases in which there is a genuine 
disagreement on a scientific or medical issue, or where it is necessary for a party to 
advance a particular hypothesis to explain a given set of facts. He added… :‘Where 
that occurs, the jury will have to resolve the issue which is raised. … In my view, the 
expert who advances such a hypothesis owes a very heavy duty to explain to the 
court that what he is advancing is a hypothesis, that it is controversial (if it is) and 
placed before the court all material which contradicts the hypothesis. … It is the 
common experience of the courts that the better the experts the more limited their 
areas of disagreement, and in the forensic context of a contested case relating to 
Chapter 1
children, the objective of the lawyers and the experts should always be to limit the 
ambit of disagreement on medical issues to the minimum.’ 
…. 
In our judgment the guidance given by both Cresswell J and Wall J are very relevant 
to criminal proceedings and should be kept well in mind by both prosecution and 
defence. … In cases involving allegations of child abuse the judge should be 
prepared to give directions in respect of expert evidence taking into account the 
guidance to which we have just referred. [272], [273] !
Re AB,  cited in this passage, had involved evidence given by Dr Colin Paterson, 84
proponent of novel diagnosis “Temporary Brittle Bone Disease”; his legacy will be further 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
!
!
Representational theories: Child developmental abilities, Normal human behaviour 
!
Discussion thus far has covered cases where a child’s injury is not adequately explained 
by the description of how it was sustained. A variation of this conclusion is where the 
history given is considered to be developmentally implausible, i.e. the child could not have 
performed the actions which he or she is said to have, as he or she is incapable of 
performing those actions.  This observation has long been described as one which should 85
lead a clinician to consider abuse as the cause of injury.  86
!
The steps of reasoning which underpin this inference differ from those previously 
discussed. A clinician who bases a conclusion as to cause on this inference is not 
providing an opinion directly on whether an injury sustained could have been caused by 
the mechanism described. It is an opinion on whether the mechanism described could 
have occurred at all. At its heart it is an inference that the parent who gave the account 
might be lying- and why would a parent lie? 
!
 Medium neutral citation: Re AB [1994] EWHC Fam 5.84
 Kemp AM et al, “Patterns of skeletal fractures in child abuse: Systematic review” (2008) 337 85
BMJ a1518, p 7.
 Kemp AM, “Fractures in physical child abuse” (2008) 18 Paediatrics and Child Health 550, p 86
552; Mok, n 42, p 979 ; Dubowitz and Bennett, n 42, p 1892.
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Another unusual feature of this inference is that it relates to a hypothesis which is 
amenable to testing by experimentation, a rare quality in this field. A paediatrician holds 
indisputable expertise in normal childhood developmental abilities, but no expertise is 
infallible. One ingenious study  examined the ability of young children to climb into a 87
bathtub (and thus sustain an accidental scald injury), through the simple method of 
installing a bathtub in an outpatient examination room and placing toy boats on its floor. 
The youngest child able to climb in was 10 months old; 10-16% of children aged 11 to 13 
months managed the feat. These findings countered the uncited assertion made in a 
reference text that children cannot climb into a bathtub until they are 14 to 16 months old. 
!
A paediatrician’s opinion based on the developmental ability of a young child at least 
relates to the clinical work they perform day in and day out. In a different class again is an 
inference derived from the observation that a parent’s history is “vague”  or seems to 88
“vary on retelling”;  that there was a “significant delay in seeking medical attention”; or 89
that the clinician perceived “evasive or aggressive responses from parent when details of 
injury are sought”.  90
!
The inferences which can be drawn from these observations are more clearly inferences 
as to the truthfulness of a parent in explaining their child’s injury. The observations would 
not directly inform a clinical opinion on mechanism-injury plausibility. Harman, the 
philosopher whose 1965 paper sparked interest in “inferences to the best 
explanation” (abductive reasoning) gave this forensic example of such an inference: 
!
When we infer that a witness is telling the truth, our inference goes as follows: 
(i) we infer that he says what he does because he believes it; 
(ii) we infer that he believes what he does because he actually did witness the 
situation which he describes. 
 Allasio D and Fischer H, “Immersion scald burns and the ability of young children to climb into a 87
bathtub” (2005) 115 Pediatrics 1419.
 Mok, n 42, p 979.88
 Kemp, n 86, Table 1. 89
See also Dubowitz and Bennett, n 42, p 1892.
 Mok, n 42, p 979.90
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Our confidence fails if we come to think there is some other possible explanation for 
his testimony (if, for example, he stands to gain a great deal from our believing 
him).  91!
But detecting lies in the history given by the parent of a child patient is not a skill in which a 
paediatrician would generally be considered to be expert. A trainee in forensic psychiatry 
has reported the difficulty which he experienced, due to his personal reaction to the case, 
in deciding whether a man who had tried to strangle his one year old son had genuinely 
experienced psychosis at that time, or had instead concocted a story of auditory 
hallucinations and other symptoms in order to avoid criminal charges.  The title of that 92
report, “Countering countertransference”, reflects a cosmos of representations of human 
emotions and behaviours, arising from psychiatric theory. Many paediatricians would have 
little more expertise in this area than a lay person.  93
!
It should come as no surprise that courts of law and legal scholars have previously 
considered the utility of this type of inference: that if an individual has lied, then they are 
probably also lying about not having committed the crime with which they are charged. 
The Queensland Court of Criminal Appeal in 1994 documented its scepticism: 
!
The prosecution turns, as it nowadays so often does, to the theory that the accused 
manifested consciousness of her guilt by telling lies about what happened. In 
practical terms, what this seems to mean in a case like this is that, having examined 
the accused’s statements once in search of damaging admissions, it is necessary to 
examine them a second time with the idea in mind that any exculpatory matter they 
contain may really be evidence not of her innocence but of carefully concealed 
guilt.  94!
 Harman, n 24.91
 Sattar SP et al, “Countering countertransference: A forensic trainee’s dilemma” (2002) 30 92
Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 65.
 See F v The Queen [1995] 83 A Crim R 502.93
 Finn (unreported, Qld Court of Criminal Appeal, 4 February 1994) 20. 94
Cited in Hamer D, “‘Hoist with his own petard'? Guilty lies and ironic inferences in criminal 
proof” (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 377. 
See also Palmer A, “Guilt and the consciousness of guilt: The use of lies, flight and other ‘guilty 
behaviour’ in the investigation and prosecution of crime” (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law 
Review 95.
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“The ability of witnesses to convey the appropriate emotional state is vital to their 
credibility.”  In the previously discussed trial of Lindy Chamberlain for the murder of her 95
infant daughter “some reports suggested that the accused…. was convicted because her 
emotional demeanour during the trial was not that of a mother who had lost her child to a 
wild dog.” The eagerness with which much of the Australian media and public at the time 
became convinced of Chamberlain's deceit and her guilt (amid lurid rumours of religious 
sacrificial rites) are a key part of a story which now “sounds like a novel Kafka stopped 
writing because it was too nightmarish.”   96
!
New research clears the path to improved clinical opinions. A 2012 study  for the first time 97
reported time to medical care in children with limb fractures sustained accidentally. Of 206 
children aged under 6 years, 13% were brought to medical care more than 8 hours after 
injury and an additional 8% more than 24 hours after injury. 9% of these children did not 
initially cry, 12% continued using their injured limb, and 15% had no external sign of injury. 
It is likely that fewer articles in future years will include the observation of “delay in seeking 
medical care” in a list of “pointers to the diagnosis of child abuse”. 
!
Some recent authoritative references make no mention of suspicious parental behaviour or 
its putative value in recognising a case of child abuse.  The Australian authors of a 98
forensic medical article have questioned the wisdom of including comments on “adverse 
psycho-social factors” in a forensic report on a child’s injury.  The American Academy of 99
Pediatrics asserts that “The role of the pediatrician is not to apportion blame or investigate 
potential criminal activity…”  100
!
Here it is necessary to distinguish between the different purposes of the guidance provided 
by different published items. Entreaties that clinicians be alert to suspicious parental 
 Reilly A, “The heart of the matter: Emotion in criminal defences” (1997) 29 Ottawa Law Review 95
117, p 121.
 Free D, “How did we get it so wrong in the Azaria Chamberlain murder case?” The Australian 96
(July 21, 2012).
 Farrell C et al, “Symptoms and time to medical care in children with accidental extremity 97
fractures” (2012) 129 Pediatrics e128.
 Skellern and Donald, n 42, p 772.98
 Skellern and Donald, n 43, p 268.99
 Christian and Block, n 66, p 1410.100
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behaviour are more often found in guidance targeted at the many clinicians and members 
of the public who have little experience working with children, and little familiarity with the 
nature of child abuse. A major objective of these statements is that of “consciousness 
raising”  for a wider audience. 101
!
Today is the era of mandatory reporting of suspected child abuse by health care 
professionals, and of record numbers of children in foster care.  Whether consciousness-102
raising is as necessary today as it was in past years is open to question. What does 
appear crucial is that the intended audience, and the purpose of advice published by 
experts on the topic of child abuse, is clear to both author and reader. 
 Elder D, “Physical injury in young children: The differential diagnosis must include child 101
abuse” (2005) 41 Journal of Paediatrics and Child Health 473.
 Carmody, n 56, [2.6].102
Chapter 2: Progress in the scientific understanding of injuries to 
children 
!
!
2.1 The Classic Metaphyseal Lesion 
!
2.2 Femoral fracture in a young child 
!
!
Outline of chapter 
!
The medical understanding of inflicted injuries in children has developed only recently, 
compared to other areas of medical knowledge, and has proceeded through clear stages. 
Classic Metaphyseal Lesions (CMLs), abnormalities at the ends of long bones, were first 
recognised as having been caused by trauma in the 1950s, and a few years later were 
recognised as being highly specific for abuse as their cause. Their mechanism of cause 
was initially believed to be avulsion of a chip of bone due to direct twisting and pulling. 
Kleinman’s meticulous research overturned this theory, demonstrating that they represent 
complete discs at the end of long bones which may in some cases be sheared off during 
violent shaking of an infant, without direct contact with the limb being necessary. 
!
Case series of very young children with femoral fractures have failed to identify other 
morphological features which in isolation strongly suggest abuse as their cause, as CMLs 
do. Many of these studies show similar, instructive, methodological limitations. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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2.1 The Classic Metaphyseal Lesion 
!
 
“Virtually diagnostic” 
!
“Pathognomonic” is a term which in medical communication is usually reserved for a 
situation of certainty. Dorland’s Medical Dictionary defines the word as “a sign or symptom 
on which a diagnosis can be made”.  Some types of injury detected in children have 1
previously been described as pathognomonic of abuse as their cause. These include 
posterior rib fractures,  retinal haemorrhages in a particular pattern,  and “classic 2 3
metaphyseal lesions” (CMLs). 
!
CMLs are small areas of bone seen at the corner or end of either end of a long bone (i.e. 
the bones of the thigh, lower leg, upper arm or forearm: femur, tibia, humerus, radius, 
ulna). Due to their appearance on radiograph, CMLs are also called “corner fractures” or 
“bucket-handle fractures” (Figs 1, 2). They were first explicitly recognised as a sign of 
trauma in 1953.  Dr Frederick Silverman noted their similarity to previously reported 4
findings in newborns who were born by breech presentation (where the newborn’s legs will 
often be forcefully pulled during delivery) (p 423).  Silverman also speculated on the 5
possible accidental mechanism of a parent suddenly grabbing and pulling a child’s arm or 
leg, either to save them from a serious fall, or in play (p 425). !!
!
!
!
 Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary (32nd ed, Elsevier, 2012).1
 Bulloch B et al, “Cause and clinical characteristics of rib fractures in infants” (2000) 105 Pediatrics 2
e48.
 Levin AV, “Retinal hemorrhage in abusive head trauma” (2010) 126 Pediatrics 961.3
 Silverman FN, “The roentgen manifestations of unrecognized skeletal trauma in infants” (1953) 4
69 American Journal of Roentgenology 413. 
See also Kleinman PK, “‘The roentgen manifestations of unrecognized skeletal trauma in infants’- 
A Commentary” (2008) 190 American Journal of Roentgenology 559.
 See Snedecor ST and Wilson HB, “Some obstetrical injuries to the long bones” (1949) 31A 5
Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery 378.
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Figure 1. Anatomy of the femur in childhood  6
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 Royal Children’s Hospital, Melbourne, “Fracture education”.6
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Figure 2. Radiographic appearance of CML 
!
The same chunk of bone demonstrates: 
(a) the classic “bucket-handle” appearance in one view, and  
(b) the “corner” appearance in a view taken at a 90º angle from the first.  7
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 Kleinman PK, “Problems in the diagnosis of metaphyseal fractures” (2008) 38 (Suppl 3) Pediatric 7
Radiology S388, Figure 2.
Chapter 2
By 1962, the sinister association of the injury was out in the open.  In co-authorship with 8
Silverman, Dr Henry Kempe published “The Battered-Child Syndrome”,  a landmark paper 9
which was the first to identify unequivocally a number of medical findings as having usually 
been inflicted deliberately by an adult- to have resulted from “serious physical abuse”. 
!
The extremities are the ‘handles’ for rough handling, whether the arm is pulled to 
bring a reluctant child to his feet or to speed his ascent upstairs or whether the legs 
are held while swinging the tiny body in a punitive way or in an attempt to enforce 
corrective measures. [150] !
In the 30 years following, several reports highlighted the many cases of severely or fatally 
abused children where CMLs were found, against their absence in cases of injury not 
thought to involve abuse.  Several articles over this period described CMLs as 10
“pathognomonic”,  “diagnostic”,  or permitting a “radiologic diagnosis”  of child abuse.  11 12 13
!
!
 See Woolley PV and Evans WA, “Significance of skeletal lesions in infants resembling those of 8
traumatic origin” (1955) 158 Journal of the American Medical Association 539.
 Kempe CH et al, “The Battered-child Syndrome” (1962) 181 Journal of the American Medical 9
Association 17.
 Worlock P, Stower M and Barbor P, “Patterns of fractures in accidental and non-accidental injury 10
in children: A comparative study” (1986) 293 BMJ 100; Kogutt MS, Swischuk LE and Fagan CJ, 
“Patterns of injury and significance of uncommon fractures in the Battered Child Syndrome” (1974) 
121 American Journal of Roentgenology 143; Galleno H and Oppenheim WL, “The Battered Child 
Syndrome revisited” (1982) 162 Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research 11.
 Thomsen TK, Elle B and Thomsen JL, “Post-mortem radiological examination in infants: 11
Evidence of child abuse?” (1997) 90 Forensic Science International 223, p 224; Loder RT and 
Bookout C, “Fracture patterns in battered children” (1991) 5 Journal of Orthopaedic Trauma 428, p 
432; Norman MG et al, “The postmortem examination on the abuse child: Pathological, 
radiographic, and legal aspects” (1984) 8 Perspectives in Pediatric Pathology 313, p 315; O’Neill 
JA et al, “Patterns of injury in the Battered Child Syndrome” (1973) 13 Journal of Trauma 332, p 
338. 
 Leonidas JC, “Skeletal trauma in the Child Abuse Syndrome” (1983) 12 Pediatric Annals 875, p 12
876.
 Kempe et al, n 9; Caffey J, “Some traumatic lesions in growing bones other than fractures and 13
dislocations: Clinical and radiological features” (1957) 30 British Journal of Radiology 225, p 228.
 Worlock, Stower and Barbor, n 10; Galleno and Oppenheim, n 10; Kogutt, Swischuk and Fagan, 14
n 10.
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In other articles published over this period, the central point made by their authors was that 
other types of fracture are at least as prevalent as CMLs in abused children.  A clinician 14
cannot relax about the possibility of child abuse just because a skeletal survey has failed  
to demonstrate any CMLs: 
!
The well known epiphyseal-metaphyseal long bone fractures, usually considered the 
classic findings in these infants, were less common in our [Battered Child 
Syndrome] series than were spiral and transverse fractures of the long bones. !
A conclusion naturally follows from this observation: that a clinician should 
!
place more emphasis on, and be more suspicious of single, ordinary long bone 
fractures, especially when clinical correlation is less than plausible.  15!
21 years after Silverman first cagily described “unrecognized skeletal trauma in infants”, it 
was apparent that the child abuse net required wider casting. The challenge still faced by a 
modern-day clinician when assessing a single “ordinary” long bone fracture in a child is 
examined in the next Section. 
!
By 1998, the need, felt by authors of medical articles, to underline the importance and 
specificity of CMLs for abuse, appeared to have abated. A review article published in that 
year focused on the differential diagnosis of medical diseases which cause similar 
appearances.  From about 2000 on it is difficult to find any medical article in which CMLs 16
are described as “pathognomonic” or “diagnostic” of child abuse. 
!
A 2001 case series of 8 infants treated for equinovarus deformity (“clubfoot”) with serial 
casting reported the finding of CML in 4 of the infants.  3 of these 4 infants had an 17
associated neuromuscular abnormality. One infant in the group who was found to have 
injuries to their tibias and fibulas (the bones of the lower legs) on both sides, was believed 
 Kogutt, Swischuk and Fagan, n 10, p 148.15
 Swischuk LE, “Metaphyseal corner fractures in infants: A review” (1998) 5 Emergency Radiology 16
103.
 Grayev AM et al, “Metaphyseal fractures mimicking abuse during treatment for clubfoot” (2001) 17
31 Pediatric Radiology 559.
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to have suffered physical abuse. That infant had been urgently brought to the emergency 
room with breathing difficulty and was found to have 24 rib fractures. Notably, in this 
abused infant their bony injuries did not include any CMLs. 
!
The authors of this report hoped to “offer some further insight into the pathogenesis of this 
well-described abuse injury” (p563). The vigorous and recurrent nature of the manipulation 
of the infant’s foot, which is part of serial casting treatment, is outlined in detail in the 
report. A 1972 report  had previously described injuries to the metaphysis of the lower 18
end of the tibia in children with this condition who were treated in the same manner, but 
since no illustrations accompanied the report it is not known whether any of those injuries 
were CMLs. 
!
As noted by Silverman when he first described the injury which would become known as 
the CML, very similar injuries can also be sustained by an infant during childbirth.  The 19
illustrations of radiographs of “obstetrical injuries” in the 1949 report which he cited  are of 20
lower quality than those familiar to modern clinicians (probably related more to printing 
than radiological technology). But from their appearance it is easy to see how Silverman 
felt they were relevant to the lesions which he was newly describing (Fig 3). A specific 
radiological approach is required to visualise their classic chip or bucket-handle 
appearance.  A 1951 case series  of injuries to newborns, again born by breech delivery, 21 22
demonstrated similar appearances, as did a 1978 case series including newborns, most of 
whom were born breech.  23
!
!
!
 Weseley MS, Barenfeld PA and Barrett N, “Complications of the treatment of clubfoot” (1972) 84 18
Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research 93.
 Silverman, n 4.19
 Snedecor and Wilson, n 5.20
 American College of Radiology, ACR-SPR Practice Parameter for Skeletal Surveys in Children 21
(ACR, 2014).
 Shulman BH and Terhune CB, “Epiphyseal injuries in breech delivery” (1951) 8 Pediatrics 693.22
 Ekengren K, Bergdahl S and Ekström G, “Birth injuries to the epiphyseal cartilage” (1978) 19 23
Acta Radiologica Diagnosis 197. 
See also Cumming WA, “Neonatal skeletal fractures: Birth trauma or child abuse?” (1979) 30 
Journal of the Canadian Association of Radiologists 30.
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Figure 3. Snedecor illustration 
!
Illustration which appeared in Snedecor’s 1949 
report.  This infant presented breech and was 24
born by vaginal delivery. A radiograph taken on 
day 2 was normal but this, taken on day 10, 
showed changes described only as “periosteal 
thickening”. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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!
!
 Snedecor and Wilson, n 5, Figures 4-A and 4-B, p 381.24
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A 2003 case report  specifically identified a CML in a newborn following emergency 25
caesarian section. Delivery followed “external cephalic version”- a manoeuvre by which an 
infant presenting breech is turned manually by an obstetrician while still in the womb. In  
the case reported, foetal distress was noted soon after the manoeuvre was performed and 
a caesarian section was urgently performed. An infant’s extraction from the uterus at 
caesarian is usually performed manually by the obstetrician and in this case would have 
also been performed urgently. Irritability and lack of spontaneous movement of the left leg 
led to radiographs which demonstrated a CML at the upper end of the tibia. 
!
This was followed by a 2007 case series  which reported the finding of a CML at the lower 26
end of the femur in three newborns, visualised in radiographs performed on day 2 or day 6 
of life. Each was born by elective caesarian section (i.e. without the mother having gone 
into labour). Two of the newborns presented breech; the third presented head first but was 
large, with a birth weight of 4.27kg. None of the deliveries was described at the time as 
having been difficult. All three newborns demonstrated clinical signs which led to 
radiograph being performed. These revealed one CML in each infant, at the lower end of 
the femur in each case. The injuries were felt to have been caused by “traction and 
twisting forces”.  A 2014 case report  described the finding of a CML on day 6 in a 27 28
newborn after vaginal breech delivery where the baby’s delivery had been urgent following 
signs of foetal distress. This was the first case of a typical CML attributed to birth by 
vaginal delivery. 
!
Of the first seven papers cited above, in which CMLs are described as “pathognomonic” or 
“virtually diagnostic” of abuse, only those by Caffey in 1957 and Kempe in 1962 cite any of 
the three obstetric reports published in 1949, 1951 and 1978, of injuries to newborns 
sustained during delivery, which were either similar to or in fact were CMLs.  A scholar 29
new to the field could form the impression that this possible mechanism of causing CMLs 
 Lysack JT and Soboleski D, “Classic metaphyseal lesion following external cephalic version and 25
cesarean section” (2003) 33 Pediatric Radiology 422.
 O’Connell A and Donoghue VB, “Can classic metaphyseal lesions follow uncomplicated 26
caesarean section?” (2007) 37 Pediatric Radiology 488.
 O’Connell and Donoghue, n 26, p 490.27
 Sieswerda-Hoogendoorn T, van Rijn RR and Robben SGF, “Classic metaphyseal lesion 28
following vaginal breech birth, a rare birth trauma” (2014) 2 Journal of Forensic Radiology and 
Imaging 2.
 Snedecor and Wilson, n 5; Shulman and Terhune, n 22; Ekengren, Bergdahl and Ekström, n 23.29
Chapter 2
had been forgotten in the study of child abuse between about 1965 and 2000, only to be 
rediscovered in 2003. This is of course unlikely; experts in the field no doubt considered it 
whenever a particular case raised its possibility. The concern which might arise is whether 
clinicians over that period, who lacked expertise in the study of child abuse, were however 
familiar with one of the articles which describe CMLs as “pathognomonic” of abuse. 
!
A 1986 report  overturned established beliefs as to how CMLs could be sustained. 30
This was a study published by radiologist Dr Paul Kleinman, pioneer of the modern 
understanding of the injuries of child abuse. Four infants who had been fatally abused 
underwent standardised postmortem radiological and histopathologic examination 
(examination by microscope of specially prepared sections of tissue) of the long bones, to 
“determine whether the inferences that have been drawn from the radiologic findings in 
abused infants are accurate…” (p 896). The report contains an exhortation to fellow 
doctors and researchers: 
!
It is curious that a condition that leads to the death of thousands of young children 
each year has prompted so little investigation into the nature of the virtually 
pathognomonic bony abnormalities. (p 904) !
This qualified use of the word “pathognomonic” bordered on the throwaway. The author 
may well have had reason to regret using that particular word since its publication. As 
curious now as it was then is the relative paucity of such research over the 28 years since 
its publication; it was published only 24 years after Kempe brought the “Battered Child 
Syndrome” into the light of day.  31
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
 Kleinman PK, “The metaphyseal lesion in abused infants: A radiologic-histopathologic 30
study” (1986) 146 American Journal of Roentgenology 895.
 Kempe et al, n 9.31
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Ripped or whipped off? 
!
Dr John Caffey, in his landmark 1957 paper,  attributed the curious appearance of 32
“metaphyseal fragmentation” to the insertion of the “periosteum” into bone in that area (Fig 
4). The periosteum is a thin membrane of connective tissue which covers all bones like a 
sleeve, providing blood supply and the progenitor cells necessary for bone healing after 
injury. In children it is relatively loosely fixed to the bone surface, except at each end near 
the growth plates, where it is more strongly tethered. 
!
An analogy might be that of a picture hook which is screwed into an interior plaster wall but 
is only embedded into plaster and not anchored into timber. If a picture which is too heavy 
is hung on the hook the plaster will fail and the hook will be wrenched free from the wall. A 
rough fragment of plaster will come away with the hook, the hook remaining intact (Fig 5). 
This theory of mechanism had a ready corollary in traumatic injuries which were already 
well understood. “Avulsion” (forcible detachment) of a bone fragment at the site of insertion 
of a tendon into bone, caused by sudden muscle contraction, or sudden stretch applied to 
a contracted muscle, is an uncommon but uncontroversial type of accidental injury. 
!
In 1972 the now eminent Caffey delivered a lecture  in which he described the serious 33
brain and eye injury caused to infants when shaken by an adult. His opinion of how CMLs 
are caused was fundamentally unchanged, although perhaps more general in its terms, 
and less exclusive of other theories of causation: 
!
All of these metaphyseal avulsion fragments appear to result from indirect, traction, 
stretching, and shearing, acceleration-deceleration stresses on the periosteum and 
articular capsules… (p 161). !
The “avulsion” theory of CML causation was widely accepted from the 1960s to the early 
1980s.  But Kleinman’s meticulous correlation of the radiological and histopathological 34
appearance of CMLs in fatally abused infants refuted it. Caffey had contended that a CML 
comprised only a fragment of bone and cartilage which had been torn out from its casing. 
 Caffey, n 13.32
 Caffey J, “On the theory and practice of shaking infants: Its potential residual effects of 33
permanent brain damage and mental retardation” (1972) 124 American Journal of Diseases in 
Children 161.
 O’Neill et al, n 11, p337 ; Galleno and Oppenheim, n 10, p 14 ; Leonidas, n 12, p 877.34
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Kleinman’s work demonstrated that in reality a CML represents a fracture which extends 
across the entire cross section of infant bone metaphysis, cleaving most of the end of a 
bone from its calcified shaft.  The separated end, which in infancy is composed entirely of 35
cartilage, is invisible on radiograph (Fig 6). Toward the centre of this cross section the 
fracture line runs very close to the border between bone and cartilage, but at its 
circumferential rim it turns slightly, leaving more calcified bone still attached to the 
otherwise invisible end. Thus the typical fracture line of a CML is actually dome-shaped, 
concave toward the shaft and convex toward its end of the bone. The metaphyseal “chip” 
is in reality most often a thin but complete circle of mostly calcified bone, a circle which 
produces very different appearances depending on the radiographic projection taken. 
!
The radiological and histological illustrations accompanying the report leave little room for 
equivocation. Equally unequivocal was Kleinman’s description of the true nature of CMLs: 
!
pediatric radiologists have erroneously concluded that this lesion involves only a 
peripheral rim of bone rather than a plane of injury across the metaphysis. (p 898) !
Fragments are not simply avulsed from the periphery of the metaphysis, but rather a 
transmetaphyseal disruption… occurs. … In three dimensions, there are no corners 
in the metaphysis, but rather a continuous rounded or ovoid contour. (p 902) !
Kleinman also inferred a different mechanism of injury from that traditionally proposed for 
CMLs, from these novel findings: 
!
These metaphyseal lesions usually occur with violent shaking as the infant is held 
by the trunk or extremities. Any theory to explain these lesions must 
presuppose this form of trauma. The whiplash forces generated by rapid 
acceleration and deceleration are delivered to the metaphysis in a shearing fashion, 
and a plane of fracture through the primary spongiosa is developed. (p 904, 
emphasis added) !
!
!
!
!
 Kleinman, n 30.35
Chapter 2
Figure 4. Caffey’s vision of causation of CMLs 
!
The periosteum when stretched by a grasping and twisting adult 
hand could tear a bone fragment from its insertion (red oval).  36
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 Caffey, n 13, Figure 22.36
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Figure 5. Picture hook analogy 
!
Caffey inferred that when the periosteum surrounding an infant’s bone was 
pulled hard enough it would tear from its insertion into the bone, taking a 
small fragment of bone with it, like plaster being ripped away from a wall. 
!
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Figure 6. The CML disc 
!
The brown discoid line represents the fracture plane 
of a typical CML.  37
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 Lonergan GJ, “Child abuse: Radiologic-Pathologic Correlation” (2003) 23 RadioGraphics 811, 37
Figure 3.
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This revised view of the morphology and possible cause of CMLs appears to have been 
generally accepted.  No significant argument has been made against it, in defence of 38
Caffey's original avulsion explanation. 
!
But then little has been published in either support or refutation of the inference of 
causation which Kleinman so emphatically advanced. This theory is that an infant's limb 
could sustain such an injury even while no adult hand is in contact with that limb. The 
drawing in the front matter of Kleinman's authoritative text, Diagnostic Imaging of Child 
Abuse,  is not that of an infant whose arm or leg is being used as a handle by an adult. It 39
is a drawing of an infant being held by the trunk and shaken, head and limbs flailing 
through dangerous arcs (Fig 7). 
!
If, as Kleinman inferred, the cross sectional area of infant bone called the “primary 
spongiosa”, near the growth plate, is the weak link in a length of infant bone, then 
centrifugal force would tend to pop the cartilage cap off each long bone, like a weakly 
glued cap on the end of a band leader’s baton in full twirl. But the use of the words 
“whiplash” and “shearing” in the paragraph quoted earlier does not appear to be incidental. 
They indicate a force which also acts to slide the detached disc of cartilage sideways off 
the end of bone on which it should neatly sit. 
!
An object from everyday life can provide an analogy here, that of a “bank roll” of coins 
wrapped in paper (Fig 8). If the roll is held by one end and waved back and forth in a 
rounded arc, the coins at the far end will tend to fly centrifugally away from their holder, as 
outlined above. In addition, if the coin at the far end of the roll is not fixed to the rest of the 
column of coins, then, with each wave through an arc, the coin at the far end will also tend 
to slide sideways, relative to the rest of the coins. As long as the coins are waved in a 
circular arc, the coin at the far end will tend to slide sideways more than the coin beneath 
it, which will tend to slide sideways more than the coin beneath it, etc. 
!
!
!
!
 Pierce MC et al, “A practical guide to differentiating abusive from accidental fractures: An injury 38
plausibility approach” (2012) 13 Clinical Pediatric Emergency Medicine 166.
 Kleinman PK, Diagnostic Imaging of Child Abuse (2nd ed, Mosby, 1998).39
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Figure 7. A cause of CMLs: shaking 
!
Kleinman argued that an infant being shaken in the 
manner depicted could sustain a CML in a limb long bone 
without the limb actually being grasped.  40
!
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 Kleinman, n 39, Figure I.40
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Figure 8. Bank roll analogy 
!
If one end of the bank roll of coins is held and the 
whole roll is waved from side to side in a circular arc, 
the coin at the far end of the roll will tend to slide 
sideways, relative to the coin beneath it. 
!
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This specific mechanism, of “whiplash” and shearing forces causing fracture, even without 
direct physical contact of the limb, has been accepted by several authors, and recounted 
in review articles.  In some reviews, however, explicit reference to the specific mechanism 41
of shaking is conspicuous by its absence. The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) 
Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect in its 2014 review had only this to say: 
!
These fractures are caused when torsional and tractional shearing strains are 
applied across the metaphysis, as may occur with vigorous pulling or twisting of an 
infant’s extremity.  42!
The omission of any mention of infant shaking is not likely to have been an oversight. A 
clue to this apparent reticence is probably contained in a review published by Kleinman in 
2008,  in which he observed that the CML “has come under considerable scrutiny in 43
courtrooms on both sides of the Atlantic” (S388). Statements as to mechanism contained 
in this review are more circumspect than than those which the same author had recorded 
22 years earlier: 
!
CMLs are commonly bilateral and often strikingly symmetrical, a tendency that has 
been well documented in gross and microscopic postmortem material. This 
suggests that accelerational forces occurring when an infant is shaken by the torso 
may also result in the CML. (S393) !
It will be recalled that in his initial 1986 report Kleinman argued that any explanatory theory 
for the injury must presuppose “violent shaking”.  44
!
The vexed nature of the nexus between scientific research, clinical practice, forensic 
practice, and court fact-finding is again apparent. In 2011 Kleinman published a statistical 
 Dwek JR, “The radiographic approach to child abuse” (2011) 469 Clinical Orthopaedics and 41
Related Research 776, p 780 ; Carty H, “Non-accidental injury: a review of the radiology” (1997) 7 
European Radiology 1365, p 1366; Chapman S, “Radiological aspects of non-accidental 
injury” (1990) 83 Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 67, p 67.
 Flaherty EG et al, “Evaluating children with fractures for child physical abuse” (2014) 133 42
Pediatrics e477, e478.
 Kleinman, n 7.43
 Kleinman, n 30, p 904.44
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analysis of the prevalence of CMLs in infants at low versus high risk for abuse.  The 45
report sits awkwardly beside his collected works. In it he identifies its impetus: 
!
conventional wisdom holds that there is a strong association between the classic 
metaphyseal lesion and infant abuse. A critical review published in 2008 found the 
literature to be lacking in a rigorous evidence base to support this widely held view. 
(p 1007) !
In fact the comment to which Kleinman referred, published in 2008, was more neutral and 
benign than that description might indicate: 
!
No comparative data were available to determine the probability of abuse for many 
fracture sites. This was particularly evident for metaphyseal fractures. Historically, 
metaphyseal fractures have been thought of as strong predictors of abuse, but we 
could not find comparative studies to support or refute this hypothesis. … The 
studies did not meet our inclusion criteria.  46!
It is tempting to wonder whether a more negative view of the purported lack of a rigorous 
evidence base might in fact have been painted by advocates in courts of law. The role of 
advocates in that setting is not to place this passage in the context of scientific discovery 
and communication, but to advance their party’s case. If so, such comments may well 
have been fired directly at Kleinman or his colleagues, in the course of an attempted 
cross-examination dressing down. 
!
One could argue that all this is so much academic hair-splitting. Kleinman has 
unambiguously published his belief that a CML could be caused by either violent shaking 
or a directly applied twisting/pulling force.  Do the technical details of the particular 47
method by which a perpetrator has delivered potentially lethal violence on an infant 
matter? 
!
 Kleinman PK et al, “Prevalence of the Classic Metaphyseal Lesion in infants at low versus high 45
risk for abuse” (2011) 197 American Journal of Roentgenology 1005.
 Kemp AM et al, “Patterns of skeletal fractures in child abuse: Systematic review” (2008) 337 46
BMJ a1518, p 7.
 Kleinman PK, “Diagnostic imaging in infant abuse” (1990) 155 American Journal of 47
Roentgenology 703, p 706.
Chapter 2
In DOHS v Mr and Mrs H [2007] VChC 2, the Children’s Court of Victoria decided a 
protection order in respect of three children, including one of infant twins who was found to 
have catastrophic injuries when brought into hospital aged 8 weeks. His twin brother “B” 
was subsequently found to have injuries which included “multiple metaphyseal fractures of 
the long bones of the arms and left lower leg” (p 28). At trial the children’s mother had 
given evidence that she had previously seen her daughter, aged five at the time of the 
infant’s presentation to hospital, “give B a ‘Chinese burn’” (p 38). The Children’s Court held 
that both infant twins had suffered significant physical and emotional harm, and that their 
sister had suffered significant emotional harm “by being implicated as a possible 
perpetrator of such serious injuries…” (p 50). No specific mention of “shaking” was made 
in the proceedings. 
!
In the equally appalling case R v Macphee [2005] QCA 175, the Queensland Court of 
Criminal Appeal in 2005 heard an appeal against the conviction of a mother for the 
manslaughter of her 3 week old son. Among many injuries found to the deceased infant 
and his triplet brothers, CMLs were found at the lower end of both tibias of one of the 
brothers. “Periosteal reaction” was also found along the arm bones of both brothers (this is 
a finding where the periosteum sleeve has been lifted away from its bone; one possible 
cause is inflicted trauma). At trial, a paediatric radiologist had said that the injuries had 
been caused by “longitudinal twisting”, and had also agreed under cross-examination “with 
the proposition that the injury could perhaps be described as ‘something like a Chinese 
burn’” [14]. This analogy with unremarkable child’s play formed part of the alternative 
hypothesis advanced by the defence, that the boy had in fact been killed by his sister, 
aged seven at the time. The only mention of “shaking” in these proceedings was the 
suggestion by counsel for the defendant that the sister might have used the word when 
interviewed by police. The Court after viewing the interview believed that she had probably 
said instead that she had “checked on” her brother [21]. The appeal against conviction was 
dismissed. 
!
The AAP no doubt has good reason to eschew talk of “violent shaking” when publishing 
guidance on the evaluation for abuse of children with fractures. The castigation and 
disgrace of paediatrician Sir Roy Meadow in the United Kingdom in 2006, after he 
provided flawed expert evidence in a criminal trial, was watched with increasing alarm by 
the American medical community.  Scientific researchers and medical professionals are, 48
 Jenny C, “The intimidation of British pediatricians” (2007) 119 Pediatrics 797.48
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however, groups relied on more than most to provide opinions uncluttered by external 
imperatives, and to not baulk at “calling things what they are”.  Ambivalence in this regard 49
can lead to unintended consequences. It appears very possible that violent shaking played 
a part in causing the serious or lethal injuries to the infants, and the injuries to their 
brothers, in both these cases. To this day, relatives of each infant may have never 
considered this possibility, believing instead that the injuries to the limbs of the respective 
infants’ brothers were caused by their respective older sisters administering a childish 
“Chinese burn”. 
!
!
“Another perspective” on CMLs 
!
Soon after O’Connell’s 2007 report  of CMLs sustained by newborns during delivery by 50
caesarian section, American pediatrician Dr Marvin Miller wrote in a letter to the journal’s 
editor  that “fetal immobilization is likely the common thread to understanding such a 51
predisposition [to fracture] in these three infants.” Miller advanced the theory that 
“Situations that diminish fetal movement will decrease bone strength” (p 598).  52
!
This theory had been advanced before. In Re AB [1994] EWHC Fam 5, Wall J, in the 
Family Division of the High Court of England and Wales, took the unusual step of naming 
expert witness Dr Colin Paterson, who had provided expert evidence to the Court in care 
proceedings.  Wall J had reason for making an exception to the customary confidentiality 53
accorded to expert witnesses: 
!
I feel obliged to say that unless a report from Dr Paterson conforms in the future to 
the guidelines laid down in Re R … his evidence in any case involving the alleged 54
 Duhaime A, “Calling things what they are” (2009) 3 Journal of Neurosurgery- Pediatrics 472.49
 O’Connell and Donoghue, n 26.50
 Miller M, “Another perspective on the cause of metaphyseal fractures” (2008) 38 Pediatric 51
Radiology 598.
 See also Miller M, “The death of temporary brittle bone disease is premature” (2009) 98 Acta 52
Paediatrica 1871.
 See also Wall N, “Medical evidence in child abuse cases: Problem areas” (2008) 28 Family Law 53
320, p 331; Williams C, “A controversial expert witness” (2000) 30 Family Law 175.
 [1990] EWHC Fam 1.54
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non-accidental injury of infants… should, in my judgement, be treated with the 
greatest caution and reserve. !
This was the judgment cited by the Court of Appeal (Crim), in R v Harris and Others [2005] 
EWCA Crim 1980, which included the “helpful guidance” for expert witnesses, discussed in 
Chapter 1. 
!
Paterson, a chemical pathologist, had proposed the existence of a novel disease, 
“Temporary Brittle Bone Disease”, to explain the several injuries found in a critically ill 10 
week old infant. No established scientific research programme of the time (or since) 
supported the existence of the disease. The previously discussed logical fallacy of circular 
reasoning was detected by the Court: 
!
A further matter of considerable concern to myself was Dr Paterson's answers to me 
when I queried with him how the instant case would be treated in the context of his 
further research. Dr Paterson told me that even if I made a specific finding of non-
accidental injury, he would still regard the case as being one in which AB suffered 
from temporary brittle bone disease and the case would be so logged in his 
research findings. I find this very worrying indeed. !
Wall J referred to an earlier decision handed down by the same Court, Re v R [1990] 
EWHC Fam 1, and  the observation by Cazalet J that: 
!
It should be borne in mind that a misleading opinion from an expert may well inhibit 
a proper assessment of a particular case by the non-medical professional advisers 
and may also lead parties, and in particular parents, to false views and hopes. !
Wall J expanded on this: 
!
Parental denial is a commonplace of child abuse: to overcome that denial and to 
accept responsibility for abuse which has in fact occurred is correspondingly painful 
and difficult for the parent. It is, however, a highly important factor in the 
consideration of the issue of child protection. Accordingly, if the medical evidence 
points overwhelmingly to non-accidental injury, an expert who advises the parents 
and the court has a heavy duty upon him to ensure that he has considered carefully 
all the available material and is, moreover, expressing an opinion which takes that 
material fully into account and which can be objectively justified. 
If in the situation just posited the truth is that the parent has injured the child non-
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accidentally, the damage done by an opinion which exonerates the parent is severe. 
The process of acceptance and recognition is either set back or destroyed; the 
parent's conviction that he or she has not injured the child is reinforced; the question 
of rehabilitation of the child is rendered more complex and the risks to the child of a 
return to parental care become even more difficult to quantify. In short, both the 
parents and more importantly the child, whose interests are paramount, are ill- 
served. !
Wall J had reason to know. In the 1990 matter which he cited, Re R, he himself had 
appeared as leading counsel for the parents, and had himself called Dr Paterson as an 
expert witness on their behalf. The “young and inexperienced parents, one of whom had 
undoubtedly shaken their child… had both been assured by various doctors, at least until 
the door of the court, that there were alternative, innocent explanations for what one of 
them had undoubtedly done.” 
!
Returning to 2008, and Miller’s alternative perspective, the authors of the report referred to 
in Miller’s letter provided a response to his letter, titled: “Classic metaphyseal lesions follow 
uncomplicated caesarean section NOT brittle bone disease”.  55
!
In 2013 the Journal of Pediatric Endocrinology and Metabolism published Paterson’s 
report  of a putative association between the multiple fractures of “Temporary Brittle Bone 56
Disease” and intracranial bleeding, possibly due to an as-yet unrecognised “natural 
disease”. In 2004 Paterson’s name had been erased from the United Kingdom’s medical 
register by the General Medical Council (GMC),  for having repeatedly misled courts with 57
medical evidence he gave on “Temporary Brittle Bone Disease”, in numerous cases and in 
the face of several judicial warnings. His conduct had been referred to the GMC by the 
President of the Family Division of the High Court. 
!
To hope that medical journals will desist from publishing articles due to their controversial 
content, or the scientific prejudice of their authors, appears futile in the internet age. 
Recent evidence indicates that Paterson and Miller will continue to publish their beliefs 
 O’Connell AM and Donoghue VB, “Letter: Classic metaphyseal lesions follow uncomplicated 55
caesarean section NOT brittle bone disease” (2008) 38 Pediatric Radiology 600.
 Paterson CR and Monk EA, “Temporary brittle bone disease: association with intracranial 56
bleeding” (2013) 26 Journal of Pediatric Endocrinology and Metabolism 417.
 Freckelton I, “Editorial: Regulating forensic deviance: The ethical responsibilities of expert report 57
writers and witnesses” (2004) 12 Journal of Law and Medicine 141.
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whatever others say. In 1986 Kleinman and colleagues proposed a representational theory 
of causation of CMLs, based on meticulous examination of the physical evidence before 
them. The belief that violent shaking of an infant held by the torso can cause CMLs has 
been accepted by many medical experts, but published statements on the topic have 
become discernibly less robust. The prevailing winds of medical journal publication 
currently favour comparative statistical analyses, but these alone do not provide the 
strongest refutation possible of Paterson and Miller’s speculative theories. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 4, the expertise which medical practitioners possess, and which 
courts of law rely on to assist them, is not expertise in statistical analysis. It is expertise in 
their area of clinical practice, or technical field of research. It appears likely that medical 
involvement in legal proceedings have played a part in muffling Kleinman’s previously 
emphatic message, even within medical journals by medical authors themselves. 
!
!
!
!
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2.2 Femoral fracture in a young child 
!
“I suspect the difficulty is when you’ve got one injury so there isn’t a 
demonstrated pattern of injury and it may be difficult to determine the 
cause…” (Magistrate informant 6) 
!
* * * * * 
!
Several case series of “Battered Child Syndrome” followed Kempe’s 1962 report.  A large 58
proportion of battered children were found to have sustained multiple injuries in those 
series.  As discussed previously however, articles published through the 1970s and 59
1980s reported many cases believed to be child abuse where the child was found to have 
sustained a single injury alone.  60
!
Recognition that a single injury to a child might flag an abusive and potentially lethal home 
environment prompted a new round of consciousness-raising by researchers: 
!
The old adage of ‘three fractures in different stages of healing’ should be 
downplayed as the primary catch phrase in the diagnosis of child abuse.  61!
In the past, emphasis has been placed on corner fractures, fractures at different 
stages of healing, and injuries at several sites. Our results suggest that fresh single 
diaphyseal [shaft] fractures are more common.  62!
A child sustaining a fracture of a long bone accidentally is, however, a relatively common 
occurrence.  A clinician’s assessment of mechanism-injury plausibility in this circumstance 63
 Kempe et al, n 9.58
  O’Neill et al, n 11; Kogutt, Swischuk and Fagan, n 10; Akbarnia B et al, “Manifestations of the 59
Battered-Child Syndrome” (1974) 56-A Journal of Bone and Joint Surgery 1159.
 Kogutt, Swischuk and Fagan, n 10; Galleno and Oppenheim, n 10; Leonidas n 12; King J et al, 60
“Analysis of 429 fractures in 189 battered children” (1988) 8 Journal of Pediatric Orthopaedics 585.
 Galleno and Oppenheim, n 10, p 19.61
 King et al, n 60, p 585.62
 See for example Worlock P and Stower M, “Fracture patterns in Nottingham children” (1986) 6 63
Journal of Pediatric Orthopedics 656.
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can thus be very challenging. It will be especially difficult if no other signs associated with 
abuse (such as additional occult injuries) are present. 
!
One example of a presentation which has often troubled clinicians is that of a very young 
child (under 4 years old) who has sustained a fracture of the diaphysis (shaft) of their 
femur (Fig 1). The femur is the largest and strongest bone in the human body. 
!
Several medical studies have been published with findings which were presented as 
informative for this clinical task, determining the cause of femoral fracture in a very young 
child. In this Section the utility of some of these reports for this purpose is examined. 
!
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!
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Case series 
!
Fourteen case series  between 1982 and 2008 reported and compared cases of femoral 64
fracture in very young children caused by accident, and cases caused by abuse. One 
study of case-control design,  of young children with this injury, was also published in this 65
period. All were retrospective studies using information gathered from hospital charts. In 
some of the studies a range of childhood injuries were reviewed which included femoral 
fracture, with some data extractable about those cases. 
!
!
!
!
!
 In chronological order: 64
Anderson WA, “The significance of femoral fractures in children” (1982) 11 Annals of Emergency 
Medicine 174; 
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Emergency Medicine 178; 
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young children” (1983) 3 Journal of Pediatric Orthopedics 341; 
Beals RK and Tufts E, “Fractured femur in infancy: The role of child abuse” (1983) 3 Journal of 
Pediatric Orthopaedics 583; 
Wellington P and Bennet GC, “Fractures of the femur in childhood” (1987) 18 Injury 103 ; 
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fracture” (1990) 144 American Journal of Diseases of Children 875; 
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Each of the case series demonstrate varying degrees of recurring methodological 
limitations. These limitations include: 
!
• Classification: Questionable methods of case classification by cause (into an Accident 
group or an Abuse group); Unrealistic classification of cases as abuse or accident 
rather than unknown/uncertain. 
• Incomplete reporting of data; Likely use of circular reasoning in the classification of 
some cases, extent unknowable. 
• Retrospective design. 
• Conclusions and recommendations which do not clearly follow from the study aim or 
findings. 
!
!
Methodological limitation: Case classification 
!
Different studies used different methods of case classification (Tabs 2, 3). Most studies 
relied to some degree on the detection of a combination of widely accepted “criteria” for 
identifying child abuse, when determining a case’s classification (Box 1). 
!
!
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Table 2. Femoral fracture study classification methods and reported prevalences of 
abuse: Overall
Author, year n Age (years) Classification method Prevalence*
Hui, 2008 127 < 3 Thomas Scale 3%
Coffey, 2005 41 < 1.5 Hospital Trauma Registry 63%
Jeerathan-
yasakun, 
2003 
39 < 5 Not stated 3%
Banaszkiewicz, 
2002 14 < 1 Thomas Scale 14 - 42%
Scherl, 2000 207 < 6 Child removed from parents 6%
Schwend, 2000 139 < 4 Thomas Scale 4%
Blakemore, 1996 42 1 to 5 Legal hearing 2%
Thomas, 1991 25 < 3 Thomas Scale 36%
Dalton, 1990 138 < 3 Multiple injuries, perpetrator 
admission
10%
Wellington, 1987 142 < 5 Beals Scale 4%
Beals, 1983 79 < 4 Beals Scale 30%
Gross, 1983 74 < 6 Clinician group consensus 36%
Anderson, 1982 117 < 16 Not stated 21%
Rosenberg, 
1982 8 < 1 Combination of markers of abuse 63%
*cases described as “suspected abuse” or “uncertain” not included 
a- pathological fractures excluded 
b- isolated fractures only; pathological fractures and injuries from "well-documented 
circumstances" excluded
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Table 3. Femoral fracture study classification methods and reported prevalences of 
abuse: Infants
Author, year n Age (years) Classification method Prevalence*
Hui, 2008 60 < 1 Thomas Scale 0 - 7%
Coffey, 2005 41 < 1.5 Hospital Trauma Registry 68%
Schwend, 2000 24 “non 
walking”
Thomas Scale 17%
Thomas, 1991 10 < 1 Thomas Scale 60%
Wellington, 1987 36 < 1 Beals Scale 6%
Gross, 1983 26 < 1 Clinician group consensus 65%
Anderson, 1982 18 < 1 Not stated 83%
*cases described as “suspected abuse” or “uncertain” not included
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Box 1. Case features supporting case classification as abuse
• Fracture not plausibly accounted for by the mechanism 
described in the history given 
• Other injuries found of differing ages, or typical of abuse 
• Previous or subsequent abuse of the same child 
• Abnormal parental behaviour 
• Delay in presentation to medical care 
• Psychosocial risk factors 
• Perpetrator admission
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One of the studies (Thomas), published in 1991, introduced a classification system using a 
combination of accepted markers of child abuse to categorise cases into 7 groups, during 
case review by the researchers (Tab 4). After initial classification, cases were divided into 3 
groups for the purpose of publication. “Definite”, “Likely”, and “Questionable” Abuse cases 
were combined into a single “Abuse” group for the reporting of the number of cases in that 
group; the same was done for “Accident” cases (Tab 5). Four subsequent studies used this 
classification system or a variation of it, calling it the “Thomas Scale” (Schwend, Rex, 
Banaszkiewicz, Hui). Two earlier studies used a similar but simpler combination of markers 
of abuse (Beals, Wellington). 
!
!
!
!
!
!
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!
!
!
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Table 4. Thomas Scale- clinicians: Criteria used to distinguish abuse from 
accidents  (Tab 2 in source article)
Definite abuse Positive skeletal survey- multiple recent fractures 
Positive skeletal survey- fractures of various ages 
Eyewitness 
Multiple internal injuries 
Physical findings-  
Bruises (hand, electric cord, teeth) 
Suspicious or unexplained burns or scars 
Sibling abused at same time 
A definite intentional act causing physical harm to child 
Parental fight; injury not directed at child 
Suspicious injury with definite later abuse
Likely abuse Original doctors called injury abuse AND history inconsistent 
History not sufficient for injury and/or  
Story of accident changes and/or  
Family members present different versions of history and/or  
Inappropriate delay in seeking care
Questionable 
abuse
History inconsistent 
History not sufficient for injury and/or  
Story of accident changes and/or  
Family members present different versions of history and/or  
Inappropriate delay in seeking care
Unknown cause Insufficient information available in charts
Questionable 
accident
Isolated incident, social worker/physician no suspicion of abuse, story 
somewhat inconsistent with extent of injury, but consistent with type of 
injury  
Story somewhat inconsistent with extent of injury, social worker/physician no 
suspicion of abuse, neglect involved  
Isolated incident, no suspicion of abuse, story not known
 Likely accident Consistent story, social worker/physician no suspicion of abuse, isolated 
injury 
Consistent story, no suspicion of abuse, neglect involved 
Minimal but consistent story, social worker/physician no suspicion of abuse, 
isolated incident 
Story consistent with injury; aggressive or irresponsible behavior involved; 
however, injury not directly inflicted
Definite 
accident
Motor vehicle accident 
Multiple witnesses (police report, ambulance at scene) 
Pedestrian hit by automobile
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Table 5. Reporting of case numbers into three combined groups in Thomas 1991 
report (Table 4 in source article)
Consensus rating
!!
0-11
Age in months !
12-23
!!
24-35
Abuse [included definite, 
likely, questionable]
6 3 0
Accident [included 
definite, likely, 
questionable]
3 2 9
Unknown 1 0 1
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The Thomas Scale at face value would provide an excellent clinical tool for standardised 
real-life assessment of relevant cases, especially for clinicians lacking experience in the 
area. But no amount of detail in the scale’s formulation can bring its sensitivity or 
specificity close to 100%. The nature of the problem being looked for, not a lack of 
diligence on the part of researchers or clinicians in its design or application, limits the 
scale’s utility. This intractable limitation would have been compounded by the retrospective 
design of each study, discussed further below. 
!
In most of these studies it is almost certain that some cases were misclassified. The 
variance in reported prevalences of abuse as the cause of femoral fracture, across all 
studies (Tab 2), is more likely due primarily to differences in classification methods chosen 
than in characteristics of patient populations. This variance is also evident in a relatively 
homogenous subgroup of children studied, infants (Tab 3). 
!
To derive the Abuse prevalence figures provided in Tables 2 and 3, cases reported 
specifically as “suspected abuse” or “uncertain cause” were not included. An exception to 
this is the figure for Thomas’s report, where the combined prevalence of cases of 
“questionable”, “likely” and “definite” abuse is presented, since the breakdown of the 
subgroups was not reported in the source article. The same was done for Hui’s report in 
respect of infants. 
!
If, in Wellington’s report, cases of ‘suspected abuse’ to infants are included in the Abuse 
category (as occurred in Thomas’s 1991 report, Tab 5), the prevalence of abuse for that 
age group is not 6% but 39%. Similarly, if cases of “uncertain cause” in Dalton’s report are 
included as Abuse, the prevalence of Abuse jumps from 10% to 70%. 
!
This is not an idle observation. Dalton’s study used the most restrictive combinations of 
clinical information to assign Accident or Abuse as the cause of a child’s femoral fracture. 
Cases were classified as Abuse in the presence of “evidence of multiple fractures in 
various stages of healing and/or multiple injuries consistent with physical abuse… and/or 
verbal admission that the child had been beaten”. An accidental case was a “child being 
previously well, sustaining an accidental injury witnessed by others” (p 875). The 
“uncertain cause” category comprised the largest proportion of cases of any study 
examined: 60%. It is likely that this study included the fewest misclassified cases of any; it 
may have included none. The one study reviewed of case-control design (Rex) used 
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similarly tight definitions of abuse or accident, comparing cases determined to be “definite 
abuse”, using the Thomas scale, to cases determined to be “definite accident”. 
!
In at least four of the studies the classification was determined by the consensus of a 
group of clinicians who reviewed case details (Schwend, Thomas, Dalton, Gross). One of 
these studies reported significant disagreement about specific case details between 
members of the reviewing group (Schwend). In one study of infants sustaining any type of 
fracture, the reviewing orthopaedic registrar and child protection paediatrician disagreed 
about the fracture’s likely cause in 9 of 74 (12%) cases (Banaszkiewicz). Classifying cases 
by consensus does not guarantee the accuracy of classification, or necessarily improve its 
accuracy as compared to a single expert’s opinion. 
!
Of all 14 case series, the study which identified cases of abuse using the hospital’s trauma 
registry yielded one of the highest prevalences of abuse (63%, Coffey). The method by 
which cases had been initially classified within the trauma registry was not reported. The 
studies in which case classification relied on decisions of an external child protection 
agency, or legal hearing, reported very low prevalences of abuse (6% Scherl; 2% 
Blakemore). 
!
!
Methodological limitation: Incomplete reporting of case data 
!
None of the 15 studies examined reported all individual case data such that the rationales 
of all case classifications were clear. No study reported the proportion of cases for which 
complete data was available to the authors. 
!
In several instances either within one study or across several studies, two cases with 
similar explanatory histories were classified differently where no or inadequate data was 
reported as to why their classification was different (Tabs 6, 7, 8, 9). 
!
!
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Table 6. Classification of cases of femoral fracture with history of fall from furniture 
or height
Author 
year Classified abuse Not classified abuse
Gross !
1983
1 infant 3 months old, 
"fell from counter top" 
 
1 infant 7 months old, 
"fell from couch"
Number not reported
Schwend !
2000
1 infant 5 months old, 
"fell from couch" 
 
1 infant 7 months old, 
"fell off of bed"
1 infant 7 months old, 
"rolled off couch" 
 
1 infant 8 months old, 
"in car seat on counter, fell over" !
1 child 22 months old, 
“fell off dresser” !
1 child 3 years old, 
“fell from dresser” 
 
Possibly more cases
Beals 
1983
4 children <4 years, 
"jumped or fell from height"
16 children <4 years, 
"jumped or fell from height"
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Table 7. Classification of cases of femoral fracture with history of fall from being 
held by an adult
Author 
year Classified abuse Not classified abuse
Gross 
1983
1 infant 8 weeks old, 
"mother slipped on rug"
Number not reported
Schwend 
2000 None
1 infant 6 months old, 
"dropped by mother" 
 
Possibly more cases
Thomas 
1991 Number not reported
3 infants 
"dropped accidentally"
Beals 
1983 None
5 children <4 years, 
"person carrying child fell"
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Table 8. Classification of cases of femoral fractures with history of possible 
accidental trauma from sibling or adult
Author 
year Classified abuse Not classified abuse
Gross !
1983
1 infant 4 weeks old, 
"stepped on by older sibling" 
 
1 infant 4 months old, 
"playing with father" !
1 infant 4 months old, 
"playing with other children"
Number not reported
Thomas 
1991 Number not reported
1 toddler 
"roughhousing with father"
Schwend !
2000
None
2 children, 2 years old: 
"playing with brother" 
"playing roughly with father" 
 
Possibly more cases
Chapter 2
!
!
Table 9. Classification of cases with the history given that the was child running on 
a horizontal surface, tripped and fell, or similar
Author 
year Classified abuse Not classified abuse
Further information provided re 
cases
Schwend !
2000
None
4 children, 2 to 3 
years old: !
1. "fell while playing" !
2. "fell in bathroom, 
parents a little unsure" !
3. "tripped over pile of 
books" !
4. "fell backward"
1."Questionable accident" (Thomas 
scale), no skeletal survey, "cleared" by 
child protection service !
2. "Questionable accident", skeletal 
survey normal, "cleared" by child 
protection service !
3. Fracture 1 year earlier, 
“Questionable accident", skeletal 
survey normal, "cleared" by child 
protection service !
4. "Likely accident", skeletal survey 
normal, "cleared" by child protection 
service
Thomas !
1991
Number not 
reported
3 “toddlers”: !
1. 2 year and 9 
months old, tripped 
while running in the 
yard, undisplaced 
oblique midshaft 
fracture !
2. 2 years 6 months 
old, tripped on a 
magazine while 
running on a 
hardwood floor, 
oblique midshaft 
fracture !
3. “tripped while 
running”
1. History of running and tripping 
outside recounted, without further 
detail !
2. Detailed history recounted of child 
running and tripping, as reportedly 
witnessed by father at home, with 
mother also present; nil further detail !
3. Nil
Beals 
1983
1 child <4years, 
"fell while walking 
or running"
9 children <4 years, 
"fell while walking or 
running"
Nil
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An explanatory history of particular interest is that of a child aged 3 years or younger, who 
is running (often on uneven ground), trips and falls, sustaining a femoral fracture from this 
incident alone (Tab 9). To many members of the public (including lawyers, and probably 
many doctors) the proposal that a toddler might generate a “force of self-propulsion… 
sufficient to fracture this large bone”  would surely sound extraordinary. This was the 66
explanatory history given for at least 17 femoral fractures in children across these studies. 
One case was classified as abuse, 16 cases as accidental. In none of these cases were all 
relevant case details reported. The possibility of a femoral fracture being sustained in this 
manner by a child in this age group is generally accepted, by clinicians with expertise in 
the area. As at December 2014, however, there was no case reported in the medical 
literature with this injury and this explanatory history, in which specific case details would 
confirm to a sceptical reader that the injury really was sustained accidentally (details such 
as corroboration by independent witnesses, or a video recording of the event). 
!
Circular reasoning is reasoning which “presumes the truth of what is to be proved”.  The 67
lack of a gold standard diagnostic test makes studies which examine abuse as a cause of 
injury especially liable to circular reasoning. Since none of the fifteen studies reported 
complete data on all their cases, it cannot be established whether any or many of their 
cases were misclassified due to circular reasoning. 
!
Some authors made no secret of their prior beliefs, beliefs which may well have influenced 
case classification in their study. The Introduction in the Schwend report included the 
opinion that “children older than a year are quite active and can generate enough force to 
fracture the femur during a fall”. The prevalence of definite abuse as the cause of femoral 
fractures in children under 4 years old in this study was reported as 4%. In Schwend's 
group, child protection services were involved in only 16 of 115 (14%) cases of walking 
children under 4 years old who presented with femoral fractures. In contrast, Anderson 
reported a prevalence of 56% in under-4-year-olds with a fractured femur. 
!
One study (Coffey) reported an association of race with abuse as the cause of injury in 
children over 18 months. Abuse has been reported as more often missed in white intact 
 Thomas et al, n 64, p 474.66
 Gensler HJ, Introduction to Logic (2nd ed, Routledge, 2010) p 56.67
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families.  None of the fifteen studies specifically stated whether or not race was 68
considered in case classification. 
!
!
Methodological limitation: Retrospective design 
!
This area of enquiry is particularly poorly suited to retrospective study. A “biomechanical 
history” is at the centre of this clinical task.  Documentation of history and examination 69
findings in cases of childhood injury seen in emergency departments has been reported to 
be poor in several studies.  Many of these case series of femoral fractures relied on 70
exactly that documentation for the clinical information which determined case classification 
(“history not sufficient for injury”, “story of accident changes”). 
!
A retrospective approach does not allow timely further information-gathering which might 
better establish the cause of injury in many cases (measures such as medical tests to 
detect additional occult injuries, or obtaining a corroborating collateral history). A carefully 
designed and performed prospective study, conducted out of an emergency department 
and published in 1968  described the change to case classification which often ensued 71
when additional information about the injury and the family could be sought in real time. 
!
!
Methodological limitation: Conclusions which do not clearly follow from the study aim or 
findings 
!
In some of the studies, the conclusions follow logically from the results, which follow 
logically from the study aim and methods. For example in Scherl’s report  the background 72
to the research was that “there seems to be a persistent perception among practitioners 
 Jenny C et al, “Analysis of missed cases of abusive head trauma” (1999) 282 Journal of the 68
American Medical Association 621.
 Pierce et al, n 38.69
 Scott DA, “Improving the measurement and surveillance of child abuse in Queensland 70
emergency departments” (Queensland University of Technology, 2012); Limbos MP and Berkowitz 
CD, “Documentation of child physical abuse: How far have we come?” (1998) 102 Pediatrics 53.
 Holter JC and Friedman SB, “Child abuse: Early case findings in the emergency 71
department” (1968) 42 Pediatrics 128.
 Scherl et al, n 64.72
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that spiral fractures of long bones are particularly suspicious” (p 103) (Fig 9); the authors 
believed this perception to be mistaken. The Results section contains the report that spiral 
fractures were overrepresented in the group of cases investigated for possible child abuse, 
but within that group were no more common in the cases where the investigation was 
“positive”. The Discussion contains the conclusions that the morphologic features of 
fractures almost certainly play a (misguided) role in whether a child abuse investigation will 
be initiated, and that such bias may result in missed cases of nonaccidental injury in 
children with transverse fractures. 
!
In other studies no such chain of reasoning is evident. Schwend’s report  concludes with 73
the assertion that “femoral shaft fractures are common in young children and can occur 
with low-energy falls and play activity” (p 481). In this study the case of a 7 month old 
infant who sustained a femoral fracture with “no story given”, who did not undergo skeletal 
survey, but whose case was “cleared” by a child protective service evaluation, was 
classified as “questionable accident”. The case of a 2 year old child was classified into the 
same category with the reported mechanism of “playing roughly with dad”, also “cleared” 
by child protective services (Table 4 of source article). 
!
Similarly, the final conclusion of Thomas’s report was that “Children old enough to run can 
fall and fracture their femurs, especially if a twisting motion occurs.”  The article contained 74
no more relevant information on the 3 cases with that explanatory history, classified as 
accidents, than the history itself. Whether each case was considered a “questionable”, 
“likely” or “definite” accident was not reported. 
!
Coffey’s report closed with the following advice: “…in our series, nearly 75% of patients 
younger than 18 months with a lower extremity fracture were injured as the result of child 
abuse. … Based on this study, the importance of screening for child abuse in infants and 
toddlers younger than 18 months cannot be overemphasized.”  In this study the case 75
classification was determined by information found on the hospital trauma registry. 
!
!
 Schwend RM, Werth C and Johnston A, n 64, p 481.73
 Thomas et al, n 64, p 476.74
 Coffey et al, n 64, p 122.75
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Figure 9. The influence of causal force on fracture pattern 
!
(a) Direct force applied perpendicular to the long axis of the bone 
causes a “transverse” or “oblique” fracture. 
(b) A twisting (torsional) force causes a “spiral” fracture, which has a 
sinusoidal appearance.  76
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 Ramasamy A et al, “Blast-related fracture patterns: a forensic biomechanical approach” (2011) 8 76
Journal of the Royal Society: Interface 689, Figure 6.
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Blakemore’s study  of children aged 1 to 5 years with femoral fracture reported that “In all 77
42 children, only one fracture was documented to be inflicted.… From this review, the 
likelihood of intentional injury to the femoral shaft appears to be low…” (p 585). The 
authors hoped that “…other centers will review their data and corroboration can be 
obtained, then the filing for investigation could be decreased in cases of accidental injury, 
reducing the emotional stress on the involved families and allowing the social agencies to 
allocate their time and resources more effectively” (p 588). In this study the method of 
case classification was “confirmation of inflicted injury by legal hearing”. Although the 
“history was considered suspicious for intentional injury in 14 children”, only 4 cases 
proceeded to a legal hearing. 
!
!
Comment 
!
The main aim of some studies was to identify whether any morphological features of a 
child’s fracture in itself was strongly associated with abuse or accident as its cause 
(Scherl, Rex). No such association has been found. The myth that a shaft fracture with a 
spiral morphology might, without regard to the explanatory history given, strongly indicate 
abuse as its cause, has been busted. No new indicators have been discovered which 
demonstrate a utility for the question comparable to that provided by the detection of 
CMLs. 
!
If more studies had compared cases of “definite accident” (as definitely as that can be 
established) with cases of “definite” abuse, it is more likely that valid inferences about 
some of the individual case criteria for abuse could have been drawn. The cause of 
femoral fracture in young children will remain uncertain in many cases, but more than 1000 
such cases were reported across the studies reviewed. 
!
The diminishing returns of studies of similar design to those reviewed here underlines the 
importance of exploring new avenues of research, such as biomechanical studies. With 
the benefit of hindsight, the reporting of cases of serious injury to a child as simply 
‘accident’ or ‘abuse’, many of which in reality would have caused the clinician who 
assessed them considerable doubt and angst, does not recommend itself as an element of 
future research design. It seems to reflect and perpetuate a misguided construction of the 
 Blakemore, Loder and Hensinger, n 64.77
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scientific problem: that child abuse is fundamentally a medical condition, which can be 
medically diagnosed.
Chapter 3: Bias 
!
!
3.1 Bias 
!
3.2 Aversion to participation in legal proceedings 
!
3.3 Fear of professional disciplinary action, fear of vilification: Meadow and the GMC 
!
3.4 Fear of professional disciplinary action, fear of vilification- continued 
!
3.5 Missed opportunities: Fear of future injury to or death of a child 
!
3.6 Addressing potential bias in forensic medical practice 
!
!
Outline of chapter 
!
Bias is arguably easier to recognise than define. The clinical determination of the cause of 
injury to a young child is particularly vulnerable to a wide array of potentially powerful 
biases. 
!
One such potential bias is aversion to involvement in legal proceedings, a concern 
underlined by the erasure from the medical register of the United Kingdom, of the name of 
paediatrician Professor Roy Meadow, as a sanction for flawed expert evidence given in a 
criminal trial. 
!
A potential bias of opposite effect is the fear of missing signs of child abuse, with 
subsequent further injury or death of a child. This was the outcome in the case of “Baby 
P”, who was seen by a paediatrician a few days before his violent death.  
!
Both of these cases are distinguished by extraordinary official responses to forensic 
medical error. 
!
!
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3.1 Bias 
!
“We had allowed ourselves, is probably a good way to put it, to appear as if 
we were biased in favour of the mother.” (Paediatrician informant 2) 
!
* * * * * 
!
The risk of expert evidence being affected by bias has been identified as a serious 
problem in the administration of justice.  It can potentially affect the formulation of a 1
forensic opinion regarding an injury to a child, and thus the content of a written report, or 
oral evidence given by an expert witness in court. It could also influence clinical decision-
making at an earlier point, when a clinician decides whether a case of injury to a young 
child should be notified to authorities, as one of suspected child abuse. 
!
There have been surprisingly few attempts to define “bias” in either the medical or legal 
literature. In the forensic context the word appears usually to refer to any distorting 
influence on an individual’s opinion or reasoning, which tends to push that reasoning 
toward an invalid conclusion. It is widely acknowledged that bias may be conscious; for 
example an expert might deliberately amend their stated opinion to best secure lucrative 
forensic work into the future. Or bias may be unconscious;  an individual might abhor the 2
possibility that their cognition is beholden to racial prejudice, yet they may conclude that 
the same history explains an injury to a child less plausibly in the case of a family of one 
race, than they would if the family was of a different race. 
!
In some instances it may become clear that a decision or an opinion was affected by bias. 
For example a clinician's decision may be shown to be incorrect, after which the clinician 
himself or herself reflects on events and realises that their own decision was swayed into 
error by bias. Another similar, but less certain, situation is where decisions are shown to be 
 Freckelton I, Reddy P and Selby H, Australian Magistrates’ Perspectives on Expert Evidence: A 1
Comparative Study (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 2001) [4.3]; Sperling HD, “Expert 
evidence: The problem of bias and other things” (2000) 4 Judicial Review 429.
 Samuels G, “Medical truth and legal proof :Changing expectations of the expert witness” (1998) 2
168 Medical Journal of Australia 84; Williams GN, “Expert evidence: A judge’s 
assessment” (Speech to Australian Institute of Quantity Surveyors Expert Witness Workshop, 21 
July 2001); Bell E, “Judicial assessment of expert evidence” (2010) 2 Judicial Studies Institute 
Journal 55.
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incorrect, and the impression given to an external observer by the overall pattern is that 
one specific source of bias has led to errors, made by clinicians whose judgement is 
usually sound. An example is the apparent increased tendency that an injury to a child of a 
minority race will evoke “some suspicion” of abuse in clinicians, than the same injury to a 
white child would.  3
!
In the medical study of child physical abuse, the general lack of diagnostic certainty makes 
the recognition of true bias a slippery proposition. Silverman, the medical researcher who 
first recognised that Classic Metaphyseal Lesions in infants are caused by trauma, may 
well have been accused by his contemporaries of carrying a bias which led him to see 
child abuse wherever he turned.  If so, the march of scientific understanding showed 4
Silverman to be right. In contrast, the same criticism might have been levelled at Professor 
Roy Meadow through the 1990s.  In his case however, with the benefit of hindsight, an 5
accusation of bias appears more soundly founded. One scientist’s bias is another’s insight, 
and often it is only in hindsight that the two can be clearly distinguished. 
!
An example of a factor which would be expected to generally improve clinical decision-
making, but which might also impart bias in some circumstances, is that of a clinician’s 
past training, and current work environment. Several studies have examined the influence 
of past training in the detection of child abuse, on the likelihood that a case is notified to 
authorities, or that a child will be “diagnosed” with child abuse.  A similar comparison has 6
been made between the assessments of young injured children in a children’s hospital, 
rather than a general hospital.  Clinicians who have received more specific training, or 7
work in a child-specific facility, are more likely to report suspected abuse or its “diagnosis”. 
This outcome, of increased detection of abuse, is almost universally presented within this 
 Flaherty EG et al, “Assessment of suspicion of abuse in the primary care setting” (2002) 2 3
Ambulatory Pediatrics 120.
 Kleinman PK, “‘The roentgen manifestations of unrecognized skeletal trauma in infants’- A 4
Commentary” (2008) 190 American Journal of Roentgenology 559.
 For example Davis JA, “Letter: Unnatural sudden infant death” (1999) 81 Archives of Disease in 5
Childhood 96.
 Sege R et al, “To report or not to report: Examination of the initial primary care management of 6
suspicious childhood injuries” (2011) 11 Academic Pediatrics 460 ; Lawrence LL and Brannen SJ, 
“Impact of physician training on child maltreatment reporting: a multi-specialty study” (2000) 165 
Military Medicine 607.
 Trokel M et al, “Variation in the diagnosis of child abuse in severely injured infants” (2006) 117 7
Pediatrics 722.
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literature as an unqualified good. It is however to be noted that the miscarriages of justice 
detailed throughout this Chapter all involved experts of national or international renown, 
whose errors required subsequent judicial correction. On the other side of the coin, the 
facility which oversaw the inadequate service provided to “Baby P” over the last few 
months and days of the abused child’s life was Britain’s most prestigious children’s 
hospital, Great Ormond Street Hospital. 
!
Space does not allow a comprehensive examination of all possible sources of bias in a 
clinician’s assessment of a child’s injury. The cases focused on in the balance of this 
Chapter are those of most current interest to a doctor who works with children, in Australia 
and the United Kingdom. 
!
!
!
!
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3.2 Aversion to participation in legal proceedings 
!
!
“Suppose you are a statistician sitting peacefully in your office one day, and you get a 
telephone call from an attorney asking you to serve as an expert witness in a case. Some 
statisticians react to this invitation as if they had been invited to their own public 
hanging….”  The same could be said of some doctors. 8
!
The legal literature contains many colourful descriptions of the experience of an expert 
witness in court. The following passage is attributed to American expert in the law of 
evidence, John Henry Wigmore: 
!
Professional men of honorable instincts and high scientific standards began to look 
upon the witness box as a golgotha,  and to disclaim all respect for the law’s method 9
of investigation.  10!
More recently, Presidents of the Family Division of the High Court of England and Wales 
have written: 
!
As judges we are sympathetic to the fact that, for the expert, participation in court 
proceedings can be intimidating, time-consuming, confrontational, complex and 
unpleasant.  11!
Cross-examination, in particular, is perceived by some experts as a gladiatorial 
combat in which the lawyers make the rules and change them as they go along.  12!
!
!
 Kadane JB, Statistics in the Law (Oxford University Press 2008) vii.8
 Another name for the hilltop, more commonly known as Calvary, on which Jesus was crucified.9
 Rares S, “Using the ‘hot tub’- How concurrent expert evidence aids understanding 10
issues” (2010) Federal Judicial Scholarship 20, [9].
 Butler-Sloss E, “Expert witnesses, courts and the law” (2002) 95 Journal of the Royal Society of 11
Medicine 431, p 433.
 Wall N, A Handbook for Expert Witnesses in Children Act Cases (2nd ed, Jordan Publishing, 12
2007) [21.2].
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Accounts in the medical literature given by medical witnesses of their experiences in court, 
are generally no happier: 
!
Doctor in the witness box: the loneliest spot on earth.  13!
Comments regarding things that worried participants most about being an expert 
witness: 
‘Looking stupid’ 
‘Public performance’ 
‘Being made to look incompetent’ 
‘Misunderstanding the question’ 
‘Not knowing why I am being questioned’ 
‘Not understanding the points of law’ 
‘Not having the knowledge’ 
‘Being goaded into a position’ 
‘Aggressive cross-examination’ 
‘The time that is involved’ 
‘Contributing to a miscarriage of justice’  14!
The hypothesis that prior negative experience in court is associated with 
[decreased] reporting [of suspected child abuse] behavior among pediatricians was 
supported by the results of this study.  15!
Many paediatricians find giving evidence in court very stressful and challenging.  16!
An excellent 2013 report  on the experiences of expert witnesses and lawyers in New 17
Zealand who are involved in criminal or family proceedings, was prompted in part by 
anecdotes that many experts there are reluctant to participate in court cases. This was 
 Smith A, “Doctor in the witness box: the loneliest spot on earth” (2005) RACP News 20.13
 Cunningham NY and Weiland TJ, “Current level of training, experience and perceptions of 14
emergency physicians as expert witnesses: A pilot study” (2009) 21 Emergency Medicine 
Australasia 497, Table 2.
 Theodore AD and Runyan DK, “A survey of pediatricians’ attitudes and experiences with court in 15
cases of child maltreatment” (2006) 30 Child Abuse and Neglect 1353, p 1362.
 Shabde N, “Child protection training for paediatricians” (2006) 91 Archives of Disease in 16
Childhood 639, p 640.
 Henderson E and Seymour F, “Expert witnesses under examination in the New Zealand criminal 17
and family courts” (Law Foundation of New Zealand, 2013).
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confirmed in interviews for the study (p 56); most experts disliked appearing in court, and 
believed that most of their colleagues try to avoid it. 
!
The dissatisfaction of many medical witnesses with the reality of giving evidence in court 
probably stems from several factors. The imposing physical environment and procedures 
are alien to most doctors, and are of course meant to convey the gravity of the court’s 
authority in resolving the dispute before it. 
!
In addition, an expert witness may feel that they have not been given an opportunity to 
properly explain their opinion on an important issue during this process. A witness who is 
naive in respect of basic legal procedure, admissibility of opinion evidence, or the 
traditional rules of evidence, may be perturbed by apparently inexplicable judicial 
interventions, either at the time of their giving evidence or on learning of it later. 
!
An expert witness will rarely have the opportunity to learn of all the evidence given or 
admitted in a matter in which they have given evidence. If the outcome is one which, from 
the information they have (often provided by the party which called them), appears to them 
unjust, it may be expected that some will conclude that the (to them) unsatisfactory nature 
of the reception of their own evidence contributed to an injustice. Such a view would lead 
to a sense of futility in the prospect of ever giving evidence in court again. 
!
A seasoned expert witness (expert in civil engineering) recounted a formative experience 
from early in his forensic career: 
!
…the bar table was literally overflowing with Senior and Junior Counsel. 
As I sat in the witness box, having been courteously and oh so politely softened for 
the kill by two veteran Senior Counsel from the Victorian Bar, I experienced that 
seminal moment. 
The one when the realisation washed over me that they had much better knowledge 
of factual matters relating to this case than I did. 
I did the only thing that any expert should do, I made the appropriate concessions, 
left the Court and flew back to Sydney. 
However, I did not feel good afterwards- in fact I felt angry, I felt terrible, I felt gutted 
and I knew instinctively that I had been set up.  18
 Cowling HC, “Personal thoughts relating to the operation of the single expert rule” (Speech to 18
North Queensland Law Association Annual Conference, 30 May 2008).
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Any risk of what might be called “professional embarrassment”, or at least stung 
professional pride, is likely to loom particularly large to a prospective medical witness. A 
doctor whose standing leads to them being called as an expert witness is likely to be 
accustomed to their pronouncements being met with deference, or at least with courteous 
attention. To have their evidence “destroyed” in court would generally be as unwelcome an 
experience as it would novel. 
!
It is not only the brittle ego of a medical specialist, however, which might lead an expert to 
avoid in their daily work any situation which could end up in the witness box. Robust cross-
examination and judicial criticism has been described as a legitimate tool of quality 
assurance in expert evidence. Justice Williams of the Supreme Court of Queensland, 
outlining the difficulties in applying any system of accreditation or sanction to wayward 
expert witnesses, in 2000 observed: 
!
If an expert was discredited on a number of occasions that would impact upon that 
expert’s standing in the Courts and in his peer group. That is perhaps the most 
significant sanction compelling compliance with such rules [of expert witness 
conduct]. … 
In the end the only real sanction can be peer pressure and standing in the eyes of 
the Court.  19!
!
F v The Queen (1995) 83 A Crim R 502 
!
Negative comments on an expert witness’s evidence or their credibility might cause 
particular discomfort if they come from the bench of a superior court, and not only cross-
examining silk. In this matter the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal held that 
evidence given by a paediatrician on the purported psychiatric condition “Child Sexual 
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome” (CSAAS), said to occur in child sexual abuse victims, 
was inadmissible. On this basis a new trial was ordered.  
!
The paediatrician had examined the complainant at the age of 12, after she had disclosed 
repeated sexual abuse, including penile penetration, by her father. The paediatrician’s 
findings on physical examination were of an obliterated hymen and tissue scarring which 
 Williams GN, “Accreditation and accountability of experts” (Paper to Medico-Legal Conference, 5 19
August 2000) p 21.
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suggested healing of previous injury. These findings were not however the focus of her 
examination-in-chief at trial: 
!
By the time Dr Packer came to give her evidence, it was apparent that the defence 
placed reliance upon the circumstances in which C's complaints came to be made, 
including her delay in complaining, and inconsistencies in her complaints. That was 
the background against which, over objection, Dr Packer gave the controversial 
evidence. !
A dispassionate reading of the judgment suggests that the primary objects of the Supreme 
Court’s displeasure were the Crown Prosecutor and the trial judge, for respectively having 
led, and having admitted, the paediatrician’s evidence on CSAAS. The decision has been 
described as “one of the more rigorous applications of the expertise rule”.  20
!
The judgment is certainly strongly worded, to the point of bluntness. The paediatrician, 
reading it, might have felt unappreciated. 
!
Dr Packer was a specialist paediatrician… She is not a psychiatrist or a 
psychologist. … !
…the evidence did not involve Dr Packer expressing any opinion concerning the 
plaintiff. She did not say, for example, that in her opinion (assuming this to be 
otherwise within her expertise) the plaintiff was affected by the syndrome about 
which she had read in literature, or even that, in her opinion, the behaviour of the 
plaintiff was consistent with such a syndrome. .… !
The law only permits the Crown to lead evidence of a complaint for a certain limited 
purpose. … The evidence of Dr Packer might be thought to make this whole 
exercise useless. Was it intended to suggest that inconsistency in stories told by a 
complainant can never reflect adversely on the reliability of the complainant? If that 
were not the suggestion, then in what circumstances would inconsistency be a 
useful guide to a complainant's reliability? None of this is addressed in Dr Packer's 
evidence. … !
So far as appears from the evidence of Dr Packer, the ‘syndrome’ is non-diagnostic. 
…whilst Dr Packer may not have done justice to the learning that exists in relation to 
the syndrome she was discussing, the second of the answers in the evidence 
 Freckelton I, “Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation evidence: The travails of counterintuitive 20
evidence in Australia and New Zealand” (1997) 15 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 247, p 279.
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quoted above seems to lead to the following conclusions: some children conceal 
abuse when they feel threatened; some children conceal abuse when they feel safe; 
some children disclose abuse when they feel threatened; some children disclose 
abuse when they feel safe. It is hardly surprising that the trial judge did not attempt 
an analysis of the practical significance of the evidence. …. !
The ‘syndrome’ referred to was not shown to be a fit subject for expert opinion. 
Whether, in truth, it is such a subject we do not know. However, what Dr Packer had 
to say about it did not demonstrate it to be so. …. !
No trial judge would relish the task of trying to explain to a jury how they might 
legitimately take account, in their reasoning processes, of evidence such as that 
given by Dr Packer. …. Perhaps if we knew more about the ‘syndrome', and its 
scientific basis, we would have a better idea, but the answer is not to be found in the 
evidence that was allowed to go before the jury in the present case. !
The leading legal scholar in Australia on expert evidence, Ian Freckelton SC, has written 
extensively on “syndrome evidence”,  including on evidence given on CSAAS.  Soon 21 22
after these proceedings he argued compellingly that the most important and valid role of 
expert evidence given on various psychological “syndromes” is in “dispelling myths or 
disabusing triers of fact of misperceptions generally held within the community”.  Such 23
evidence at best “removes from the evaluation process one potential source of error and 
enables the jury to exercise its evaluation in a more informed fashion” (p 297). 
!
In this Chapter on the subject of expert witness bias, however, the question is not the 
legitimacy of the evidence given, or its exclusion. It is whether any emotional response to 
the judgment, on the part of the paediatrician involved or of other clinicians reading it, 
could feasibly engender bias in their future clinical decisions, or their future documented 
forensic opinions. 
!
 Freckelton I, “When plight makes right- the forensic abuse syndrome” (1994) 18 Criminal Law 21
Journal 29; Freckelton I, “Editorial: Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy and criminal prosecutions for 
child abuse” (2005) 12 Journal of Law and Medicine 261; Freckelton I, “Autism Spectrum Disorder: 
Forensic issues and challenges for mental health professionals and courts” (2013) 26 Journal of 
Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities 420.
 Freckelton I, “Judicial pedagogy and expert evidence on victims' responses to trauma” (1997) 4 22
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 79.
 Freckelton I, “Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation evidence: The travails of counterintuitive 23
evidence in Australia and New Zealand” (1997) 15 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 247.
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One can guess at the paediatrician’s reflections after the fact, if she was of a similar 
temperament to the several doctors quoted above, describing their court experience. She 
had trained and continued to practice in a challenging and unglamorous area of medicine, 
one shunned even by many paediatricians. She held undisputed expertise in a skill which 
only a tiny fraction of doctors hold: the interpretation of the genital examination of a 
prepubertal girl.  At trial, due to circumstances arising from purely legal considerations, a 24
lawyer had asked her questions regarding a purported medical entity with which she was 
familiar, from her own reading of articles published in medical journals. The presiding 
judge had specifically allowed her to answer those questions. She had done so to the best 
of her ability. As a result of her evidence being ruled inadmissible, the criminal conviction 
of the individual who (on the information available to her) was most likely to have 
repeatedly sexually abused a girl from the ages of 7 to 12 was overturned. The 
paediatrician at that time might also have wondered whether, in the words of Justice 
Williams quoted earlier, her participation in proceedings had had an “impact upon that 
expert’s standing in the Courts and in [her] peer group.” 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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 See Smith A, “The prepubertal hymen” (2011) 40 Australian Family Physician 873.24
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3.3 Fear of professional disciplinary action, fear of vilification: Meadow and the GMC 
!
!
The handling by the United Kingdom’s General Medical Council (GMC), of a 2005 
complaint against paediatrician Professor Sir Roy Meadow, alarmed many observers. 
!
Meadow had given expert evidence for the prosecution in the 1999 trial  of Sally Clark, for 25
the murder of two of her infant children. In 2003 Clark’s convictions were overturned,  26
after results came to light of microbiological tests conducted on one of the deceased 
infants, results which had not been disclosed at trial. The Home Office pathologist 
responsible, Dr Alan Williams, was heavily criticised by the Court of Appeal (Crim) of 
England and Wales for this and other serious lapses. Over time he had changed his 
conclusions on the cause of death of one of the infants, the presence or absence of retinal 
haemorrhages in one, whether brain lacerations found in one were real or artifact, and on 
other critical findings. 
!
Meadow had played no part in this omission or these errors; his opinion that Clark had 
murdered her children was based in part on Williams’s reports and conclusions.  Meadow 27
had however given evidence at trial which drew its own criticism, first in the BMJ  and 28
mainstream media, then from the Court of Appeal. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
 R v Clark [2000] EWCA Crim 54. 25
See Skellern C, “Medical experts and the law: Safeguarding children, the public and the 
profession” (2008) 44 Journal of Paediatrics and Child Health 736.
 R v Clark [2003] EWCA Crim 1020.26
 Meadow R, “A case of murder and the BMJ” (2002) 324 BMJ 41.27
 Watkins SJ, “Editorial: Conviction by mathematical error? Doctors and lawyers should get 28
probability theory right” 320 BMJ 2.
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The flawed evidence which Meadow had given was called “statistical evidence” by the 
Court of Appeal (Civ), in R v Clark [2003] EWCA Crim 1020 (at [94]). In examination-in-
chief he had been asked about the chances of multiple SIDS deaths in one family. 
Meadow had agreed that the chance of SIDS occurring in one family like the Clarks was 1 
in 8543. He was then asked about the chance of two infants dying of SIDS in that family. 
He answered: 
!
you have to multiply 1 in 8,543 times 1 in 8,543… it’s approximately a chance of 1 in 
73 million. 
…in England, Wales and Scotland there are about say 700,000 live births a year, so 
it is saying by chance that happening will occur about once every hundred years. 
[96], [97] !
Under cross-examination Meadow added: 
!
…it’s the chance of backing that long odds outsider at the Grand National, you 
know; let’s say it’s an 80 to 1 chance, you back the winner last year, then the next 
year there’s another horse at 80 to 1 and it is still 80 to 1 and you back it again and it 
wins. Now here we’re in a situation that, you know, to get to these odds of 73 million 
you’ve got to back that 1 in 80 chance four years running… 
…it’s the same with these deaths. You have to say two unlikely events have 
happened and together it’s very, very, very unlikely. [99] !
This method of calculation of probability, and the figure Meadow arrived at, has been 
widely criticised as incorrect. If Meadow had also explicitly argued that this extreme rarity 
itself led to the inescapable conclusion that the accused had murdered her children, he 
would have also been advancing the “prosecutor’s fallacy”, outlined in Chapter 1. 
!
At trial the defence did not object to this evidence. One of the co-authors of the study from 
which Meadow drew his figures had directly informed Clark’s legal team that the data it 
contained was not suitable for the inference which Meadow subsequently made. Another 
co-author of the same study himself appeared as an expert witness for the defence. At trial 
the judge gave the jury a cautionary direction as to their use of statistics, although the 
adequacy of this warning was subsequently questioned. 
!
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Clark had first appealed her convictions in 2000, in R v Clark [2000] EWCA Crim 54. One 
of the grounds of appeal was the “statistical evidence” given by Meadow. The Court of 
Appeal, as it was constituted on this first occasion, commented: 
!
While to deal properly with this ground of appeal in its context in the trial it has been 
necessary to consider the evidence and issues in detail, it was very much a side-
show at trial. The experts were debating the incidence of genuine SIDS 
(unexplained deaths with no suspicious circumstances) in a case where both sides 
agreed that neither Christopher’s death nor Harry’s death qualified as such. [126] !
Two statisticians gave evidence to this first Court of Appeal on Meadow’s error. Having 
examined the trial material and the fresh evidence, the Court of Appeal rejected two of 
three elements of this ground of appeal outright: !
In our judgment…. Professor Meadow's opinion was based on his expert 
assessment of the medical and circumstantial evidence, not on the statistical 
material. Most of his examination in chief was concerned with the medical issues. 
He nowhere suggests that Table 3.58…. provides any evidence that these deaths 
were unnatural, only that true SIDS were rare. … And it is clear from reading his 
evidence that his conclusion was firmly based on that medical and circumstantial 
evidence, as one would expect. [144] !
In regard to the third element of this ground of appeal, the Court recorded some 
ambivalence: 
!
…we conclude that there is some substance to the criticism that the judge appeared 
to endorse the prosecution’s erroneous approach in this particular. The ultimate 
question for us is whether the error of approach rendered the conviction unsafe. 
That is something best considered after examining the remaining grounds of appeal, 
when we can look at the case in the round. [168] !
Ultimately the Court held that the strength of other evidence received at trial (much of it 
later shown to be wrong) would have eclipsed whatever influence Meadow’s “statistical 
evidence” might have had on the minds of the jury: 
!
In the context of the trial as a whole, the point on statistics was of minimal 
significance and there is no possibility of the jury having been misled so as to reach 
verdicts that they might not otherwise have reached. [256] 
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The case took on a different complexion after the discovery of the several defects in the 
evidence given by pathologist Dr Williams at trial. This second Court of Appeal, referring to 
new evidence given by forensic pathologist Professor Roger Byard, held that Williams had 
omitted routine dissection and histology, and so had prevented verification of his findings. 
It held further that he had altered a number of potentially important diagnoses and 
conclusions over time (as outlined above). The appeal was allowed and Clark’s convictions 
overturned. 
!
Following this, Clark’s father made a complaint to the GMC alleging that Meadow’s flawed 
evidence constituted serious professional misconduct. In 2005 the GMC’s Fitness to 
Practice Panel (FPP) concluded that Meadow was indeed guilty of serious professional 
misconduct. The Panel ordered that his name be erased from the medical register.  29
Clark's father had not sought Meadow’s striking off, but that Meadow should be prevented 
from acting as an expert in child abuse cases in the future. The Panel had specifically 
found that Meadow had not intended to mislead the court and that there was no evidence 
of any calculated or wilful failure to use his best endeavours to provide evidence. “He had 
acted in good faith.”  30
!
In finding Meadow guilty of serious professional misconduct, and striking him off the 
medical register, the Panel did not obtain or read the judgment of either Court of Appeal. 
This anomaly came about because Meadow’s counsel had wanted the Panel to have the 
judgment in the first appeal which, as above, did not contain heavy criticism of Meadow’s 
“statistical evidence”. The second Court of Appeal was more directly critical of the 
“statistical evidence”, and the GMC’s counsel had wanted the Panel to have that judgment 
alone. “Apparently the resulting agreement between leading counsel was that neither 
judgment should go to the panel.”  31
!
In Meadow v General Medical Council [2006] EWHC 146 (Admin), Justice Collins allowed 
Meadow’s appeal against both the GMC’s findings and the sanction. The primary reason 
provided by the Court for the decision was essentially pragmatic. Collins J commented that 
!
 The Fitness to Practice Panel’s decision in this matter was previously publicly available, but is no 29
longer.
 Meadow v General Medical Council [2006] EWHC 146 (Admin) at [6].30
 General Medical Council v Meadow [2006] EWCA Civ 1390 at [268] (Thorpe LJ).31
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There can be no doubt that the administration of justice has been seriously 
damaged by the decision of the FPP in this case and the damage will continue 
unless it is made clear that such proceedings need not be feared by the expert 
witness. [19] !
Collins J had become “aware of the real difficulties experienced in the Family Division 
because of the reluctance of doctors to produce reports and give evidence”. [6] 
!
Collins J also recorded that, separate to this consideration, he would have allowed 
Meadow’s appeal: 
!
As I have said, he made one mistake… It was a mistake, as the Panel accepted, 
that was easily and widely made. It may be proper to have criticised him for not 
disclosing his lack of expertise, but that does not justify a finding of serious 
professional misconduct. [54] !
I need say little about the sanction. It was unnecessary since the appellant had 
retired from clinical practice. … The FPP referred to the seriousness of his 
‘undermining of public confidence in doctors who have this pivotal role in the 
Criminal Justice System’. If the full facts are taken into account and the media 
campaign based on a lack of knowledge of all the circumstances is ignored that 
comment is unjustified. And to say, as the FPP did, that his conduct was 
‘fundamentally incompatible with what is expected by the public from a registered 
medical practitioner’ approaches the irrational. [57] !
The GMC appealed this decision soon after, in General Medical Council v Meadow [2006] 
EWCA Civ 1390. The Attorney General of the United Kingdom “intervened” (a legal term 
and process) in the appeal, submitting that the (then) extension of expert witness immunity 
from civil suit, to immunity from disciplinary proceedings, was inappropriate and unlawful, 
an argument with which the Court of Appeal unanimously agreed. The close interest taken 
by the government and by various professional organisations in these proceedings, and 
the issues which they encompassed, is outlined in the judgment.  32
!
!
!
 See also Gornall J, “Standing up for justice” (2007) 334 BMJ 1139.32
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In this appeal the bench included Lord Justice Thorpe, Deputy Head of Family Justice. 
Thorpe LJ recorded the following impression of the Panel’s decision-making: 
!
With the advantage of hindsight it seems both extraordinary and disadvantageous to 
deny the panel both judgments of the Court Appeal (Criminal Division). …. 
The predictable outcome, in my judgment, was that the panel failed to understand 
the full context in which Professor Meadow gave evidence. Their reasons suggest 
that they never understood that Professor Meadow’s evidence as to probabilities 
went to a non-issue at the conclusion of the evidence. [268], [269] !
Similarly, Lord Justice Auld: 
!
Where the conduct of an expert alleged to amount to a professional offence under 
scrutiny by his professional disciplinary body arises out of evidence he has given to 
a court or other tribunal, it is, therefore, important that that body should fully 
understand, and assess his conduct in the forensic context in which it arose. Of 
great importance are the circumstances in which he came to give the evidence, the 
way in which he gave it, and the potential effect, if any, it had on the proceedings 
and their outcome. If the disciplinary body lacks information to enable it properly to 
assess the expert’s conduct in that forensic context, or fails properly to take it into 
account, a court reviewing its determination is likely to bring important insights of its 
own to the matter. Not least among those should be an appreciation of the isolation 
of an expert witness, however seasoned in that role, in the alien confines of the 
witness box in an adversarial contest over which the judge and the lawyers hold 
sway. [205] !
In 2005, at the time of Meadow’s hearing before the Panel, the full judgments of both high-
profile appeals lodged by Clark in 2000 and 2003 were most likely available on the public 
website of the British and Irish Legal Information Institute  (a charitable trust, inspired by 33
Australia’s pioneering “AustLII”, providing full-text primary legal materials on the internet 
without charge), as they are now. 
!
 http://www.bailii.org/ 33
See Freedman C and Ury J, “BAILII's Continuing Expansion” (2008) 19 Computers and Law 5.
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The fallout from the affair has been significant.  The 2006 disciplinary proceedings 34
occurred against a background of mounting public and media (and hence political) 
agitation, on the issue of parents accused of harming their own children, and on 
“Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy” especially. The effect of headlines which had already 
demonised Meadow is hard to untangle from the effect of the GMC’s actions; headlines 
such as “His legacy of shattered lives”,  and “He doesn’t like women, says ex-wife”.  35 36
!
The vilification of both Meadow and his work, in both Houses of Parliament, also featured 
in the mix.  Earl Howe, for example, inserted his suspicion at the “pernicious and ill-37
founded” theory of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, and “its inventor” (Meadow), into his 
suggestion before the House of Lords that mercury present in vaccines is a cause of 
childhood autism, and might also cause ADHD.  (This was relatively gentle fare; in the 38
House of Commons, John Hemming MP likened paediatrician Dr David Southall to Nazi 
doctor and conductor of experiments on living Jews at Auschwitz, Josef Mengele).  39
!
Several reports in the years leading up to Meadow’s misconduct hearing indicated difficulty 
in the provision of paediatric services in child protection roles.  40
!
The President of the Family Division of the High Court of England and Wales expressed 
her concern around that time that the adverse publicity attached to the criminal trials had 
 See Henderson E and Seymour F, n 17, p 59; Williams C, “United Kingdom General Medical 34
Council fails child protection” (2007) 119 Pediatrics 800; Ranson D, “Professional regulation and 
justice: Balancing community benefit” (2006) 13 Journal of Law and Medicine 414; Payne H, “The 
jigsaw of child protection” (2008) 101 Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 9; Mathews B et al, 
“A way to restore British paediatricians’ engagement with child protection” (2009) 94 Archives of 
Disease in Childhood 329.
 Driscoll M, “His legacy of shattered lives”, Sunday Times (25 January 2004).35
 Cohen D, “He doesn’t like women, says ex-wife”, Evening Standard (23 January 2004).36
 House of Commons debates, Hansard (24 February 2004).37
 House of Lords debates, Hansard (5 February 2003) Column 316.38
 House of Commons debates, Hansard (19 December 2006) Column 1346.39
 RCPCH Research Division, “The RCPCH Child Protection Survey” (March 2003); Dyer O, 40
“Doctors reluctant to work on child protection committees, survey shows” (2004) 328 BMJ 307; 
Mittal R et al, “Are future paediatricians trained for handling child protection issues?” (2005) 
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led to doctors refusing to accept instructions to advise the court.  The leading legal British 41
scholar on expert evidence also criticised the actions and decision of the GMC,  on 42
pragmatic grounds, but also on issues of principle.  
!
Medical observers in the United States anticipated a “chilling effect” on child protection 
practice from the GMC’s actions,  and concluded that the GMC was intent on intimidating 43
paediatricians.  44
!
!
!
!
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 Hallett H, “Expert witnesses in the courts of England and Wales” (2005) 79 Australian Law 41
Journal 288.
 Blom-Cooper L, “Disciplining Expert Witnesses by Regulatory Bodies” [2006] Public Law 3. 42
 Chadwick DL, “Meadow, Southall, and the General Medical Council of the United 43
Kingdom” (2006) 117 Paediatrics 2247.
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3.4 Fear of professional discipline, fear of vilification- continued 
!
!
The storm which engulfed Meadow did not materialise without warning over still waters. 
The British public had been sensitised to forensic paediatric misfeasance, in large part by 
the “Cleveland crisis” of 1987. In the English county of that name, two paediatricians had 
diagnosed sexual abuse in many children over a short period. In many cases their 
diagnosis was largely based on the novel physical finding of “reflex anal dilatation”.  125 45
of 165 children examined were initially found to have been sexually abused, and were 
removed from their parents or carers. 
!
Initially, the media and public sympathy was strongly in support of the social workers 
and paediatricians; however, as the scandal came to embroil middle class families, 
public opinion shifted. These middle-class families were more able to challenge the 
power, authority and legal sanctions imposed by the government systems. The 
media turned to support the parents and a public inquiry was instigated…  46!
98 of the children were eventually returned home, and 27 wardship cases dismissed. 
!
The media reported on the Enquiry extensively: 
!
The evidence of witnesses was used very selectively by the press in emotive 
headlines to imply blame or support for their main protagonists or their actions. This 
sustained several lines of reporting: criticism of the doctors and social workers, inter-
professional conflicts, damage and wrong-doing to the families and the search for 
someone to blame.  47!
Headlines included: 
!
“Doctors guilty of sex assault in child tests” 
“Doctors cheered over signs of abuse” 
“Abuse doctor wanted world recognition”  48
 See Butler-Sloss E, “The Cleveland Enquiry” (1989) 57 Medico-Legal Journal 149.45
 Skellern, n 25, p 740.46
 Donaldson LJ and O’Brien S, “Press coverage of the Cleveland child sexual abuse enquiry: a 47
source of public enlightenment?” (1995) 17 Journal of Public Health Medicine 70, p 70.
 Donaldson and O’Brien, n 47, p 74.48
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Returning to the 2000s, a counterpoint to Meadow’s flagellation and the GMC’s method of 
decision-making in that case was the censure by the same Panel of Dr Colin Paterson, he 
of fantastical “Temporary Brittle Bone Disease” and of frequent appearances in the witness 
box on both sides of the Atlantic. Paterson’s name was erased from the medical register of 
the United Kingdom in 2004. His conduct had been referred to the GMC by President 
Butler-Sloss of the Family Division of the High Court of England and Wales. The complaint, 
and the GMC’s decision, related to expert evidence which he had recurrently given despite 
judicial criticism and warnings. 
!
In referring Paterson to the GMC, Butler-Sloss P foreshadowed a suggestion made by 
Collins J in Meadow v General Medical Council, that the presiding judge play a central role 
in determining whether an expert witness has so transgressed expected standards that 
they should face disciplinary proceedings.  It was the judges of the realm who stymied 49
that proposal. The idea did carry inherent practical difficulties, foremost of which was the 
conflict of interest which the plan would present to a judge. How could any judge make a 
disciplinary referral without calling into question her or his decision to have admitted that 
evidence?  50
!
Few doctors working with children would lament Paterson’s fate, or argue that this decision 
by the GMC was unfair. Meadow’s treatment by the criminal justice and professional 
regulatory systems was so extraordinary that it might lure clinicians into a nihilistic 
cynicism in regard to both systems. Yet the functions which they serve, at least, are 
necessary. 
!
!
Corresponding events in Australia 
!
In two recent cases in Australia criminal charges have been brought against a mother 
following multiple infant deaths. The Australian media has not to date pursued those 
themes so often pursued by Fleet Street. 
!
 Meadow v General Medical Council [2006] EWHC 146 (Admin) at [22].49
 Groves M, “Professional disciplinary proceedings against expert witnesses” (2007) 14 Journal of 50
Law and Medicine 306.
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In R v Matthey [2007] VSC 398, charges against Carol Matthey of the murder of four of her 
children were dropped, after the Supreme Court of Victoria held that most of the medical 
evidence given at committal was inadmissible. The case received only limited media 
attention. One of the few stories published on it, in The Age, was a balanced account, rich 
in detail, and bereft of villainous caricatures of the medical witnesses involved.  51
!
Press coverage of the case of Kathleen Folbigg, convicted in 2003 of the murder of three 
of her children and the manslaughter of another,  presents a mixed picture. The case 52
differs from others here discussed in a number of ways. The prosecution at trial did not rely 
as heavily on medical evidence alone as the prosecution in R v Clark. Folbigg’s husband 
had found diaries which she had written, after the death of their fourth child, and handed 
them in to police. Several entries in the diaries could have held probative value for the jury 
deciding the matter. The High Court on this basis distinguished the matter from R v 
Cannings [2004] EWCA Crim 01 (one of the English infant murder cases in which Meadow 
had given evidence) in particular. Folbigg appealed against her convictions in 2005; the 
appeal was reopened in 2007. On both occasions the appeal was dismissed.  53
!
Another distinct feature of this case is that it has recently attracted renewed public interest 
(including media reports which countenance Folbigg’s innocence), and this interest was 
instigated by members of the legal profession. Several legal scholars have strongly 
criticised the medical evidence given at trial,  and a judicial review of the matter is being 54
sought.  Thus far, the Australian media’s treatment of the medical witnesses themselves 55
has not replicated the bloodlust of their British counterparts (notwithstanding the odd 
 Kissane K, “The unsolved mystery of four infant deaths”, The Age (25 October 2007).51
 R v Folbigg [2003] NSWSC 895.52
 Folbigg v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 371.53
 See Cunliffe E, Murder, Medicine and Motherhood (Hart Publishing, 2011); Cunliffe E, “(This is 54
not a) Story: Using court records to explore judicial narratives in R v Kathleen Folbigg” (2007) 27 
Australian Feminist Law Journal 71; Edmond G et al, “Admissibility compared: The reception of 
incriminating expert evidence (i.e. forensic science) in four adversarial jurisdictions” (2013) 3 
University of Denver Criminal Law Review 31; Betts S and Goodman-Delahunty J, “The case of 
Kathleen Folbigg: How did justice and medicine fare?” (2007) 39 Australian Journal of Forensic 
Sciences 11. 
The Betts paper was extensively quoted, without comment, in the judgment in R v Mathey [2007] 
VSC 398.
 Mc Carthy J, “Kathleen Folbigg case review bid challenges SIDS evidence”, Newcastle Herald (6 55
October 2014).
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reference to the Salem witch hunts).  It is possible that the collective memory lingers in 56
the Australian media, of having sung chorus to Lindy Chamberlain’s conviction and 
imprisonment. This time, however, it is not an accused mother who stands to be vilified. 
Prominent radio personality Alan Jones has recently taken up Folbigg’s cause.  57
!
The heaviest penalty given to a medical practitioner in Australia by a professional 
regulatory body, for work done in a forensic capacity, was a 6 month suspension given to a 
forensic psychiatrist, found to have engaged in improper conduct in a professional respect 
by the Medical Board of Western Australia, confirmed on appeal, in Mustac v Medical 
Board of Western Australia [2004] WASCA 156. The psychiatrist had inappropriately used 
the “Test of Memory Malingering” to conclude that two patients had attempted to deceive 
him, a purpose for which the test had not been designed. His invalid opinion was included 
in medico-legal reports for each patient, involved in separate worker’s compensation 
claims.  58
!
In 2008 the Supreme Court of South Australia  explicitly followed the decision of the Court 59
of Appeal in General Medical Council v Meadow. Professionals in Australia remain liable to 
professional disciplinary proceedings following complaints which arise from their work 
done in a forensic role. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
 Whittaker M, “Did she do it? Why Kathleen Folbigg may not have killed her four babies”, Sydney 56
Morning Herald (2 February 2013).
 Benns M, “Radio host Alan Jones leads calls for convicted child killer Kathleen Folbigg to have 57
her case reviewed”, Sunday Telegraph (19 January 2014).
 Mustac v Medical Board of Western Australia [2004] WASCA 156. 58
See also Freckelton I, Editorial: Regulating forensic deviance: The ethical responsibilities of expert 
report writers and witnesses” (2004) 12 Journal of Law and Medicine 141.
 James v Keogh [2008] SASC 156.59
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3.5 Missed opportunities: Fear of future injury to or death of a child 
!
!
It could be argued that the desire to avert possible serious future harm to a child is an 
intention which is most difficult to separate into instances of necessary intervention, as 
distinct from instances of clinician bias. In any case of injury to a young child which does 
not appear routine, a clinician must contemplate the possibility of child abuse, for the 
foremost reason that if it has occurred, and it is not detected, it may prove lethal. The risks 
created, however, when vigilance is placed too far ahead of knowledge and understanding, 
were amply demonstrated during the Cleveland crisis. 
!
Numerous studies have addressed this concern. The most important to date is a 1999 
study  which found that 54 of 173 (31%) of children who were found to have suffered 60
abusive head trauma had previously suffered abusive head trauma and been brought for 
medical review, without the real cause for presentation being detected at that time. 4 of the 
5 deaths in the group might have been prevented by earlier recognition of abuse. The 
authors acknowledged the difficulty of detecting abuse at the first opportunity; non-specific 
symptoms such as vomiting or irritability are common in infants and young children, and 
commonly caused by other, benign, conditions. Similar findings have been reported 
since.  61
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 Jenny C et al, “Analysis of missed cases of abusive head trauma” (1999) 282 Journal of the 60
American Medical Association 621.
 See Tilak GS and Pollock AN, “Missed opportunities in fatal child abuse” (2013) 29 Pediatric 61
Emergency Care 685; Oral R et al, “Fatal abusive head trauma cases: Consequence of medical 
staff missing milder forms of physical abuse” (2008) 24 Pediatric Emergency Care 816; Cobley C 
and Sanders T, “‘Shaken Baby Syndrome’: Child protection issues when children sustain a 
subdural haemorrhage” (2003) 25 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 101.
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Fleet Street, the GMC and the House of Commons, revisited: Baby P 
!
A clinician can be subjected to excoriation similar to that applied to Professor Roy 
Meadow, but for the converse error, of not having recognised and adequately responded to 
the possibility of child abuse. 
!
This was to be the fate of paediatrician Dr Sabah Al-Zayyat. In August 2007 a 17 month 
old boy- “Baby P”- was brought into a north London hospital in cardiorespiratory arrest, 
unable to be resuscitated. Post-mortem examination revealed dozens of horrific inflicted 
injuries, infamously including a vertebral fracture. Al-Zayatt had seen the boy two days 
earlier in an outpatient clinic, at which time the vertebral fracture, along with multiple rib 
fractures, were most likely already present. The tabloid headlines which followed did not 
surprise: “Doctor who missed broken back speaks out”.  62
!
The prolonged epilogue to the boy’s death was, however, more remarkable than the 
headlines. Al-Zayyat had little child protection training or experience but had been 
recruited into a position which, according to the recruitment documentation, required it. 
This circumstance arose largely because in 2006 four paediatricians working there had 
provided a letter to the NHS Trust which oversaw it, describing the setup of the clinic and 
hospital where Baby P was eventually seen by Al-Zayyat as unsafe, due to several 
problems including “missing records” and “no child protection follow-up”.  Two of the 63
paediatricians left soon after the letter was sent; one was “put on special leave”. 
!
After Baby P’s death, two eminent paediatricians were commissioned to “review the 
Clinical Practice in Child Protection of Dr Sabah Al-Zayyat”.  The report identified deficits 64
in Al-Zayyat’s competence in assessing and managing child protection cases and gave 
recommendations for these to be addressed. The paediatricians also included their opinion 
that “the present arrangements for seeing child protection cases at [the hospital] cause 
grave concern”. The concern related especially to lack of consultant medical staff, lack of 
 Rayner G, “Baby P: Doctor who missed broken back speaks out”, The Telegraph (19 November 62
2008).
 Hammond P and Bousfield A, “Shoot the messenger: How NHS whistleblowers are silenced and 63
sacked” (2011) 1292 Private Eye 15.
 Sibert JR and Hodes D, “Review of child protection practice of Dr Sabah Al-Zayyat” (May 2008).64
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nursing staff, limited availability of vital medical records, and inadequate links with 
comprehensive paediatric services nearby. 
!
One of the paediatricians who had warned the NHS Trust in 2006 of the risks posed by the 
service at that time reported that, after Baby P’s death, lawyers from the NHS trust had 
approached her and offered her a sum “rising to £120 000” to leave her job there and stay 
silent.  In 2011 the Trust was reported to have “formally apologised” to this doctor.  65 66
!
Meanwhile, an increasingly troubled Al-Zayyat had been suspended from practice by the 
GMC in 2008.  In the face of media vilification and death threats  she applied for 67 68
“voluntary erasure” from the medical register, in October 2010. She wrote: 
!
I am deeply sorry, from the bottom of my heart, for the tragic death of Baby Peter. 
His death will be with me until the last day of my life. I wish I could turn the clock 
back and do things differently, but I cannot. Words cannot express how truly sorry I 
am. I am extremely sorry with regret, as I failed the child and let my patient down. I 
fell below the standards expected of me on that day. I thought my decisions and 
actions on the day and at the time were reasonable, but in hindsight my decisions 
were wrong.  69!
Al-Zayyat’s application was refused. The GMC reasoned that 
!
granting her application for voluntary erasure would satisfy one element of the public 
interest, the protection of patients. But it would not address the other two elements: 
the maintenance and promotion of public confidence in the medical profession and 
the maintenance and promotion of public confidence in the GMC’s performance of 
its statutory functions.  70
 Gilligan A, “‘If Great Ormond Street had listened to me, Baby Peter would still be alive’, says 65
consultant”, The Telegraph (6 December 2009).
 Butler P, “Great Ormond Street hospital issues apology to Baby P whistleblower”, The Guardian 66
(15 June 2011).
 In at least one Australian matter a medical practitioner has received a professional disciplinary 67
sanction for not acting on signs of child abuse, where the child has subsequently died: Medical 
Board of South Australia v Christpoulos [2000] SADC 47 (1).
 Parish E, “Who should we blame for the death of Baby P?” (2014) 349 BMJ g6643.68
 Al-Zayyat v General Medical Council [2010] EWHC 3213 (Admin) at [26].69
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Al-Zayyat then appealed to the High Court, in Al-Zayyat v General Medical Council [2010] 
EWHC 3213 (Admin). The High Court noted that Al-Zayyat’s initial application had been 
supported by a psychiatrist who had seen her on two occasions. The GMC’s Fitness to 
Practice Panel had itself sought the opinion of a second psychiatrist, who did not see her. 
Al-Zayyat had returned to her birth country of Saudi Arabia the day before the hearing was 
scheduled. The Panel was intent that Al-Zayyat should participate in the hearing, by video 
link if necessary. It rejected the GMC’s own suggestion that it should proceed in her 
absence. After four days of evidence was heard from the two psychiatrists, the Legal 
Assessor to the Panel reminded its members “that the evidence of both doctors was to the 
effect that Dr Al-Zayyat was not able effectively to participate in the proceedings…” [22]. 
Nevertheless the Panel held that her “lack of engagement in these proceedings so far is 
not a consequence of a genuine and involuntary incapacity to engage”, and refused her 
application. 
!
This was a conclusion which the High Court did not understand. “…on analysis, there is 
simply no support for the Panel's conclusion that her absence from the proceedings and 
her inability to participate in them were anything other than genuine and involuntary” [34]. 
The GMC subsequently granted Al-Zayyat voluntary erasure. 
!
Voluntary erasure from the medical register did not sate the appetite of all stakeholders in 
health care delivery in the United Kingdom. MP Stephen Barclay in 2014 decried the 
injustice of doctors “taking early retirement so they can avoid going to disciplinary 
hearings”.  He pointed to 39 such cases of doctors over the previous three years, one of 71
which was the case of Al-Zayyat. Al-Zayyat’s retirement was indeed early- she was aged 
53 at the time. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
 Newton J, “Dozens of doctors accused of serious malpractice ‘retire early to avoid disciplinary 71
hearings’”, Daily Mail (30 August 2014).
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3.6 Addressing potential bias in forensic medical practice 
!
!
Many other factors have the potential to distort a clinician’s reasoning process in the 
assessment of an injury to a young child. Aversion to confrontation, or to causing 
distressed parents further distress, may act as a strong disincentive to raising relevant 
concerns with the child’s parents, or to notifying authorities of these concerns.  This may 72
especially be the case if further investigation entails potential risk to the child, such as the 
long-term risks of radiation from a skeletal survey, or from computed tomography (CT) 
imaging of the head.  73
!
A clinician’s past negative experience of the involvement of a child protection agency, in a 
case of suspected child maltreatment, may also play a significant part in determining a 
clinician’s response.   74
!
Expert witnesses in common law jurisdictions have long enjoyed (presumed) immunity 
from civil suits arising from their evidence. A 2011 decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom, Jones v Kaney [2011] UKSC 13,  revealed this immunity to be illusory. 75
This decision only qualified the witness immunity rule in regard to actions for clients 
against their own experts, for breach of duty.  76
 See Steinberg KL et al, “Effects of legally mandated child-abuse reports on the therapeutic 72
relationship” (1997) 67 American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 112; Asnes AG and Leventhal JM, 
“Managing child abuse: General principles” (2010) 31 Pediatrics in Review 47, p 47; Haines L and 
Turton J, “Complaints in child protection” (2008) 93 Archives of Disease in Children 4; Lazenbatt A 
and Freeman R, “Recognizing and reporting child physical abuse: a survey of primary healthcare 
professionals” (2006) 56 Journal of Advanced Nursing 227, p 231; Morris JL et al, “To report or not 
to report: Physicians’ attitudes toward discipline and child abuse” (1985) 139 American Journal of 
Diseases of Children 194, Table 4.
 Brody AS et al, “Radiation risk to children from computed tomography” (2007) 120 Pediatrics 73
677.
 Lazenbatt and Freeman, n 72, p 232 ; Flaherty EG et al, “Health care providers’ experience 74
reporting child abuse in the primary care setting” (2000) 154 Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent 
Medicine 489, p 492; Zellman GL, “Report decision-making patterns among mandated child abuse 
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Civil suits have also arisen in common law jurisdictions in cases where a clinician has 
failed to report suspected abuse and as a result been held liable in negligence,  including 77
at least one Australian case.   78
!
Of interest to doctors who work with children is the House of Lords decision, JD v East 
Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust [2005] UKHL 23. Three conjoined appeals were 
heard, from suits in which parents sought damages from doctors whose initial opinions that 
their children had suffered abuse were later shown to be wrong. The appeals were 
dismissed, the House of Lords confirming that no duty of care is owed to parents by 
respondents in these circumstances.  79
!
Several studies have reported increased rates of investigation of cases of injury to a child, 
in families of a minority race or of low socioeconomic status, compared to other families 
where similar features of possible child abuse were present.  80
!
Partisanship is a recurring source of bias in the opinion evidence given by an expert 
witness.  Identifying with one “tribe” or another appears to be a deeply ingrained human 81
instinct. An expert’s opinion may drift into consistency with their own party’s position.  The 82
 See Fairgrieve D and Green S (eds), Child Abuse Tort Claims Against Public Bodies: A 77
Comparative Law Review (Ashgate Publishing, 2004).
 AB v Victoria [2000] VSC 239R (Unreported, Restricted, Supreme Court of Victoria, Gillard J, 15 78
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randomized study” (2012) 160 Journal of Pediatrics 1003; Cobley C and Sanders T, “‘Shaken Baby 
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expert may also suspend customary scepticism when provided with “facts” or assumptions 
provided to them by the instructing party. This has occurred in matters involving alleged 
child abuse.  (In child protection cases the “other party” is not always anonymous, since a 83
clinician may meet, or indeed may have commenced a therapeutic relationship with a 
parent who is believed to have abused their young child. As detailed above however, this 
situation may itself bring other equally powerful biases to bear.) 
!
The term “scientific prejudice” was used in 2009 family proceedings in the United Kingdom 
to describe the intransigence of opinion of two medical witnesses.  Perhaps most 84
specifically, the term describes the immutability of an opinion on a scientific issue in the 
face of new, contradicting, evidence. It can be confidently identified when an expert has 
described a principle of how a valid inference may be drawn, a principle which they later 
decline to themselves follow, when it clearly should be applied.  Circular reasoning is also 85
a common feature of positions of scientific prejudice. 
!
It has been argued that some expert witnesses have a personal stake in their view on a 
scientific controversy being accepted by a court, even when specific facts of the case 
require conceptual contortion to achieve this.  Here the currency of prestige and authority 86
within a scientific field may hold more influence than financial remuneration. 
!
A closely related phenomenon has been described by the Children’s Court of Victoria, 
regarding child protection proceedings: 
!
some experts, particularly those not used to court process and having their 
professional opinions challenged, resent the process and see it as disrespectful.  87
 R v Matthey [2007] VSC 398 at [142]; Meadow, n 27.83
 A Local Authority v S [2009] EWHC 2115 (Fam).84
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Forensic physicians, unbias thyselves 
!
Several measures to address bias in forensic medical practice have been recommended.  88
A standard one is that individuals should remain consciously aware of the possible effect 
of bias, and vigilant against specific manifestations of bias, both at the time of decision-
making and later, when actively reflecting on a case.   89
!
Training which specifically addresses common biases in forensic work is one systemic 
approach to the problem.  Peer review between professionals is also seen as an 90
important safeguard.  A process which might be considered a variation of peer review is 91
the regular multidisciplinary review of cases, which occurs in many hospital-based child 
protection teams.  92
!
Another possible approach to addressing bias would be most relevant to the minority of 
paediatricians whose work incorporates a substantial case load of specifically forensic/
child protection work, especially at a tertiary level. This is one-on-one “clinical supervision”, 
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of the sort routinely undertaken by psychiatrists and trainees in psychiatry.  Given the 93
strong emotional element of most cases of suspected child abuse faced by clinicians, a 
model of reflection which is native to psychiatric practice might well provide benefit to 
forensic clinical decision-making. Although it would present logistical and perhaps 
professional challenges, a version of this model has been trialled, with some success, in 
the practice of developmental/behavioural paediatrics.  94
!
!
!
!
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Chapter 4: Expert evidence and injury interpretation in legal 
proceedings 
!
!
4.1 Judicial reception of expert evidence 
!
4.2 The rules of evidence 
!
4.3 The science of statistics 
!
!
!
!
Outline of Chapter 
!
In a society of increasing complexity, courts of law increasingly turn to individuals with 
technical expertise, to assist their decision-making. These expert witnesses bring with 
them the risk of serious injustice. Their apparent authority may sway the tribunal of fact, 
beyond the proper effect of the technical assistance for which they were called. 
!
The operation of the rules of evidence in Australian jurisdictions continues to evolve. 
Although Children’s Courts are not bound by the rules of evidence, the principles which 
they reflect are relevant to child protection proceedings. The concepts of expertise, and 
area of expertise, are more difficult to neatly circumscribe in real life than in abstract 
formulation. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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4.1 Judicial reception of expert evidence 
!
!
In 2003 Justice Wood of the Supreme Court of New South Wales described the advent of 
the expert witness in legal proceedings centuries ago as a net positive: 
!
The use of expert witnesses, as an aid to the justice system, was a significant 
advance when compared with medieval reliance upon faith, which was itself 
dependent upon the ordeals of cold water, hot iron and combat.  1!
Usually a witness who gives evidence in legal proceedings may only give “evidence of 
fact”. They may tell the court what they observed through their primary senses; what they 
directly saw or heard. They may not give their opinion on inferences they themselves drew 
from the witnessed events. It is for the “tribunal of fact”, the court, to determine what 
inferences can be made from the sum of the evidence before it. 
!
Exception is made for the expert witness (Box 2).  Guidance regarding expert evidence 2
was given by Justice Cazalet in the Family Division of the High Court of England and 
Wales, in Re R [1990] EWHC Fam 1: 
!
Expert witnesses are in a privileged position; indeed, only experts are permitted to 
give an opinion in evidence. Outside the legal field the court itself has no expertise 
and for that reason frequently has to rely on the evidence of experts.  3
 Wood J, “Forensic sciences from the judicial perspective” (2003) 6 Judicial Review 149, p 166.1
 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79.2
 This appears to be the same case, decided on 27 July 1990, which elsewhere is cited as: Re J 3
[1991] FCR 193, although these cases are not linked in case citators.  
Re J has been widely cited in the Australian legal literature: see NSW Law Reform Commission, 
Expert Witnesses: Report 109 (NSWLRC, June 2005) p 139; Family Court of Australia, “The 
changing face of the expert witness: Discussion paper” (FamCA, 2002) Appendix E; Wood, n 1, p 
170; Sperling HD, “Expert evidence: The problem of bias and other things” (2000) 4 Judicial 
Review 429, p 459; Cooper RE, “Federal Court expert usage guidelines” (1997) 16 Australian Bar 
Review 203.
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Box 2. Section 79 of the uniform Evidence Acts
79 Exception: opinions based on specialised knowledge 
(1)  If a person has specialised knowledge based on the person’s training, study or 
experience, the opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an opinion of that person that 
is wholly or substantially based on that knowledge.  
(2)  To avoid doubt, and without limiting subsection (1):  
(a) a reference in that subsection to specialised knowledge includes a reference to 
specialised knowledge of child development and child behaviour (including 
specialised knowledge of the impact of sexual abuse on children and their 
development and behaviour during and following the abuse); and 
(b) a reference in that subsection to an opinion of a person includes, if the person 
has specialised knowledge of the kind referred to in paragraph (a), a reference to an 
opinion relating to either or both of the following: 
(i) the development and behaviour of children generally; 
(ii) the development and behaviour of children who have been victims of sexual 
offences, or offences similar to sexual offences.
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Evaluation of the validity of the expert’s conclusions 
!
“The function of an expert is to provide the trier of fact, judge or jury, with an inference 
which the judge or jury, due to the technical nature of the facts, is unable to formulate.”  4
More specifically, an expert witness’s duty is to “to furnish the trier of fact with criteria 
enabling evaluation of the validity of the expert’s conclusions.”  An expert must not only 5
state what their opinion is, but how they arrived at that opinion, in a manner intelligible to 
the court. 
!
Justice Kirby of the High Court of Australia in 2003 described the increasing challenge 
faced by courts in recent decades:  6
!
with the advances in scientific knowledge and the increase in technological capacity, 
the proof, reception and consideration of forensic evidence has become much more 
complex. (p 132) !
The challenge posed is not merely that of an incrementally increasing body of scientific 
knowledge. It is that 
!
unlike mechanical technologies of earlier generations, it is not now possible even for 
highly intelligent and well-educated lay people to comprehend the details of the 
sciences that I have mentioned [nuclear physics, informatics and genomics] or the 
technologies that have come in their wake. … The incapacity of even educated 
people to understand questions such as these presents serious social 
consequences for every legal system. (p 132) !
!
!
!
!
 Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 1200.4
 Makita v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305 at [59]. 5
See also Davie v Edinburgh Magistrates (1953) SC 34 at [40]; Samuels G, “Medical truth and legal 
proof: Changing expectations of the expert witness” (1998) 168 Medical Journal of Australia 84; 
Bell E, “Judicial assessment of expert evidence” (2010) 2 Judicial Studies Institute Journal 55, p 
67.
 Kirby M, “Expert evidence: Causation, proof and presentation” (2003) 6 Judicial Review 131.6
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It is a challenge which is not likely to diminish: 
!
Given the complexities of modern life, including the greater reliance on technology, it 
is likely that more and more cases before the courts will necessitate the calling of 
expert evidence.   7!
Another feature of expert evidence appears unlikely to change: 
!
doctors are still the expert witnesses who are most in demand, and their evidence is 
the scientific testimony most commonly presented to the courts.  8!
The concern that an impressive expert witness might usurp the decision-making role of the 
court has attended expert evidence as long as courts have received it. The High Court of 
Australia outlined this risk in 1989;  and again in 1999: 9
!
Experts who venture ‘opinions’…outside their field of specialised knowledge may 
invest those opinions with a spurious appearance of authority, and legitimate 
processes of fact-finding may be subverted.  10!
Lord Justice Leveson of the High Court of England and Wales in 2009 identified a modern 
aspect to this longstanding concern: 
!
Am I being farfetched if I wonder whether this view is attributable more to television 
programmes like CSI than to everyday life in the courts? If you have watched that 
programme, each tends to be solved forensically: an expert, doctor or scientist, 
provides the links and the proof. …. there can be a temptation, certainly in the eyes 
of the public, to think that there can be expert evidence to prove the essential point 
in a case, to the extent that you don’t need regular, old fashioned normal witnesses 
any more…  11!
 Williams GN, “Expert evidence: A judge’s assessment” (Speech delivered at the Australian 7
Institute of Quantity Surveyors Expert Witness Workshop, 21 July 2001).
 Samuels, n 5, p 84.8
 Murphy v The Queen [1989] 167 CLR 94 at [131] (Dawson J).9
 HG v The Queen [1999] 197 CLR 414 at [44] (Gleeson CJ).10
 Leveson BH (Speech to the Annual Bond Solon Expert Witness Conference, 6 November 2009).11
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It has been argued that a gulf exists between the approach taken to reasoning and 
problem-solving by legal professionals, and that taken by scientists. This divide might 
contribute to a degree of incommensurability between expert opinion and court reception 
of it. This difference in approaches was captured in the title of a speech given by former 
Justice of the Supreme Court of New South Wales, Gordon Samuels: “Medical truth and 
legal proof”. 
!
The procedure adopted in our courts tends to exacerbate fundamental differences in 
approach between doctors and lawyers. Medicine is a science and law is not. 
Developments in medicine are made by experiment and observation; in law they are 
made by the decisions of legislatures and judges. A medical fact is one which can be 
empirically supported or clinically determined; a legal fact is one which is more 
probable than other countervailing facts. A trial lawyer seeks to win by tipping the 
scales of proof in his or her favour by the preponderance of cogent evidence. 
Hence, the search is for positive answers and firm conclusions; for the means of 
establishing the proposition that will prove the issue in dispute and end the case. 
Beyond that the lawyer has no commitment. Thus, lawyers often find difficulty in 
dealing with the expert, whether forensic scientist or medical practitioner, who does 
have a continuing commitment to the search for a final answer…  12!
A medical author echoed these words a short while later: 
!
the approaches used by the two disciplines to establish their respective truths are 
fundamentally different. Common law process is based on an adversarial system in 
which opposing parties present evidence to a judge or jury who determine the 
outcomes. Litigants construct their cases largely by selecting evidence that is 
advantageous to themselves, rather than the ‘absolute truth’. In contrast, Western 
medicine is based on scientific evidence. It seeks to establish its ‘truth' through 
rigorous scientific methods which are foreign to the legal profession in its training 
and practice. 
In the curial interface between medicine and the law, science is moulded into an 
uneasy and unnatural use within a system of intellectual combat alien to the 
scientific method. Enmeshed in this process are expert witnesses.  13!
 Samuels, n 5, p 86.12
 Tjiong RT, “Reforming the law on expert evidence” (1998) 168 Medical Journal of Australia 53, p 13
53.
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Even the wording of the “opinion rule” contained in the uniform Evidence Acts might seem 
designed to remind an expert witness, however accomplished they might be in their own 
professional practice, of just how far they have wandered from home: 
!
Evidence of an opinion is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact about the 
existence of which the opinion was expressed.  14!
It is indeed common for an expert witness to express frustration that they were denied an 
opportunity to present their opinion in a way which to their mind would have rendered it 
most coherent. 
!
the details of forensic procedure place restrictions sanctioned by the rules of 
evidence upon the scientist's, and the doctor's, accustomed method of exegesis and 
description. The need to deploy closely reasoned opinion by means of question and 
answer, and the danger of fatal disconnection if the interrogating counsel is inept or 
the judge's interventions unduly copious, are not designed to promote lucidity. … 
Since our mode of trial does not involve painstaking and wide-ranging investigation 
conducted by an impartial inquisitor, it is not designed to ferret out the truth in any 
absolute sense.  15!
Justice Rares of the Federal Court of Australia described the typical course in the forensic 
use and testing of expert evidence: 
!
-Each expert is taken tediously through all his or her contested assumptions and 
then is asked to make his or her counterpart’s assumptions;  
-Considerable court time is absorbed as each expert is cross-examined in turn;  
-The expert issues can become submerged or blurred in a maze of detail;  
-Juries, judges and tribunals frequently become concerned that an expert is  
partisan or biased;  
-Often the evidence is technical and difficult to understand properly;  
-The experts feel artificially constrained by having to answer questions that may 
misconceive or misunderstand their evidence;  
-The experts feel that their skill, knowledge and, often considerable, professional 
accomplishments are not accorded appropriate respect or weight;  
-The Court does not have the opportunity to assess the competing opinions given in 
circumstances where the experts consider that they are there to assist it – rather 
 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 76(1).14
 Samuels, n 5, p 85.15
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experts are concerned, with justification, that the process is being used to twist or 
discredit their views, or by subtle shifts in questions, to force them to a position that 
they do not regard as realistic or accurate.  16!
An expert’s lack of familiarity with theoretical or practical aspects of law will render an 
already alien environment even less scrutable. Wilmott and colleagues described the role 
of doctors in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment in Australian 
states, in a series of studies.  Their conclusions regarding doctors in that context could 17
apply equally to professionals giving expert evidence in today’s courts: 
!
• They play a significant legal role in the decision-making process. 
• It is important that they know the law in this area. 
• There are significant gaps in what they know of the law in this area. 
• The law in this area is complex and sometimes uncertain or inconsistent. !
These challenges were a reason for the establishment in 2000 of the Expert Witness 
Institute of Australia, based on similar bodies in the United Kingdom.  Two judges whose 18
comments on expert evidence are cited in this Chapter were heavily involved in its 
establishment.  Other judges and scholars embraced it with some enthusiasm.  19 20
Unfortunately no record of the Institute exists after 2007. 
!
 Rares S, “Using the ‘hot tub’- How concurrent expert evidence aids understanding 16
issues” (2010) Federal Judicial Scholarship 20.
 White B et al, “The legal role of medical professionals in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-17
sustaining treatment: Part 1 (New South Wales)” (2011) 18 Journal of Law and Medicine 498 ; 
Wilmott L et al, “The legal role of medical professionals in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-
sustaining treatment: Part 2 (Queensland)” (2011) 18 Journal of Law and Medicine 523 ; Wilmott L 
et al, “The legal role of medical professionals in decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining 
treatment: Part 3 (Victoria)” (2011) 18 Journal of Law and Medicine 773.
 See for example Jackson B, “The doctor as expert witness- help or hindrance?” (2007) 47 18
Medicine, Science and the Law 277, p 286.
 Abadee AR, “The expert witness in the new millennium” (Speech to General Surgeons Australia 19
2nd Annual Scientific Meeting, 2 September 2000); Williams, n 7.
 Wood, n 1; Langdon J and Wilson P, “When justice fails: A follow-up examination of serious 20
criminal cases since 1985” (2005) 17 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 179; McLellan P, “New 
uniform expert evidence rules (NSW) 2006” (Speech to Expert Witness Institute of Australia and 
University of Sydney Faculty of Law, 16 April 2007).
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Like the experts themselves, judicial officers often find the time spent by an expert in the 
witness box to be a challenging period. In 1999 legal scholar Freckelton and colleagues 
published a landmark empirical study  of the perspectives of Australian judges on expert 21
evidence, followed in 2001 by a similar study  of the views of magistrates. The findings of 22
these surveys could be considered required reading for any prospective expert witness. 
Table 10 summarises the main findings regarding the issues which are of most direct 
relevance to an expert witness. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
 Freckelton I, Reddy P and Selby H, Australian Judicial Perspectives on Expert Evidence: An 21
Empirical Study (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 1999).  
 Freckelton I, Reddy P and Selby H, Australian Magistrates’ Perspectives on Expert Evidence: A 22
Comparative Study (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 2001).
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Table 10. Perspectives on expert evidence- Freckelton’s surveys of Australian 
judges and magistrates
Question
Judges!!
1999
Magistrates!!
2001
Usefulness Proportion of respondents who found expert evidence useful “often” or “always” 83% 77%
Bias Often Proportion of respondents who encountered bias on the part of an expert “often” or “always” 28% 21%
Occasional Proportion of respondents who encountered bias on the part of an expert “occasionally" 68% 72%
Jargon, 
obscure 
language
Often
Proportion of respondents who encountered 
language in expert evidence which was difficult 
to understand “often” or “always”
14% 15%
Occasional
Proportion of respondents who encountered 
language in expert evidence which was difficult 
to understand “occasionally"
77% 72%
Opinion 
beyond 
expertise
Often
Proportion of respondents who encountered 
experts who had failed to stay within the 
parameters of their expertise “often” or “always”
13% 10%
Occasional
Proportion of respondents who encountered 
experts who had failed to stay within the 
parameters of their expertise “occasionally”
80% 75%
Failed to 
prove 
basis
Often
Proportion of respondents who encountered 
expert evidence where the bases of the 
expert's opinion was not proved “often” or 
“always”
15% 5%
Occasional
Proportion of respondents who encountered 
expert evidence where the bases of the 
expert's opinion was not proved “occasionally”
69% 67%
Over-
complexity Often
Proportion of respondents who encountered 
expert evidence which was too complex to 
adequately evaluate “often” or “always”
2% 2%
Occasional
Proportion of respondents who encountered 
expert evidence which was too complex to 
adequately evaluate “occasionally”
45% 51%
Difficulty 
from 
disputed 
expert 
evidence
Often
Proportion of respondents who encountered 
difficulty in evaluating one expert opinion 
against another expert’s opinion “often” or 
“always”
22% 31%
Occasional
Proportion of respondents who encountered 
difficulty in evaluating one expert opinion 
against another expert’s opinion “occasionally”
70% 55%
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Other findings of close interest to medical witnesses included the following: 
!
• Of all the problems, bias on the part of the expert witness was ranked well ahead of any 
other concern. This was named as the most serious problem of all by 30% of magistrates 
and 35% of judges. 
• The factors which judicial officers found most persuasive when an expert gives oral 
evidence were prior experience in the field, clarity of explanation, impartiality and 
familiarity with the facts of the case. 
• None of an expert’s: prior experience as an expert witness; publications; educational 
qualifications; or appearance, was considered to be a persuasive factor by many judicial 
officers. 
• 57% of magistrates and 49% of judges found the overall standard of expert reports to be 
“good” or “very good”. 
• 93% of magistrates found “demonstrative aids” (diagrams, models, charts etc.), as part 
of expert evidence, helpful or necessary. 
• In cases where it appeared that lawyers had played an active part in finalising the 
content of an expert report, 26% of magistrates and 40% of judges felt that the lawyer’s 
contribution usually helped the judicial officer assess the weight to be given to the 
expert’s evidence. 
• In contrast, 38% of magistrates and 25% of judges felt that this action by a lawyer 
usually hindered their assessment. 
!
!
Judicial reception of medical evidence 
!
In Freckelton’s survey of judges the “comments which lamented the incidence of the 
abandonment of neutrality particularly singled out medical witnesses…”  23
!
To understand the ambivalence with which much of the legal profession regard medical 
witnesses, it is necessary to understand the settings in which much medical evidence is 
given, in common law jurisdictions. The most common setting is personal injury litigation. 
“This is the place where most ordinary lawyers come face to face with an expert. That 
 Freckelton, Reddy and Selby, n 21, p 25.23
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expert is usually a medical practitioner….”  It includes claims for injury sustained on the 24
roads and in the workplace.  It also includes medical negligence litigation, an area in 25
which “polarisation of experts” has been a particular challenge.  26
!
In a much-cited 2000 paper,  Justice Sperling of the Supreme Court of New South Wales 27
set out a searing denunciation of the extent and range of expert witness bias: 
!
In the ordinary run of personal injury work and to a lesser extent in other work, the 
expert witnesses are so partisan that their evidence is useless. (p 430) !
The paper included an observation which has often been made: 
!
In the adversarial system, experts who will support an opinion at one extreme or the 
other are selected. …the adversarial system is… calculated to bring forward 
unrepresentative opinions in cases where a range of opinions exists. (p 430) !
“Selection bias” is a phenomenon known to medical researchers,  but in this setting it is 28
intentional.  29
!
Among several possible approaches to address expert witness bias, Sperling J advanced 
a suggestion of his own: 
!
Another possible sanction I propose for consideration would be to procure 
amendment of the various statutes which govern disciplinary proceedings against 
professionals, such as the Medical Practitioners Act… Breach of duty of objectivity 
as an expert witness could be made a species of professional misconduct, that 
 Kirby M, “Book review: Expert Evidence” (1994) 26 Australian Journal of Forensic Sciences 77, 24
p 79.
 Samuels, n 5. 25
See also Bell DS, “Repetition strain injury: an iatrogenic epidemic of simulated injury” (1989) 151 
Medical Journal of Australia 280.
 Abadee, n 19.26
 Sperling, n 3.27
 See for example Davey Smith G and Ebrahim S, “Editorial: Data dredging, bias, or 28
confounding” (2002) 325 BMJ 1437.
  See also Ryan M, “The adversarial court system and the expert medical witness: ‘The truth the 29
whole truth and nothing but the truth?’” (2003) 15 Emergency Medicine 283 ; Bell, n 5, p 55.
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would attract the sanction of disciplinary proceedings. The suggestion is novel. I 
think it should be explored.  (p 438) 30!
The Family Court of Australia endorsed this proposal the following year, in Re W and W 
[2001] FamCA 216 at [192]. Reality has overtaken the novel suggestion of 2000, as 
detailed in Chapter 3. 
!
Many papers on personal injury law, including Sperling J’s, leave the reader with the 
impression that presiding over such proceedings would, at least on occasion, be a 
dispiriting experience.  Claims for compensation made through no-fault schemes funded 31
by the public purse (especially for transport accident and work-related conditions) 
dominate the area. A claimant’s state of health after injury, as determined by the tribunal or 
court, is central in determining the outcome of proceedings.  This sets the scene for the 32
calling of medical witnesses; and for judicial suspicion that mercenary partisanship might 
influence medical evidence. 
!
Grant and Studdert, in an empirical study published in 2013,  reported the characteristics 33
of medical witnesses in 345 such cases in Victoria. Cases involved an average of nine 
medical witnesses, about half of whom had not clinically cared for the injured party. 
Orthopaedic surgeons and psychiatrists were most often called as non-treating experts. 
Expert witness activity was heavily concentrated within a small group of “repeat players”. 
The average age of these frequent experts was 66 years, and almost all were male. Within 
this group of frequent experts almost all were engaged much more frequently by one side 
(claimant, or Transport Accident Commission) than the other. 81% of medical evidence 
was given in the form of written reports only, without oral evidence being adduced. 
!
 Sperling, n 3, p 438.30
 In the American setting, brokerage firms which connect attorneys with expert witnesses are 31
reported to use slogans such as “If the first doctor we refer doesn't agree with your legal theory, we 
will provide you with the name of a second prospective expert”: Reifert E, “Getting into the Hot Tub: 
How the United States could benefit from Australia’s concept of ‘Hot Tubbing’ expert 
witnesses” (89) University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 103, p 107.
 Grant G and Studdert DM, “The injury brokers: An empirical profile of medical expert witnesses 32
in personal injury litigation” (2013) 36 Melbourne University Law Review 831.
 Grant and Studdert, n 32.33
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The other group of cases which have recently placed medical witnesses under the 
spotlight are high-profile criminal trials which have resulted in a miscarriage of justice, 
where medical evidence contributed significantly to that outcome. Recent Australian 
examples include Gilham v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 131  and R v Keogh (No 2) 34
[2014] SASCFC 136. This group of cases also includes those in which mothers have been 
charged with the murder of their children, after multiple infant deaths in one family- cases 
discussed throughout this thesis. 
!
!
A fatal conceit 
!
A contrast commonly drawn between the approach taken by science and that taken by law 
is that science strives to elucidate absolute truths while law merely seeks to resolve 
disputes. 
!
Judges and lawyers do not themselves often suggest that the point of most legal 
proceedings is a quest for truth. Justice McLellan of the Supreme Court of New South 
Wales: 
!
The common law, in a principle acknowledged by lawyers, but not… understood by 
the broader community, has never represented that a jury’s verdict or for that matter 
a judge’s decision is always synonymous with the truth of the situation.  35!
Former Justice Samuels: 
!
The adversarial trial is, above all, intended to produce a winner. In our system the 
question is not ‘What is the truth of the matter?’. It is not ‘Who killed X?’. It is not 
even ‘Did the accused kill X?’. It is ‘Has the prosecution proved beyond reasonable 
doubt that the accused killed X?’, because the issue is whether the party carrying 
the burden of proof has discharged it. I think that in most cases the adversarial 
conflict does elicit the truth, but it cannot be regarded as designed to do so.  36!
 See Edmond G and San Roque M, “The cool crucible: Forensic science and the frailty of the 34
criminal trial” (2012) 24 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 51.
 McLellan P, “The Australian Justice System in 2020” (Speech to National Judicial College of 35
Australia, 25 October 2008) p 7.
 Samuels, n 5, p 86.36
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The Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, in the matter R v 
Cannings [2004] EWCA Crim 01, also underlined the modest ambition inherent to 
administering justice by adversarial means. Lord Justice Judge referred to another recent 
trial of a mother charged with murder, following multiple infant deaths: 
!
The verdict in Trupti Patel decided no point of principle: on the evidence the jury was 
not sure of guilt. Lest anyone seek to read anything deeper into that observation, 
and imply that we are commenting one way or another on the verdict, we emphasise 
that that is all that is ever decided by a ‘not guilty’ verdict. Nowadays, we read and 
hear much about a new concept, ‘found innocent’: that is not a verdict known to the 
law. [15] !
Justice Kirby’s comment on this specific point could apply equally to any misrepresentation 
of legal processes as a search for “objective truth”: 
!
It would be as well if experts, and those who write on expert evidence, understood 
from the outset this most fundamental characteristic of our accusatorial criminal 
justice system.  37!
In reality the pursuit and discovery of absolute “truth”, in scientific research or in medical 
practice, is habitually overstated. The florid words of Dr Richard Tjiong, ear, nose and 
throat surgeon, law graduate, and founder of doomed insurer United Medical Protection, 
will be recalled: 
!
Western medicine is based on scientific evidence. It seeks to establish its ‘truth' 
through rigorous scientific methods which are foreign to the legal profession in its 
training and practice.  38!
In Tjiong & Anor v Tjiong [2010] NSWSC 578 the Supreme Court of New South Wales held 
that Dr Tjiong had consistently lied in evidence to the Court, and had forged documents 
including a pilot’s log book in order to mislead the Court. Justice Palmer recorded that he 
was 
!
 Kirby, n 24, p 78.37
 Tjiong, n 13, p 53.38
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unable to accept anything that [Tjiong] says unless it is agreed or else supported by 
reliable corroborating evidence which has not, in some way, emanated from [Tjiong]. 
[120] !
Tjiong’s niece and nephew had commenced civil proceedings, over the control of the 
inheritance of his recently deceased brother. At their conclusion the Palmer J sent the 
record of proceedings to the Director of Public Prosecutions for consideration as to 
whether Tjiong should be prosecuted for perjury. 
!
An American trial lawyer has noted that 
!
a true expert will not be without strongly held views. A specialist is unlikely to be 
neutral about the issues that divide his colleagues, while a nonspecialist may be all 
too willing to equate truth with prevalence, that is, wisdom with the views that are 
published most often. These biases are inconsistent with any conception of 
neutrality. 
Judges should be wary of experts who portray themselves as independent, neutral, 
objective, and free of all biases, as neutrals are non existent in science.  39!
In doing so he cited Austin Bradford Hill, eminent epidemiologist and author of the 
eponymous and widely-accepted scientific “criteria for causation”: 
!
What I do not believe… is that we can usefully lay down some hard-and-fast rules of 
evidence that must be obeyed before we can accept cause and effect. … 
All scientific work is incomplete- whether it be observational or experimental. All 
scientific work is liable to be upset or modified by advancing knowledge. That does 
not confer upon us a freedom to ignore the knowledge we already have, or to 
postpone the action that it appears to demand at a given time.  40!
An American legal scholar has eloquently surveyed scientific progress over the 20th 
century: 
!
The scientific view of the world has changed… as reflected in its very language, 
from Newton's ‘laws’ to Einstein's ‘relativity’ and the Heisenberg ‘uncertainty 
principle’. Whereas Newton's laws of motion were mathematical rules that governed 
 Miltenberg N, “Myths about ‘neutral’ scientific experts” (2000) 36 Trial 62.39
 Bradford Hill A, “The environment and disease: Association or causation?” (1965) 58 40
Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine 295, p 300.
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a mechanistic world, Einstein redefined time and space in terms that are no longer 
absolute, but depend on the relative position of the individual observer. Heisenberg 
transformed the concept of the building blocks of nature by demonstrating that 
electrons cannot be located definitely in time or space in their atomic orbits, but only 
predicted in terms of probability. The solid certainties of Newtonian physics, where 
predictable effects followed inexorably from identifiable causes, have given way to a 
world of chance.  41!
Strongly held beliefs in paediatric medicine have been overturned as regularly and as 
unexpectedly as in other scientific fields. Dr Benjamin Spock, in the 1958 edition of his 
bestselling book Baby and Child Care,  warned against placing infants on their back to 42
sleep: “If he vomits, he’s more likely to choke on the vomitus. Also, he tends to keep his 
head turned to the same side- usually toward the centre of the room. This may flatten the 
side of his head.” A 2005 review  found that evidence was available from 1970 which 43
showed that infants who slept face-down were at significantly higher risk of SIDS. But it 
was not until 1988 that the first overview of studies on the effect of sleeping position on the 
risk of SIDS was published.  The American Academy of Pediatrics first published advice 44
to sleep infants on their backs in 1992.  The authors of the 2005 review estimated that up 45
to 60 000 infants died from SIDS in the intervening years as a result of this delay in 
research findings being widely adopted. 
!
A medical author in 1994 drew the same parallels between scientific research and legal 
reasoning which are drawn throughout this thesis: 
!
Surely scientific methodology is no more than a particular application of logic? 
In logic, exactly the same as in science, the critical approach requires not so much 
the search for truth as the recognition of falsity. The enquiry which concentrates on 
finding supporting evidence for an idea does not equate to the testing for falsity, nor 
does it have the same probing value. Indeed, the search confined to proving a point, 
 Deason EE, “Court-appointed expert witnesses: Scientific positivism meets bias and 41
deference” (1998) 77 Oregon Law Review 59, p 99.
 Spock B, Baby and Child Care (The Bodley Head, 1958).42
 Gilbert R et al, “Infant sleeping position and the sudden infant death syndrome: systematic 43
review of observational studies and historical review of recommendations from 1940 to 
2002” (2005) 34 International Journal of Epidemiology 874.
 Beal S, “Sleeping position and SIDS” (1988) 332 Lancet 512.44
 Kattwinkel J, Brooks J and Myerberg D, “Positioning and SIDS” (1992) 89 Pediatrics 1120.45
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no matter how incorrect that point, can proceed endlessly to the satisfaction of those 
convinced of their mistaken views. Similarly, both logic and science employ the 
same principles to elucidate cause and effect. …. Argument in the courtroom and in 
judgments too often offends these principles.  46!
Scholars have even suggested that decision-making in criminal justice could benefit from 
the literature on medical decision-making, pointing to many similarities between the 
respective reasoning processes.  47
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
 Bell DS, “Whose accountability, judges or experts?” (1994) 26 Australian Journal of Forensic 46
Sciences 74, p 75.
 Mears DP and Bacon S, “Improving criminal justice through better decision making: Lessons 47
from the medical system” (2009) 37 Journal of Criminal Justice 142.
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4.2 The rules of evidence 
!
“The fact that the rules of evidence don’t apply [in child protection 
proceedings], it doesn’t mean that you throw the rules of evidence out the 
window. Essentially we do follow the rules of evidence, it just means that in 
appropriate circumstances you can relax them.”  (Magistrate informant 6) 
!
* * * * * 
!
The common law exclusionary rules in respect of expert evidence are more often called 
simply “the rules of evidence”. In the words of Justice Michael Kirby, the rules of evidence 
!
represent the response of a legal system which, in the past submitted most factual 
decisions to determination by a jury of ordinary lay citizens. It is to protect that jury 
from being over-awed by the expert- surrendering their decision to the opinion of the 
witness- that the evidentiary rules of the common law were crafted. But those rules 
remain as useful reminders to the judicial decision-maker, of the limits of expertise, 
of the need to scrutinise its foundations and of the obligation to make decisions 
which cannot be surrendered to any witness, however impressive, skilled and 
apparently authoritative.  48!
The rules of evidence are:  49
• The expertise rule. 
• The area of expertise rule. 
• The common knowledge rule. 
• The basis rule. 
• The ultimate issue rule. !
The operation of the rules of evidence in Australian jurisdictions has been fundamentally 
transformed by the “uniform Evidence Acts”,  legislated in many but not all states over the 50
 Kirby, n 24, p 81.48
 Freckelton I and Selby H, Expert Evidence: Law, Practice, Procedure and Advocacy (5th ed, 49
Thomson Reuters, 2013) p 17.
 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). 50
See Judicial College of Victoria, “History of the uniform Evidence Acts”, Uniform Evidence Manual 
(JCV, June 2011); Australian Law Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law: Report 102 (ALRC, 
13 February 2006).
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last 20 years. New South Wales  and Victoria  have enacted new Evidence Acts as part 51 52
of this harmonisation; Queensland has not.  53
!
Space does not permit more than a cursory survey of this topic, although all expert 
witnesses should endeavour to become familiar with the rules of evidence. The uniform 
Evidence Acts have officially abolished two rules of evidence, while formalising others. The 
very existence of one rule of evidence has been questioned. Judicial officers almost never 
refer to any rule of evidence by name in their judgments. An expert witness today does not 
need to know the traditional formulations of the rules of evidence by heart. It is the 
principle which each rule encapsulates which will be instructive. 
!
!
The rules of evidence, the study of child abuse, and injury interpretation 
!
The expertise rule is that “experts must be experts”.  They must have “specialised 54
knowledge based on [their] training, study or experience”.  This proposition sounds 55
simple, but the expertise which is required to help a court make sense of particular 
evidence and facts before it may differ from the expertise on which a professional relies in 
their daily work. 
!
The area of expertise rule is that an expert may only give opinion evidence on an area that 
is recognised by the court as an area of expertise. A conceptual variation of the area of 
expertise rule may come into consideration when an expert witness proposes that a new 
testing technique, or a newly proposed diagnostic entity, is part of an established area of 
expertise. 
!
The common knowledge rule (abolished in uniform Evidence Act jurisdictions) is that 
expert evidence will not be heard on matters considered to be areas of common 
 Evidence Act 1995 (NSW).51
 Evidence Act 2008 (Vic).52
 See Queensland Law Reform Commission, A Review of the Uniform Evidence Acts: Report no. 53
60 (QLRC, 2005).
 Freckelton I, “Current legal issues in forensic psychiatry” (Proceedings of conference Homicide: 54
patterns, prevention and control, Australian Institute of Criminology, 12 May 1992) p 192.
 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79.55
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knowledge, i.e. matters “within the capacity of lay persons to decide without expert 
assistance”.  It could be viewed as a mirror image of the expertise rule. 56
!
The basis rule is that, for expert evidence to be admitted, the factual bases of that 
evidence must be proved to the court,. The status of expert opinion evidence when not all 
of its factual bases have been proved to the court has been described as the most 
controversial and most litigated issue in expert evidence law in modern times.  57
!
The ultimate issue rule (abolished in uniform Evidence Act jurisdictions) is that an expert 
witness may not give opinion evidence on a matter which is the central legal question to be 
determined by the court. For example, in a murder trial an expert witness may not give 
evidence that they have no doubt that the accused killed the deceased. The “ultimate 
issue” can be more difficult to demarcate in real life than on paper. In Murphy v The Queen 
[1989] 167 CLR 94, Justice Deane noted that: 
!
[It is not] an acceptable answer to assert that expert evidence is not admissible on 
the very question which a jury is required to decide. Such an assertion is plainly 
unacceptable as a general rule of the law of evidence. It would, for example, 
preclude expert opinion that a bullet admittedly fired by an accused was the cause 
of death in a case where the only defence to a charge of murder was that death had 
resulted from some other cause. [127] !
The rules of evidence are best understood in the context of real-life cases in which their 
underlying principles have been considered. 
!
In F v The Queen (1995) 83 A Crim R 502, the evidence given by a paediatrician witness 
on Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS) was criticised by the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales in terms which reflected several rules of evidence: 
!
!
!
!
!
 Freckelton and Selby, n 49, p 88.56
 Freckelton and Selby, n 49, p 122.57
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• The expertise rule: 
The paediatrician should not have given evidence on a purportedly psychiatric 
condition.  58
!
• The area of expertise rule: 
CSAAS was in any case not shown to be a true psychiatric condition: “The 
‘syndrome’ referred to was not shown to be a fit subject for expert opinion.” 
!
• The common knowledge rule:  
“…much of what Dr Packer was talking about, whilst it might apply to victims of child 
sexual abuse, could apply to all manner of people in a wide variety of circumstances. 
… All this is a matter of common experience, and something of which jurors are 
expected to be aware.” 
!
In 1987, at the height of the Cleveland crisis, the Family Division of the High Court of 
England and Wales in care proceedings recorded a finding  which although remarkable to 59
a modern reader, appears to have been true at that time. The Court held that the training 
of a paediatrician did not include training on child sexual abuse and that the opinion of a 
police surgeon (equivalent to today’s forensic physician) must be preferred in that regard 
(a demonstration of the expertise rule). 
!
In a similar matter heard soon after, the same Court  recognised the detection of child 60
sexual abuse as a legitimate area of expertise, but expressed its scepticism of the 
diagnostic value of the physical finding of “reflex anal dilatation”, on its own, in this regard. 
!
In R v Millar 1989 CarswellOnt 99, 71 C.R. (3d) 78 the Ontario Court of Appeal held that 
“the subject of child abuse is a specialty” [110], and that medical witnesses may be 
competent to express an opinion in this regard. Opinion evidence from five medical 
witnesses was admitted; the evidence of a sixth doctor, a family physician, was not, due to 
the paucity of his relevant experience. 
 For an Australian matter in which a paediatrician’s opinion evidence was preferred over that of 58
two psychiatrists, on issues which were inherently more psychiatric than paediatric, see Traeger by 
his next friend John Winston Traeger v Harris (No 4) [2011] WADC 45.
 Cleveland CC v C [1988] FCR 607.59
 Cleveland CC v D [1988] FCR 615.60
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The general question of whether “injury interpretation”- inferring the cause or mechanism 
of an injury from its physical characteristics- should be considered a medical area of 
expertise, does not currently permit a single answer. Establishing whether multiple knife 
wounds were self-inflicted, or inflicted by another individual, from the pattern of wounds 
left, may or may not be a legitimate area of expertise.  Establishing whether one assailant 61
or two inflicted multiple knife wounds on multiple victims, from the similar pattern of 
wounds found on different victims, is not.  62
!
In the 2004 criminal matter R v LM [2004] QCA 192, a mother’s convictions for torture and 
unlawful wounding of her two children was overturned on appeal. Medical evidence given 
at trial, on Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, was held by the Queensland Court of Appeal 
to be inadmissible, as the purported syndrome was “not a psychiatrically identifiable illness 
or condition” (area of expertise rule). “Ordinary people are capable of understanding that 
some mothers may harm their children through deceitfully manipulating unnecessary 
medical treatment…” [67] (common knowledge rule). 
!
In R v Matthey [2007] VSC 398, the Supreme Court of Victoria held that “The Crown could 
not argue that, in considering the cause of death of any individual child, the medical 
evidence in relation to the other children was relevant” [2] (basis rule). The Court also held 
that “The determination of the actual cause of death was a matter for the jury and the 
medical evidence was to be limited to opinions of the diagnostic possibility of, or 
consistency with, an asphyxial episode” [184] (ultimate issue rule). 
!
In Goodlad v Western Australia [2010] WASCA 20, a man convicted of aggravated assault 
of his young stepdaughter appealed against his conviction. One ground of his appeal was 
that the evidence given by a paediatric registrar regarding injuries to the child “was 
inadmissible in the absence of evidence of the history given [to the registrar by the child’s 
mother]” [9] (basis rule). The appeal was dismissed; the registrar had only identified the 
possible mechanism of injuries of the type suffered by the child, an opinion which did not 
rely on the mother’s history. 
!
 R v Anderson [2000] VSCA 16; Middleton v The Queen [2000] WASCA 213.61
 Gilham v The Queen [2012] NSWCCA 131.62
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Problematic expert evidence given by Professor Roy Meadow in the English criminal trial 
R v Clark [2003] EWCA Crim 1020 has most often been described as a violation of the 
expertise rule. 
!
!
Children’s Courts and the rules of evidence 
!
Children’s Courts hearing child protection matters in Australia are not bound by the rules of 
evidence.  This most likely reflects a judicial approach, originating in English law, that 63
“when you are dealing here with children… any jury and any justices need all the help they 
can get”.  Although the Children's Courts are not bound by the rules of evidence, they 64
may still apply any of them when appropriate- when in the child’s best interests. The 
Children’s Courts do so to the current day, both explicitly  and in effect. In doing so they 65
follow precedent, and prudence. 
!
In the 1933 matter R v War Pensions Entitlement Appeal Tribunal [1933] 50 CLR 228, 
Justice Evatt, dissenting, recorded the following observations regarding any statutory 
decision-maker (in that case a tribunal) which is not bound by the rules of evidence: 
!
Some stress has been laid by the present respondents upon the provision that the 
Tribunal is not, in the hearing of appeals, ‘bound by any rules of evidence.’ Neither it 
is. But this does not mean that all rules of evidence may be ignored as of no 
account. After all, they represent the attempt made, through many generations, to 
evolve a method of inquiry best calculated to prevent error and elicit truth. No 
tribunal can, without grave danger of injustice, set them on one side and resort to 
methods of inquiry which necessarily advantage one party and necessarily 
disadvantage the opposing party. In other words, although rules of evidence, as 
such, do not bind, every attempt must be made to administer ‘substantial 
justice.’ [256] !
 Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld), s 105; Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 63
1998 (NSW), s 93(3); Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic), s 215(d).
 DPP v A&BC Chewing Gum [1968] 1 QB 159 at [165A]. 64
See also Re M and R [1996] EWCA Civ 1317.
 KB, DOHS and CR & KR [2008] VChC 5, p 14.65
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Judicial comment has been recorded on the standing of the rules of evidence in child 
protection proceedings, in matters heard in Queensland,  New South Wales  and 66 67
Victoria.  Most of that recorded comment is in line with the cautious sentiment of Justice 68
Evatt, quoted above, that courts should be slow to turn their back on processes which 
have protected against injustice, even when not obliged to follow them to the letter. 
Some of this judicial comment is even more emphatic than that of Evatt J.  Comment 69
published by professionals working in those jurisdictions adds to this picture.   70
!
In contrast, in Secretary, Department of Human Services v Sanding [2011] VSC 42, Justice 
Bell in the Supreme Court of Victoria distinguished between the rules of natural justice 
(discussed further in Chapter 5), and the rules of evidence. Bell J insisted that: 
!
While a court or tribunal operating under flexible procedural provisions must observe 
the rules of natural justice, this does not mean that those rules can be used to admit 
the rules of evidence through a side door… 
It is well-established that the rules of evidence form no part of the rules of natural 
justice. [130] !
The well-established general principle is that the content of the rules of natural 
justice must take into account the nature of the jurisdiction being exercised. Where 
the jurisdiction is one in which the interests of the child are paramount, the particular 
content and application of the rules of natural justice will reflect the nature of that 
jurisdiction. [135] !
 Department of Child Safety v SJ & MB [2009] QChCM 1.66
 In the Matter of Pamela (No 3) (Children’s Court of NSW, Schurr CM, 27 August 2003); In the 67
Matter of IP, LP, RP and BP (Children’s Court of NSW, Mitchell CM, 20 November 2001); “R” v 
Department of Community Services [2001] NSWSC 419 at [19]; A and B v Director of Family 
Services (1996) 20 Fam LR 549. 
 DOHS v Mr D & Ms W [2009] VChC 1, p 46.68
 Department of Child Safety v SJ & MB [2009] QChCM 1 at [17], [25], [26].69
 See Children’s Court of Victoria, “Response to the Victorian Law Reform Commission Review of 70
Victoria’s child protection legislative arrangements” (April 2010) pp 80-81; Herridge S, “Non-
accidental injury in care proceedings- a digest for practitioners” (2009) June Children’s Law News, 
pp4-5; Marien M, “The crucial role of the Children’s Court Clinic assessment report in decision 
making by the Children’s Court of New South Wales” (30 October 2009), pp 7-8; McLachlan RJ, 
“Establishment in care proceedings” (2007) November Children’s Law News, [29]-[32]; McLachlan 
RJ, “Privilege in care proceedings” (2001) June Children’s Law News 11, [5], [6].
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Bell J, returning to the topic of the rules of evidence, nevertheless concluded with 
guidance similar to that given regarding rules of natural justice: 
!
The court may inform itself as it thinks fit, provided that the information on which it 
acts is sufficiently reliable and probative to form a proper basis for its decision. It is 
not bound by the rules of evidence. Some cases may require formal evidence and 
other cases may not. The nature of the information which will form a proper basis for 
the court’s decision, and the procedure by which it will be obtained, will vary from 
case to case, or category of case to category of case. Where on the spectrum the 
case or category of case may sit is for the court to determine in the proper exercise 
of its procedural discretion, having regard to the paramount consideration of the best 
interests of the child and the court’s duty to ensure a fair hearing. [153] !
This approach concords with that preferred in Freckelton and Selby’s reference text: 
!
The better view is that courts and tribunals should not act on material that is of little 
probative value but of significant prejudicial effect.  71!
This formulation carries the additional advantage of being less likely to bamboozle an 
expert witness than past contradictory guidance, for example that the rules of evidence in 
the various state jurisdictions should either “still be applied unless, for sound reason, their 
application is dispensed with”;  or that “the rules of evidence do not apply unless the 72
Court specifies affirmatively that they do.”  73
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
 Freckelton and Selby, n 49, p 24.71
 A and B v Director of Family Services (1996) 20 Fam LR 549.72
 McLachlan (2001), n 69, [6].73
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4.3 The science of statistics 
!
“Record the facts, the scientific facts. Height, weight, size. Do the tests, age 
appropriate skills. Just go back and begin at the beginning.”   
(Magistrate informant 3) 
!
* * * * * 
!
The error made by Professor Roy Meadow has often been described in the following 
terms: Meadow’s evidence strayed beyond the area of his own expertise.  He gave 74
statistical evidence, and such evidence should only be given by a witness with statistical 
expertise. This was the finding of Sir Anthony Clarke MR in General Medical Council v 
Meadow [2006] EWCA Civ 1390: 
!
It is in my opinion of the utmost importance that an expert should only give evidence 
of opinion which is within his particular expertise and that, where a statement, 
whether made in writing or orally, is outside his expertise, he should expressly say 
so. … 
It was the failure of Professor Meadow to adopt these principles and to adopt these 
precautions which, in my opinion, amounted to serious professional misconduct. 
[71], [72] !
This was also how the General Medical Council (GMC) had portrayed Meadow’s 
transgression, when striking him off: 
!
…[Meadow] went beyond the limits of his professional competence by straying into 
the area of statistics without revealing [his] admitted limited understanding of the 
subject…”  75!
In this Section the questions will be examined of whether this is an accurate 
characterisation of Meadow’s error and, more importantly, whether it is a helpful 
 Bell, n 5, p 92; Wall N, A Handbook for Expert Witnesses in Children Act Cases (2nd ed, Jordan 74
Publishing, 2007) [1.15].
 As quoted in Marcovitch H, “Editorial: Some relief for expert witnesses” (2007) 92 Archives of 75
Disease in Childhood 102. The decision in the GMC Fitness to Practice Panel’s hearing of the 
complaint regarding Meadow is no longer publicly available.
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characterisation. Does it light the way to better, more reliable expert evidence, and thus to 
improved delivery of justice? 
!
There can be no doubt that Meadow made a serious error, and that it contributed to a 
miscarriage of justice. The extent and nature of its contribution were sources of some 
disagreement between decision-makers, after the fact. 
!
!
Four Courts of Appeal 
!
In Chapter 3 the comments of the “first”, 2000, Court of Appeal, in R v Clark [2000] EWCA 
Crim 54, on Meadow’s evidence were outlined. They were clearly stated: 
!
[The statistical evidence] was very much a side-show at trial. The experts were 
debating the incidence of genuine SIDS… in a case where both sides agreed that 
neither… death qualified as such. [126] 
Meadow’s opinion was based on his expert assessment of the medical and 
circumstantial evidence, not on the statistical material. … And it is clear from reading 
his evidence that his conclusion was firmly based on that medical and circumstantial 
evidence… [144] 
In the context of the trial as a whole, the point on statistics was of minimal 
significance… [256] !
In R v Clark [2003] EWCA Crim 1020, the “second” Court of Appeal considered the sum of 
the evidence, with the advantage of the knowledge of the unreliability of the pathology 
evidence given at trial. The appeal was necessarily allowed on that ground alone. The 
second Court of Appeal also recorded comment on Meadow’s “statistical evidence”. In 
doing this, it may be assumed that the Court was responding to a sociolegal imperative: 
that a superior court should provide authoritative guidance on statistical evidence given in 
criminal trials. 
!
The second Court of Appeal recorded: 
!
Finally we should say a little about the statistical evidence led before the jury. The 
matter was the subject of only brief argument before us and we certainly heard none 
of the evidence.  
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It is unfortunate that the trial did not feature any consideration as to whether the 
statistical evidence should be admitted in evidence and particularly, whether its 
proper use would be likely to offer the jury any real assistance. Inherent in the 
evidence were dangers. [172], [173] !
Quite what impact all this evidence will have had on the jury will never be known but 
we rather suspect that with the graphic reference by Professor Meadow to the 
chances of backing long odds winners of the Grand National year after year it may 
have had a major effect on their thinking notwithstanding the efforts of the trial judge 
to down play it. 
The Court of Appeal on the last occasion would, it seems clear to us, have felt 
obliged to allow the appeal but for their assessment of the rest of the evidence 
as overwhelming. … We are quite satisfied that if the evidence in its entirety, as it 
is now known, had been known to the Court it would never have concluded that the 
evidence pointed overwhelmingly to guilt.  
Thus it seems likely that if this matter had been fully argued before us we would, in 
all probability, have considered that the statistical evidence provided a quite distinct 
basis upon which the appeal had to be allowed. [177]-[180] (emphasis added) !
This passage is singular, among those judgments by a superior court cited within this 
thesis, as containing a conclusion where the reasoning which led the Court to that 
conclusion is far from clear. 
!
The passage downplays any possible divergence between the approach taken to 
Meadow’s evidence by the second Court of Appeal, as compared to that taken by the first 
Court of Appeal. Subsequently, however, two further Courts of Appeal did recognise and 
highlight a difference in approaches to Meadow’s evidence. Justice Collins in Meadow v 
General Medical Council [2006] EWHC 146 (Admin), commented that 
!
The difference of approach of the two courts is obvious, but it does not mean that 
the first was acting unreasonably. [41] !
Collins J also recounted the following argument made by Meadow during the General 
Medical Council hearing: 
!
he would not accept the accuracy of the allegations that he held himself out as being 
expert in matters relating to deaths classified as SIDS and the statistics concerning 
them. He did not challenge that he was ready, willing and considered himself able to 
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give such evidence. The distinction, while narrow, is obvious (indeed, the allegation 
of holding out was deleted). [42] !
This narrow but obvious distinction is central to the question under discussion in this 
Section. 
!
Similarly, Lord Justice Thorpe, in General Medical Council v Meadow [2006] EWCA Civ 
1390, recorded that 
!
it is clear that the judgment given in April 2003 was more critical of the evidence of 
Professor Meadow than had been the judgment in October 2000. However the issue 
was more profoundly canvassed at the first appeal and the tentative conclusion 
expressed by the second court was further qualified by its introductory paragraph:  
‘Finally we should say a little about the statistical evidence led before the jury. The 
matter was the subject of only brief argument before us and we certainly heard none 
of the evidence.’ [265] !
!
Statistics 
!
Dorland’s Medical Dictionary defines “statistics” as 
!
A discipline devoted to the collection, analysis, and interpretation of numerical data 
using the theory of probability, concerned particularly with methods for drawing 
inferences about characteristics of a population from examination of a random 
sample.  76!
Sir Richard Eggleston, Australian judge and legal scholar, who endeavoured to bring ideas 
from the study of probability and statistics into mainstream legal reasoning, wrote that 
!
The science of statistics is concerned with the recording and tabulation of past 
events and with the prediction of future events on the basis of past experience.  77!
The first Court of Appeal in R v Clark handed down its judgment on October 2nd, 2000. 
The Issue for that week of the world’s leading medical journal, the New England Journal of 
 Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary (32nd ed, Elsevier, 2012).76
 Eggleston R, Evidence, Proof and Probability (2nd ed, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983) p 18.77
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Medicine, contained 5 reports of primary research. 4 of these are saturated in statistical 
terms and analysis  (the fifth is an observational case series of 19 patients with a rare 78
disease). Each of these 4 studies includes a subsection, “Statistical analysis”, presumably 
at the journal’s insistence. 
!
Since 1838 the Royal Statistical Society has published its own journal. In 2000, the year of 
Clark’s first appeal, the journal was divided into two series. One Series was titled 
“Statistics in Society”. The Issue of this Series covering the date of the judgment in Clark’s 
first appeal contains 9 articles. These are all articles examining the application of a 
statistical method to a particular real-life issue. One examines a statistic commonly 
reported in medical articles, the “number needed to treat”.  Another applies the statistical 79
method of “multiple imputation” to the problem of missing data in diaries of alcohol 
consumption, collected for public health purposes.  80
!
Many of the articles in the same Issue of the corresponding series, “Statistical 
Methodology”, are impenetrable to a reader who is not a trained statistician. In 4 of the 16 
articles included, however, the statistical/mathematical technique described was tested on 
a data set drawn from real-life (e.g. from a study of iron intake in relation to preterm 
delivery).  In another 3 articles the authors suggest a likely real-life application of their 81
demonstrated statistical technique (e.g. modelling the spread of an air pollutant).  82
!
 Jacobs LD et al, “Intramuscular Interferon Beta-1a therapy initiated during a first demyelinating 78
event in multiple sclerosis” (2000) 343 New England Journal of Medicine 898; Saltz LB et al, 
“Irinotecan plus Fluorouracil and Leucovorin for metastatic colon cancer” (2000) 343 New England 
Journal of Medicine 905; Goldstein JA et al, “Multiple complex coronary plaques in patients with 
acute myocardial infarction” (2000) 343 New England Journal of Medicine 915; Haffner D et al, 
“Effect of Growth Hormone treatment on the adult height of children with chronic renal 
failure” (2000) 343 New England Journal of Medicine 923.
 Hutton JL, “Number needed to treat: Properties and problems” (2000) 163 Journal of the Royal 79
Statistical Society: Series A 403.
 Longford NT et al, “Handling missing data in diaries of alcohol consumption” (2000) 163 Journal 80
of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A 381.
 Zhou H and Wang C-Y, “Failure time regression with continuous covariates measured with error” 81
(2000) 62 Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B 657.
 Brown PE et al, “Blur-generated non-separable space-time models” (2000) 62 Journal of the 82
Royal Statistical Society: Series B 847.
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These observations regarding the content of medical and statistical academic journals 
support the proposition that statistics and medicine are symbiotic disciplines. More than 
this, the relationship between statistics and medicine (as for most modern sciences) is that 
of obligate symbiosis. If neither the field of medicine existed, nor any other field of inquiry 
dealing in numerical data and drawing inferences from that data, then the discipline of 
statistics would also not exist. Correspondingly, if modern medical research teams did not 
include individuals trained and skilled in organising- in a valid and meaningful way- the raw 
data obtained through observation and experimentation, then the field of medicine would 
be severely stunted. 
!
Statistical methods also provide a specific essential element of many scientific fields, by 
enabling inferences which are not necessarily intuitive. “Objectivity” in scientific research 
does not only mean giving equal favour to either side of a partisan dispute; it also refers to 
the disinterested mindset which a researcher can take while collecting raw data. Only the 
process of standardised statistical analysis, after data collection, will give that data 
meaning. An argument can be made that the contribution of professional statisticians 
should be more prominently recognised in medical publications, in line with how 
indispensable that contribution usually is. 
!
A doctor “uses” statistics often and extensively in standard clinical practice. Doctors rely on 
research findings founded on statistical analysis. In addition, expert clinical practice is 
informed by statistical concepts, such as “number needed to treat”, and “absolute risk 
reduction”. The contribution of statistics and statisticians is built in to the system of health 
care and medical research which all clinicians inhabit. 
!
The system is far from perfect. The terror and ineptitude of many doctors in the face of the 
most modest proposal for the mildest regression analysis possible, is legendary. Despite 
the ubiquity of the “p-value” as a means of describing statistical significance in medical 
research, many doctors would struggle to articulate how the figure is derived.  83
!
!
!
!
 See Goodman SN, “Toward evidence-based medical statistics, 1: The p value fallacy” (1999) 83
130 Annals of Internal Medicine 995.
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Risk of recurrence 
!
Meadow gave evidence on the probability of multiple SIDS deaths in one family. In the 
context of the trial in which he gave it, it does appear that the question would have been 
better answered by a properly-informed statistician. This observation is different to those 
quoted above, that he gave evidence on an issue in which he lacked expertise. The 
question he was asked was an essentially medical question, just as it was an essentially 
statistical question. Meadow made this argument himself in his GMC hearing, as quoted 
by Collins J above. He did not hold himself out as a statistical expert, but he did believe 
himself qualified to answer the question put to him.  
!
This point can be illustrated in a number of ways. The question which examining counsel 
put to Meadow at trial is not quoted verbatim in the relevant judgments, but one may 
assume it was close to: “What is the probability that SIDS will occur twice, or more often, 
to infants in the same family?” The same question will have been asked many times, by 
grieving and worried parents, in the aftermath of the SIDS death of one of their children, in 
which full investigation had found no evidence of any other cause of death. Few would 
argue that a paediatrician should decline to answer it in a real-life clinical scenario of this 
sort, for lack of expertise on the issue. 
!
This question, and the importance of its answer to real-life families, was in fact the main 
reason that a team of researchers conducted the groundbreaking study from which 
Meadow drew the primary figure for his calculation- the “CESDI” study.  The study, which 84
had not yet been published at the time of Clark’s trial, reported a risk of SIDS in a family 
with the characteristics of the Clarks as 1 in 8543. Meadow calculated the probability of 
two SIDS deaths in the same family by merely squaring that number, as if the probability of 
each death would be independent of each other: 8543 x 8543 = ~73 million. Yet this 
approach does not account for rare medical conditions which may predispose to an 
infant’s SIDS death, and which may be genetically inherited, such as metabolic disorders, 
or cardiac arrhythmias. Such conditions could leave no signs to distinguish a resulting 
infant death from any other case of SIDS. Although rare, when present in a family such a 
condition would be more likely to lead to multiple infant deaths than the chance recurrence 
of SIDS. 
 Fleming P, Sudden unexpected deaths in infancy: The CESDI SUDI studies 1993-1996 84
(Stationery Office London, 2000).
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Risk factors and risk of recurrence are hardly considerations which are alien to a medical 
practitioner. Since the cause of SIDS is still not understood, the mechanism by which a 
smoking member of the household increases the risk of SIDS can only be speculated on. 
But no one doubts that the increased risk is real. In fact, the table from the pre-publication 
draft of the CESDI study, from which Meadow obtained the figure of 1 in 8543, was itself a 
table of risk factors and incidences. Other risk factors listed were maternal age, and 
employment status of family members. In a family with all 3 risk factors, the risk of SIDS is 
much higher, 1 in 214. Meadow used the figure from that table without countenancing the 
possible existence of any other risk factors than those three- even though the mechanism 
by which a rare metabolic or cardiac disease could cause sudden infant death would be 
more immediately comprehensible to a clinician, than the risk factors of maternal age or 
employment status. 
!
What exactly led Meadow to make this error is not critical to this discussion, but decades  85
of efforts to protect children, in the face of increasing incredulity and scorn may well have 
played a part. It must also be constantly recalled that SIDS was never advanced by the 
defence in R v Clark as a possible cause of death of the infants, and that the “statistical 
evidence” was a side-show. 
!
!
Silos of expertise 
!
From the reaction of some to the problematic evidence given by Meadow in R v Clark,  86
one might gain the impression that what Meadow had actually done was to storm into an 
American court in the middle of a hearing on an electoral redistricting matter,  elbow a 87
 Meadow R, “Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: The hinterland of child abuse” (1977) 310 Lancet 85
343.
 Green P, “Letter from the President to the Lord Chancellor regarding the use of statistical 86
evidence in court cases” (Royal Statistical Society, 23 January 2002); Hill R, “Reflections on cot 
death cases” (2005) 2 Significance 13. 
See also Sesardic N, “Sudden infant death or murder? A royal confusion about probabilities” (2007) 
58 British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 299; Nobles R and Schiff D, “Misleading statistics 
within criminal trials: The Sally Clark case” (2005) 2 Significance 17.
 See Kadane JB, Statistics in the Law (Oxford University Press, 2008); Tam Cho WK and Yoon 87
AH, “Strange bedfellows: Politics, courts and statistics: Statistical expert testimony in Voting Rights 
cases” (2001) 10 Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 237.
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statistician out of the witness box, and open his opinion evidence with a command to 
“Trust me, I’m a doctor.” 
!
The analysis undertaken in this Section lays bare the enormous challenge faced by courts 
of law, which must rely on expert assistance to resolve disputes fairly, but which must first 
decide whether a self-titled “expert” really is an expert, and whether they are the expert 
which the court needs. The paradox inherent to this task is that the court not only lacks the 
required expertise, it also lacks expertise to itself authoritatively determine which proposed 
expert will possess the required expertise. American judge Learned Hand famously wrote 
in 1901: 
!
The trouble with all this is that it is setting the jury to decide where doctors disagree. 
The whole object of the expert is to tell the jury not facts but general truths derived 
from his specialised experience. … It is just because they are incompetent for such 
a task that the expert is necessary at all.  88!
In the past, this catch-22 figured less acutely for proceedings heard only by a judge and no 
jury, since a judge will on average be more highly educated and better informed than most 
members of the public. As noted earlier, however, that fortuitous loophole is steadily 
closing. Technical expertise moves relentlessly, year by year, toward greater complexity 
and greater sub-specialisation, into super-sub-specialisation and beyond. Since 1982, one 
medical journal has been dedicated entirely to a slice of human tissue just 0.6mm thick- 
the cornea.  Yet the imperative remains that a court must access the right expert 89
assistance for the particular matter before it. 
!
!
Royal Victoria Infirmary v B [2002] EWCA Civ 348 
!
It would be hard to believe that common law courts have never before considered the 
potential difficulty of defining the scope of a witness’s expertise, of the sort which arose in 
R v Clark.  In 2002, between the two Clark appeals, the Court of Appeal (Civ) of England 90
 Hand L, “Historical and practical considerations regarding expert testimony” (1901) 15 Harvard 88
Law Review 40, p 54.
 Polack FM, “Trend toward subspecialization” (1982) 1 Cornea 1.89
 See also Arden v Malcolm [2007] EWHC 404 (QB); A v Angus Council [2012] CSOH 134.90
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and Wales considered a matter in which the determinative question was the life 
expectancy of a seven year old girl with cerebral palsy. At two months of age the girl had 
been admitted to hospital with bronchiolitis but suffered a severe hypoxic episode, for 
which the NHS Trust admitted negligence. The girl claimed damages, and the total amount 
to be calculated depended on the estimate of how many more years the girl would survive, 
in the context of her severe disability and the complications of cerebral palsy. 
!
At trial the judge received evidence on this question from an eminent statistician and a 
paediatrician. The paediatrician witness had in fact been called by the same side as the 
statistician, the NHS Trust. Despite this, the two experts strongly disagreed on how the 
child’s life expectancy should be estimated. The paediatrician took, as his starting point, 
figures from a report published by the statistician witness himself. This was a report drawn 
from data on thousands of patients with cerebral palsy in the statistician’s home state of 
California. The paediatrician took that study’s reported likely range, of years of survival, 
which was applicable to the girl. Then, based essentially on his own clinical assessment of 
the girl, as against the details of the cerebral palsy patients in the study, he chose the 
lowest number of years from within that range. 
!
The statistician instead interrogated the same database from which his publication had 
been derived, and constructed a new, customised “life table”, after also obtaining further 
specific details about the girl’s condition, such as her functional skills. This calculation 
resulted in a life expectancy which was less than that estimated by the paediatrician- 
translating into a smaller sum of money. 
!
The trial judge had preferred the evidence of the paediatrician, whose approach he 
described as “holistic”. He had criticised the statistician’s evidence 
!
because it ignored the individual claimant, downplayed the role of the clinician to an 
unacceptable degree and was too mechanistic. The characteristics by which [the 
statistician] identified his cohort were unrefined and too narrow in scope. … 
I accept that statistics are a useful tool in the hand of the clinician but where reliable 
medical evidence is before the court they should not displace the expertise of the 
clinician. They provide, rather, a useful background to, and cross-check on, the work 
of the doctor. [6] !
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The appeal was dismissed in a 2-1 majority decision. The Court of Appeal did not need to 
choose between the evidence of the statistician and that of the doctor. The legal question 
which it had to resolve was whether it had been open to the trial judge to prefer the 
evidence of the paediatrician over that of the statistician, and the Court answered this in 
the affirmative. The Court of Appeal also handed down much pertinent guidance within the 
judgment, on the proper forensic roles of statistician and clinician: 
!
I doubt whether such a clear distinction exists between ‘statistical’ and so called 
‘clinical’ evidence, as [counsel for the NHS Trust] asserted in his attractively 
presented submissions. When a doctor gives expert evidence, the court relies on 
the witness for a professional opinion which takes account of contemporary 
knowledge and expertise, not limited to his or her own personal experience but 
including reports of the experiences of other doctors and other published material. 
…the court must still rely primarily, in my judgment, on expert medical witnesses 
before reaching a conclusion in the particular case. It would be wrong to allow a 
statistician, or an actuary, to do more than inform the opinions of the medical 
witnesses and the decision of the court, on what is essentially a medical, or clinical, 
issue. [39] !
…in cases such as the present… a judge needs all the help that he can get. [The 
assessment of life expectancy] should not be regarded as a field in which voices of 
two distinct disciplines compete for dominance. What is surely required is 
interdisciplinary co-operation. The statistician alone cannot provide the judge's 
needs. His conclusions are only drawn from a relatively small human population 
group whose disabilities roughly match those of the claimant. Equally a medical 
expert cannot meet the judge's needs. Although he can offer profound 
understanding of the claimant's case, his knowledge of comparable cases is limited 
to what chance has brought to his professional care during the course of his career. 
[46] !
The words of the second paragraph quoted above are those of the dissenting judge, Lord 
Justice Thorpe, who three years later was appointed Deputy Head of Family Justice. As 
described in Chapter 3, Thorpe LJ was also the member of the bench who later, in General 
Medical Council v Meadow, was most sympathetic of Meadow’s actions, and most 
scathing of the GMC’s response. Yet there is no pro-doctor bias apparent in this earlier 
judgment; rather a strong promotion of interdisciplinary forensic practice prevails. Thorpe 
LJ’s reason for arguing for success of the appeal was that the paediatrician should not 
Chapter 4
have first based his opinion in part on the statistician’s published work, but then refused to 
make any adjustment in reaction to the statistician’s developing opinion. 
!
It is tempting to wonder whether Thorpe LJ’s focus on the importance of interdisciplinary 
cooperation in legal proceedings in this matter was influenced by his customary seat in the 
Family Division. As will be further discussed in Chapter 5, such collaboration is both 
necessary and expected in proceedings conducted in the Family Division, and judges of 
the High Court hold authority to insist that expert witnesses submit to this interdisciplinary 
approach.
Chapter 5: “That which is the only one of its kind”: Children’s Courts 
and child protection proceedings 
!
!
5.1 A singular jurisdiction 
!
5.2 The child’s best interests and natural justice: Adversarial proceedings 
!
5.3 “Attempts to reach the truth”: Care proceedings in the United   
Kingdom 
!
!
Outline of chapter 
!
The suspected abuse or neglect of a child, and the state’s response to it, invokes profound 
and at times conflicting ethical concerns. Child protection practice in Australia is based on 
the paramountcy of the child’s best interests, and is centred around state Children’s 
Courts, and statutory child protection agencies. The great majority of child protection 
investigations and proceedings involve primarily psychosocial issues. In the court setting, 
tensions often arise between child protection workers, of social science discipline 
backgrounds, and legal officers of the court. In this milieu, cases of serious physical injury 
to young children where the injury may have been inflicted are not a natural focus for the 
customary stakeholders in the system. Adversarial proceedings in child protection cases 
continue to generate debate; an understanding of the legal as distinct from the common 
meaning of the word “adversarial” is necessary to understand the issues under discussion. 
Although far from perfect, the family justice system of the United Kingdom continues to 
provide a model for how difficult cases can be resolved. A particular strength of that 
jurisdiction appears to be its management of cases of physical injury to young children 
which involve complex or disputed medical evidence. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
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5.1 A singular jurisdiction 
!
“…you see in our court we’ve got that thing that we can inform ourselves and 
we’ve got this really kind of loose test on the balance of probabilities, so in the 
child protection jurisdiction, in our jurisdiction we’re working on a different test, 
which is a civil test and so the jurisdiction being statutory and the power having 
to be enforced from the statute law and the test being civil and the evidentiary 
provisions being different is probably not a good comparative.”   
(Magistrate informant 3) 
!
* * * * * 
!
One of the earliest reported applications of law specific to a child’s welfare was the biblical 
account of a judgment of King Solomon of Israel.  Matters in which a state agency seeks 1
authority to intervene in a child’s family life, for the child’s benefit, are heard in the 
respective Children’s Court of each Australian state. Although given various names in each 
state and over time, for simplicity all such matters will be referred to here as “child 
protection” proceedings. 
!
The High Court in 1987 described “neglect proceedings” in terms which hold true for all 
child protection proceedings, that they 
!
are truly a creature of statute, neither civil nor criminal in nature. They are therefore 
‘sui generis’  [that which is the only one of its kind]. 2!
 1 Kings 3:16-28 (NKJV). 1
The Court of Appeal (Crim) of England and Wales referred to this account in R v Cannings [2004] 
EWCA Crim 01 at [140].
 J v Lieschke [1987] 162 CLR 447 (Wilson J). 2
See also Best R, “Procedural tips in running unusual care applications” (2010) 2 Children’s Law 
News.
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The statutes governing child protection practice in each Australian state share similar 
underlying principles and formulations  (as they do with the Children Act 1989 (UK)). Front 3
and centre of all these Acts is the principle that the child’s best interests are the paramount 
consideration in the administration of the Act. The intersection of the “best interests” 
principle with the rights of parents, principles of natural justice, and other common law 
principles, can lead to tensions between competing considerations, for both statutory 
officers and judicial decision-makers. 
!
A number of different orders under each Act connote various powers to the state child 
protection agency (Tab 11). The decision in an application for a child protection order turns 
on the question of whether a child is deemed a “child in need of protection”, which is itself 
defined by the related questions of  
!
• whether a child “has suffered significant harm” or is “at an unacceptable risk of harm”,  4
and 
• whether the child lacks a parent who is “able and willing” to protect them from harm. !
!
 Scott D, Australian child protection legislation (Australian Institute of Family Studies, August 3
2014). 
See also Mathews B in: Monahan G and Young L (eds), Children and the Law in Australia 
(LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008) Ch 10; Bromfield L and Higgins DJ, National comparison of child 
protection systems (Australian Institute of Family Studies, April 2005); Bromfield L and Holzer P, “A 
national approach for child protection: project report” (Australian Institute of Family Studies, 
December 2008).
 Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) s 10; Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 4
1998 (NSW) s 71(1); Children, Youth and Families Act 2005 (Vic) s 162. 
Different thresholds are applied from state to state, for example in Victoria the threshold is only met 
if a child has suffered harm “due to…abuse”. For this and other details specific to each state see 
Scott D, “Australian legal definitions: When is a child in need of protection?” (Australian Institute of 
Family Studies, August 2014); Grant P, “The Role of the Children’s Court in Child Protection in 
Victoria” (Paper at LIV Family Law Conference, 19 November 2010).
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Table 11. Child Protection Acts, Orders under the Act, and state child protection 
agencies in Queensland, NSW and Victoria
Act Orders under the Act Statutory child protection agency
Queensland Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld)
Temporary assessment order!
Court assessment order!
Temporary custody order!
Child protection order
Department of 
Communities Child 
Safety and Disability 
Services- Child Safety 
Services
NSW
Children and Young 
Persons (Care and 
Protection) Act 1998 
(NSW)
Emergency care and protection 
order!
Assessment order!
Care order
Department of Family 
and Community 
Services
Victoria
Children, Youth and 
Families Act 2005 
(Vic)
Temporary assessment order!
Therapeutic treatment order!
Interim accommodation order!
Protection order (several types)!
Permanent care order
Department of Human 
Services- Children, 
Youth and Families
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A statutory agency is responsible for responding to notifications of suspected child abuse 
or neglect, in each state.  Historically, child protection workers have most often been 5
qualified in the discipline of social work, but this is no longer a uniform requirement.  The 6
approach taken by child protection workers at the points of intake of notifications, 
investigation, and intervention, is in theory influenced by previous decisions of that state's 
Children’s Court, although the reality in that respect is often problematic.  7
!
Alternative dispute resolution methods are encouraged as a means of addressing 
concerns of possible child maltreatment without necessitating a Court hearing.  The 8
process must be voluntarily entered into by parents or carers, and the nature of these 
processes differs from state to state.  9
!
The Family Court of Australia exercises federal jurisdiction to which private cases (e.g. 
divorce) are brought, with a remit which extends beyond the welfare of children.  These 10
cases sometimes involve allegations of child abuse. Sophisticated processes have been 
developed within that jurisdiction to best manage such matters.  11
 Goldsworthy K, “Reporting abuse and neglect: State and territory departments responsible for 5
protecting children” (Australian Institute of Family Studies, January 2015).
 See Peak Care Queensland, “Response to Queensland Child Protection Commission of Inquiry 6
February 2013 Discussion Paper” (March 2013); Australian Association of Social Workers, 
“Submission to the Review of the Qualifications and Training Pathways- Department of Child 
Safety Queensland” (February 2008).
 Sheehan R and Borowski A (eds), Australia’s Children’s Courts Today and Tomorrow (Springer, 7
2013) Ch 10.2; Johnstone P, “The Importance of clinical evidence in care proceedings” (2012) 4 
Children’s Law News [1.11]; Wood J, Report of the Special Commission of Inquiry into Child 
Protection Services in NSW (State of NSW, November 2008) [11.2]; Sheehan R, “The Children‘s 
Court and child protection: The primacy of the socio-legal response to child abuse” (1999) 52 
Australian Social Work 5.
 See Sheehan R, “Alternative dispute resolution in child protection matters: the Victorian 8
experience” (2006) 59 Australian Social Work 157.
 See Boxall H, Morgan A and Terer K, “Evaluation of the Family Group Conferencing pilot 9
program” (Australian Institute of Criminology, 2012); Crossley P, “New model conferences: 
Evaluation report” (Clear Horizon Consulting, February 2012).
 Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).10
 Higgins DJ and Kaspiew R, “Child protection and family law: Joining the dots” (Australian 11
Institute of Family Studies, May 2011); Higgins DJ, “Cooperation and coordination: An evaluation of 
the Family Court of Australia’s Magellan case-management model” (Family Court of Australia, 
October 2007).
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All Australian states and territories have appointed a Children’s Commissioner or 
equivalent, whose primary role is to “advocate for children's rights and examine and review 
legislation, policy and practices that affect the health, welfare, care, protection and 
development of children”.  One role of the Children’s Commissions in some states is to 12
examine the practice of the state child protection agency, especially through reports on 
cases of a child’s death.  13
!
Many children who have been the subject of child protection proceedings, later appear as 
either victims or offenders in juvenile justice matters. For a vulnerable child, the state child 
protection system may be but one strand in a complex web of organisations and 
jurisdictions.  14
!
!
Doubly invisible: Child protection proceedings involving alleged physical abuse 
!
Within the forensic medical landscape, child protection cases are eclipsed, in number and 
prominence, by criminal cases. This circumstance is further outlined in Chapter 7. 
!
Separate to this, within the child protection landscape, dominated by social workers and 
lawyers, cases of alleged serious physical abuse to very young children are relatively 
obscure. A Children’s Court is primarily a court of psychosocial adversity, and social 
science expertise. 
!
Cases of suspected physical abuse comprise a minority of cases of suspected 
maltreatment. In the year to 2013, only 20% of notifications to the child protection agency 
of an Australian state which were substantiated were cases of physical abuse.  38% of 15
 Meredith V, “Children's commissioners and guardians” (Australian Institute of Family Studies, 12
August 2014).
 Commission for Children and Young People and Child Guardian (Qld), “An investigation into the 13
adequacy of the actions of certain government agencies in relation to service provision to a subject 
child” (March 2011). 
 See Australian Law Reform Commission, Family Violence- A National Legal Response: Report 14
114 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010) [2.69]; Dessau L, "Children and the court system”, (Paper 
at Children and Crime: Victims and Offenders Conference, Australian Institute of Criminology, 17 
June 1999).
 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, Child protection Australia: 2012-13 (AIHW, 2014) p 19.15
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substantiated notifications related to emotional abuse, and 28% to neglect. In Queensland, 
16% of children placed in foster care because of substantiated harm have suffered 
physical abuse (compared to neglect in 57% and emotional abuse in 22%).  16
!
The existence of “Children’s Court Clinics” in Victoria and New South Wales, publicly 
funded services with staff who provide clinical assessments exclusively for their respective 
Courts, speaks to the predominance of cases of emotional abuse, or neglect, being 
brought to Children’s Courts.  The clinical staff of these clinics are all professionals in a 17
social science discipline, such as psychology or social work. 
!
Several scholars have pointed to the apparent anomaly whereby the final decision in a 
case of suspected child maltreatment, in which the difficulties which a child and family face 
are primarily psychosocial, is made by a professional with no or little specific expertise in 
social science disciplines- a magistrate or judge.  Such cases comprise the majority. 18
!
A leading Australian social work scholar, in a major report on the decision-making of 
magistrates in child protection proceedings in Victoria, recorded a remarkable assertion: 
!
Magistrates all expressed the view that this work is ‘not really law’…  19!
It may be assumed that these exact words were not used by every single magistrate 
interviewed. In the context of disputed cases of serious physical injury to a young child, in 
which a court weighs a large volume of complex medical evidence to arrive at a high-
stakes decision,  the assertion would be hard to fathom. The magistrates interviewed 20
were, however, almost certainly referring to those cases dominated by psychosocial 
issues, since these constitute the standard fare of judicial child protection work. 
!
The central participation of professionals from such dissimilar backgrounds as law, and a 
social science, in a system which delivers high-stakes decisions based on complex and 
 Carmody T, Taking responsibility: A roadmap for Queensland Child Protection (Queensland Child 16
Protection Commission of Inquiry, June 2013) p 37.
 Sheehan and Borowski (2013), n 7, Ch 10.6.3.17
 Sheehan (1999), n 7; Sheehan and Borowski (2013), n 7, Ch 10.5.1.1.18
 Sheehan (1999), n 7, p 9.19
 Such as DOHS v Mr and Mrs H [2007] VChC 2.20
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uncertain information, sets the scene for intractable tensions and wilful misunderstanding. 
A social work scholar in 2003 observed that “The needs of infants for adequate protection 
are often lost in the clamour of adult voices in the socio-legal process.”  The adult voices 21
referred to in that study were those of parents on the one hand, and of officers (both social 
work and legal) of a state authority on the other. 
!
It was however a different clamour which preoccupied three recent Inquiries into the child 
protection systems of Australia’s three most populous states. This is the sound which 
arises from the voices of social work professionals in one corner, and the voices of legal 
professionals in the opposite corner. 
!
In child protection matters which involve young children who have suffered a serious 
physical injury, psychosocial issues may not be determinative of the outcome, as they are 
in other matters. Physical evidence may lead to a conclusive medical opinion on the cause 
of injury, and this may largely determine the outcome of proceedings.  In these cases the 22
medical conclusion based on the physical evidence may itself influence the conclusion 
arrived at in psychosocial assessments, and the court’s reception of those assessments.  23
For example a psychologist’s opinion that the five year old sister of an infant with life-
threatening injuries was both psychologically capable of and likely to have caused those 
injuries, may be rejected outright if the court accepts a medical opinion that a five year old 
is simply not physically capable of causing such injuries.  The usually robust voices of 24
legal and social science expertise recede in these matters. Child protection jurisdictions in 
Australia do not uniformly guarantee a child a strong voice in proceedings, such as that 
which would be provided by their own legal representative.  At worst, the prevailing voice 25
in decision-making, in the case of a seriously injured child, may be that of a medical 
witness whose opinion is outdated, or overly dogmatic, or precautionary to the point of 
error, or derailed by any of a long list of possible biases. 
 Campbell L et al, “High risk infants in the children’s court process in Australia: Dilemmas and 21
directions” 25 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 121, p 121.
 See Herridge S, “Non-accidental injury in care proceedings- a digest for practitioners” (2009) 6 22
Children’s Law News; Butler-Sloss E, “Expert witnesses, courts and the law” (2002) 95 Journal of 
the Royal Society of Medicine 431.
 Re CB and JB [1998] EWHC Fam 2000.23
 DOHS v Mr and Mrs H [2007] VChC 2.24
 Ross NM in: Monahan and Young, n 3, Ch 23.25
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5.2 The child’s best interests and natural justice: Adversarial proceedings 
!
“Sometimes there are no medical reports at all, in fact most times there 
would be no medical report. And the number of matters that actually get to 
hearing… is only a very small handful. The material first comes from the 
Department and usually it’s contained by other conversations they’ve had 
with doctors or sometimes some subpoenaed evidence from hospitals. … It’s 
very, very rare.” (Magistrate informant 1) 
!
“I’m absolutely certain that Child Safety would present to families, the way 
police present to families, inappropriate summaries of the evidence before 
them. The difference is that the police ethical model includes interrogation as 
a legitimate part of police practice. Interrogation by its nature involves sharing 
of mistruths and misdirections to the person of interest. Neither Health’s nor 
Child Safety’s underlying ethical parameters allow that.”  
(Paediatrician informant 3) 
!
* * * * * 
!
In this Section reference is made to case law and commentary arising from the child 
protection jurisdictions of Australian states. Judgments have been published in only a 
small fraction of child protection proceedings in these jurisdictions. The great majority of 
these are matters heard in the last decade; the same is true for child protection matters 
decided in superior courts. This relative paucity of published literature stands in contrast to 
the large volume of material in publication from the Family Court of Australia, and to 
published judgments in public cases brought to family courts in the United Kingdom. The 
Children’s Court of New South Wales is currently the most prolific state child protection law 
publisher, through its online publication of Children’s Law News,  since 2001. The 26
Children’s Courts of Victoria  and Queensland  have also begun publishing important 27 28
judgments. This Section focuses mainly on child protection law as it has developed in 
these three states. 
 http://www.childrenscourt.justice.nsw.gov.au/childrenscourt/lawnews.html26
 http://www.sclqld.org.au/caselaw/QChC27
 http://www.childrenscourt.vic.gov.au/legal/judgments-and-decisions/family-division28
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A modern rendition of the principles of natural justice is: 
!
• The parties to a dispute must be given adequate notice and the opportunity to be heard; 
and 
• The decision maker must be disinterested and unbiased.  29!
The principle that the decision maker must be unbiased can be considered in relation to 
both the actions taken by child protection officers in child protection investigations, and the 
conduct of a child protection hearing in court. Applying the principles of natural justice to 
administrative law (the body of law regulating government decision making,  which 30
includes interventions undertaken by state child protection agencies) is by its nature a 
significant challenge.  31
!
Central to any examination of natural justice at common law is an understanding of the 
distinction between “adversarial” and “inquisitorial” legal proceedings. It is primarily a legal 
procedural one. 
!
An adversarial legal system is 
!
characterised by opposing parties having the responsibility for deciding what the 
issues are and how the case is to be presented. !
An inquisitorial legal system is 
!
characterised by a judicial officer having responsibility for pretrial investigations, and 
the conduct of the trial.  32!
!
 Caldwell J, “Family proceedings concerning children: The nature of natural justice” (2010) 12 29
Otago Law Review 345, p 345.
 Attorney-General’s Department, Australian Government Administrative Law Policy Guide 30
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2011) [1.1].
 Lindsay R, “Natural justice: Procedural fairness: ‘Now we see through a glass darkly’” (2010) 63 31
AIAL Forum 67, p 67; McMillan J, “Natural justice- Too much, too little or just right?” (2008) 58 AIAL 
Forum 33.
 Australian Law Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 2010).32
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In everyday use the word “adversarial” means 
!
involving or characterized by conflict or opposition.  33!
Proponents of an inquisitorial legal system argue that it is a better method of establishing 
the truth, and that this should be a key feature of any legal system. Proponents of an 
adversarial legal system argue that it best protects the rights of individuals, especially 
against wrongful criminal conviction and punishment. 
!
No such ambivalence applies to the common-usage meaning of “adversarial”. A 
cooperative approach would be preferred to an adversarial approach in almost any 
undertaking, if this everyday meaning of the word is intended. 
!
Sir Anthony Mason, former Chief Justice of the High Court, strongly promoted the 
particular strength of adversarial proceedings, when commenting on changes proposed to 
them in 1999: 
!
The second major question is whether we are willing to make do with less of an 
emphasis on procedural fairness. Are we willing to allow the judge to decide  
(a) whether witnesses will be called and, if so, which witnesses and  
(b) to limit cross-examination which is not as significant an element in the European 
model as it is with us.  
The emphasis on procedural fairness is at the heart of the adversarial model. …our 
conception of procedural fairness is centred on the entitlement of the party to 
present his own case…  34!
The former Chief Justice noted the calling of expert witnesses as a particular concern in 
this regard. 
!
!
!
!
 Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 2010).33
 Mason A, “The Future of Adversarial Justice” (Paper at 17th AIJA Annual Conference, 1999) p 5.34
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Legislators and judges do not themselves consistently distinguish between the technical 
legal and the common meaning of the word “adversarial”. The District Court of New South 
Wales in child protection proceedings in 2011 observed that: 
!
While pursuant to s 93 of the Act proceedings before the Children's Court… are not 
to be conducted in an adversarial manner, there was, unfortunately, a degree of 
hostility between certain of the counsel involved.  35!
!
Adversarial child protection proceedings: New South Wales 
!
The authority on the nature of child protection proceedings in New South Wales is Talbot v 
Community Services [1993] 30 NSWLR 487.  The Supreme Court of New South Wales 36
considered a summons “seeking a declaration that an order of the Minister for Community 
Services' delegate be quashed as having involved a denial of natural justice” [489D]. It 
seemed to Justice Young that “the learned [Children’s Court] magistrate considered that he 
was not dealing with a lis between parties but was conducting an inquiry” [490B]. Of most 
concern to the court was that the Children’s Court magistrate had conducted long 
conferences with legal advisers in chambers without the parties being present; this 
circumstance was considered an affront to natural justice. The court “recognised in the 
authorities that proceedings for custody are in a special category”, and that the court “in 
exercising its inherent jurisdiction in relation to custody… is not bound by the strict rules of 
evidence but has a discretion to act on material which is rationally probative even though 
excluded by such rules so long as the court considers that it is proper to act on such 
material and is fair to the parties before it.” With regard to the proposition that child 
protection proceedings might be inquisitorial in nature, however, Young J held that 
!
the Act does not allow for such a procedure at all… There is virtually no indication in 
the Children (Care and Protection) Act that what the legislature has authorised is an 
inquiry. ...the proceedings are court proceedings and the magistrate is not in the 
 Re Elizabeth [2011] NSWDC 245 at [36].35
 See also McLachlan R, “The Children’s Court’s power to limit the presentation of evidence or the 36
cross examination of deponents of documents” (Paper to Annual St James Practitioner’s 
Conference, 19 June 2004); Re Peter and Ors [2002] NSWSC 67 at [57] (O’Keefe J); McLachlan 
R, “Guardian ad Litem- Addendum” (2002) 7 Children’s Law News; Hartingdon and Ors v 
Community Services [1993] 17 FLR 126, p 128 (Levine J).
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position of a chairman of an inquiry who is able to direct it according to his best 
analysis of the situation. [500G] !
Much recent attention has however focused on the problems associated with “adversarial” 
proceedings. The 2008 Special Commission of Inquiry into Child Protection Services in 
New South Wales  (“the Wood Inquiry”) addressed these concerns: 37
!
At the heart of the submissions made to the Inquiry was whether the Children’s 
Court should be empowered to embrace a more inquisitorial approach to care 
matters or confined to the more traditional role of deciding cases brought before it 
on the evidence adduced by the parties. [11.82] 
… 
A significant concern which was entertained related to the difficulties which, it was 
reported, caseworkers often found in dealing with a process that they viewed as 
unduly adversarial. [11.87] 
… 
Proceedings of this kind in the Children’s Court almost always commence in an 
atmosphere of acrimony and of great concern on the part of the family that they 
might lose their child; as well as concern on the part of DoCS [Department of 
Community Services] staff as to the safety, welfare and well-being of the child… 
[11.105] 
… 
...the relationship between DoCS and the Court does appear at least at times, to be 
strained, to the point where the best interests of the children...involved may not 
always be served. The reasons for this may include the nature of the jurisdiction 
which lends itself to strong emotional reactions, the strong and understandable 
desire of the Court to reach a correct decision, the pressure placed on DoCS staff 
working in a very challenging environment, a perception of and, at times, the reality 
of poor practice on the part of DoCS, the fact that it is a party in every case, the 
small pool of lawyers (mainly legally aided) who appear before the Court, and the 
personalities of those involved. [11.107]  !
Published discussions of adversarial child protection proceedings have often omitted a 
description of the manner in which adversarialism denigrates the child’s best interests. It 
does seem unlikely that a hostile environment would in itself benefit a child subject to 
proceedings. Commissioner Wood noted that 
!
 Wood, n 7. 37
See also Re Anna, Bruno, Courtney and Deepak [2001] NSWSC 79 at [14] (Hodgson CJinEq).
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there is a risk that comments made in the presence of the family which are unduly 
critical or dismissive of DoCS, are likely to impact adversely on the trust that is 
essential if DoCS staff are to work constructively with the child or young person who 
is the subject of the proceedings, and his or her parents, for example in relation to 
contact, restoration and support if that child is taken into care. Additionally if DoCS 
workers feel, whether justifiably or not, that they are likely to be subject to sustained 
criticism, then this may adversely affect the quality of their case preparation or 
appearance in Court. [11.106] 
… 
The Inquiry is strongly of the view that the relationship between DoCS and the 
Children’s Court should change to one which is less adversarial, and more 
conducive to working cooperatively… [11.109, emphasis added] !
A disturbing judicial illumination of the dangers which the principles of natural justice guard 
against is set out in the judgment in Re Georgia and Luke (No 2) [2008] NSWSC 1387. 
DoCS had removed a 15 month old girl from the care of her parents, on grounds which the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales could not elucidate beyond recreational cannabis 
use. The Court held that 
!
the action of the DOCS officers in seizing these children… was motivated by upset 
at the confrontation which they had had at the parents' home on that day. …  
The circumstances which I have recounted amount, in my opinion, to a gross abuse 
of power on the part of the DOCS officers concerned. The result has been to 
remove young children from the care of good and nurturing parents for the last 
twelve weeks. The insistence by the DOCS officers that the Children's Court 
proceedings continue on their course and the children remain in custody pending 
their conclusion aggravates the abuse of power already perpetrated. [72]-[74] 
(Palmer J) !
The judgment detailed some of the confrontation which had upset the DoCS officers, as 
recorded in their own affidavits: 
!
[The mother, “B”] was making a hot drink. She was dressed in her pyjamas. Her hair 
was messy and knotted. I observed that [the mother] appeared to have lost a lot of 
weight in the period since I had last seen her. Her clothes were hanging off her and 
her bones were protruding. A conversation with words to the following effect took 
place. 
[DOCS officer] said: “Hi [B], how are you?” 
[B] mimicked: “Hi [B] how are you?” 
Chapter 5
[DOCS officer] said: “[B] you look like you have lost a lot of weight. Are you ok?” 
[B] said: “You look like you’ve put on weight.” 
… 
The officer had no rational basis for attributing weight loss to the mother’s drug use 
when there is no evidence of heroin addiction or other substance abuse by the 
mother. [44], [50] !
!
Adversarial child protection proceedings: Victoria 
!
In a 2009 report of an own-motion investigation into child protection practice in that state,   38
the Victorian Ombudsman argued that 
!
the current legal system perversely encourages disputation rather than cooperation 
in the protection of children [39] 
and that 
the appropriateness of a legal system that generates such a degree of conflict ought 
to be reconsidered by government. [41] !
In support of this view the Ombudsman pointed to cost implications, and the negative 
experiences of child protection workers. The Ombudsman quoted the Principal Practitioner 
as saying that heavily contested legal processes had drawn the Department’s attention 
away from pursuing children’s best interests, and that the experiences of child protection 
workers in the Children’s Court was 
!
‘dominating the work culture and at times shaping critical decision making through 
the lens of ‘what would get through or be accepted by the Court’. (p 58) !
This report led to a review of relevant legislation and processes by the Victorian Law 
Reform Commission (VLRC), which was asked to “consider models that take a more 
administrative case management approach to child protection issues”.   39!
 Brouwer GE, “Own motion investigation into the Department of Human Services child protection 38
program” (Ombudsman Victoria, November 2009).
 Victorian Law Reform Commission, “Review of Victoria’s Child Protection Legislative 39
Arrangements: Information Paper” (VLRC, February 2010) p 2. 
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The Victorian Child Safety Commissioner in submission to that review went so far as to 
advocate abolition of the Children’s Court entirely, and replacement of it by a tribunal which 
would “adopt an inquisitorial rather than an adversarial approach”.   40
!
The current adversarial system of the Children’s Court does not serve children’s 
best interests and should be replaced by a collaborative approach. (Attachment B) !
The VLRC in its 2010 report concluded that 
!
While there appears to be widespread support for the paramountcy of the ‘best 
interests’ principle, key participants in child protection matters do not always appear 
to have a shared view of how the principle should be applied in individual cases. 
This results in significant tension between the various participants in the system.  41!
The VLRC recommended that Victoria 
!
should move away from child protection procedures that closely resemble those 
used in summary criminal prosecutions. The processes used in child protection 
matters should be specially designed for this unique jurisdiction which is neither 
criminal nor civil in nature… New procedures should reflect the fact that most child 
protection cases are resolved by agreement. (p 17) !
The Protecting Victoria’s Vulnerable Children Inquiry into the entire child protection system 
across the state was conducted soon after this. The Inquiry Panel did not recommend that 
the Court be replaced by a tribunal, instead advising that 
!
Changes are… required to some elements of the operation of the Children’s Court 
to reduce the adversarial nature of court processes.  42!
!
!
 Geary B, “Submission to VLRC Review of Victoria’s Child Protection Legislative 40
Arrangements” (Victorian Child Safety Commissioner, 1 April 2010) p 1.
 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Protection Applications in the Children’s Court: Final Report 41
19 (VLRC, June 2010) p 16.
 Cummins P, Report of the Protecting Victoria’s Vulnerable Children Inquiry (Department of 42
Premier and Cabinet, January 2012) xliii.
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Adversarial child protection proceedings: Queensland 
!
In 2013 the Queensland Child Protection Commission of Inquiry delivered its report.  43
Submissions to the Commission called into question the approach taken by the 
Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services (DCCSDS) to legal 
proceedings, especially in respect of procedural fairness: 
!
Criticisms have been especially levelled at a lack of compliance with model litigant 
principles, the poor quality of material and evidence presented in support of 
applications, and the department’s failure to obtain early legal advice about 
proposed intervention. 
The model litigant principles… establish the basis on which the State of Queensland 
should conduct litigation, which includes fairness and applies to child protection 
proceedings. (p 478) !
A particular concern was the lack of a duty of disclosure of essential documents by 
DCCSDS to other parties to proceedings: 
!
In the absence of a disclosure regime, child protection proceedings are conducted 
largely on the basis of affidavit evidence sworn to by Child Safety officers. This 
affidavit material often relies on hearsay rather than direct evidence from original 
sources. In addition, the department may have additional, relevant information that 
is not part of the affidavit evidence. To obtain access to this departmental 
information, parties must issue a subpoena… (p 461) !
In this regard the Commission observed that: 
!
In child protection proceedings, any obligation to make disclosure would involve 
considerations closer to those in criminal matters, rather than civil proceedings. The 
obligation should be modelled on section 590AB of the Criminal Code and, as the 
applicant continues investigating until trial, should be a continuous one. (p 462) !
The VLRC three years earlier had broadly recommended that child protection proceedings 
in Victoria move away from procedures used in summary criminal prosecutions. In 
Queensland, however, the Commission identified this feature of criminal justice as 
conspicuous by its absence. 
 Carmody, n 16.43
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Another issue examined examined was a lack of uniform access for either children or 
parents, to legal representation: 
!
in reality the views of children and young people are not always sought or well 
presented to the court during proceedings. (p 472) !
The anomaly that publicly funded representation in private family law disputes is more 
accessible than in child protection matters was highlighted: 
!
…although the Commonwealth’s priorities for family matters include state matters 
where a child’s health or safety is at risk, currently all Commonwealth funding is 
used for family law matters. This should mean that child protection matters are 
prioritised over family law matters. The funding arrangements, however, appear to 
favour family law matters in which there may be no, or lower levels of, risk to a child. !
The report underlined the dangers posed through lack of adequate representation in an 
essentially adversarial system: 
!
The worst possible scenario is that because child protection proceedings generally 
lack a legally represented contravenor, it is possible that children are entering out-of-
home care who should be the subject of less intensive orders or no orders at all. 
(p 471) !
Of equal relevance to the issue of legal representation, as it arises in the Queensland 
setting, is a recent series of studies reporting the experiences and views of community 
organisation workers who had supported and advocated for mothers in child protection 
interventions, and of lawyers with experience in child protection law.  The starting point of 44
these studies was the observation that “From a legal perspective, serious power 
imbalances exist between the parties in child protection matters”,  and that “In legal 45
proceedings, the existence of power imbalances between the parties often indicates that a 
 Walsh T and Douglas H, “Lawyers’ views of decision-making in child protection matters: The 44
tension between adversarialism and collaborative approaches” (2012) 38 Monash University Law 
Review 181. 
See also Douglas H and Walsh T, “Mothers and the child protection system” (2009) 23 International 
Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 211.
 Walsh T and Douglas H, “Lawyers, advocacy and child protection” (2011) 35 Melbourne 45
University Law Review 621, p 622. 
See also KD v Department of Child Safety and Others [2011] QChC 8; Re Nellie [2004] NSWLC 8.
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lawyer may be needed to support the vulnerable party; criminal cases provide the best 
example.”  46
!
The accounts given by lawyers working in the system, reported in these studies, make for 
sobering reading: 
!
the lawyers overwhelmingly lacked confidence in the decision-making processes 
within the child protection system in Queensland. The interviewees’ particular 
concerns can be distilled into two key themes: denial of procedural fairness and 
concerns regarding evidence and proof.  47!
One focus of examination in these studies was the manner in which Family Group 
Meetings (FGMs) and other alternative dispute resolution (ADR) forums are conducted. 
This is of particular interest since ADR methods have been touted as a salve to the 
inflammation engendered by court proceedings.  Within Queensland, however, 48
descriptions of how these meetings play out in real life were perhaps as alarming as those 
of court hearings: 
!
many of the lawyers interviewed reported that the department did not make their 
current child protection concerns clear to parents, and that this limited parents’ 
capacity to identify and address the issues in dispute. !
lawyers interviewed stated that parents were often actively discouraged by the 
department from seeking legal advice. Indeed, some of the participants maintained 
that even those parents who were represented were encouraged to engage in 
discussions with the department without consulting their lawyer. !
The lawyers we interviewed also described situations of both actual and ostensible 
bias on the part of the FGM convenor. Participants said: ‘The chairperson who’s 
always employed by the Department of Child Safety, even though they are from a 
different division, they still are effectively seen by the clients as part of the process.’ 
‘I’ve had family group meetings where the person that removed the child is 
convening the meeting’ … ‘Often in family group meetings, the departmental worker 
 Walsh and Douglas, n 45, p 623.46
 Walsh and Douglas, n 44, p 191.47
 Gormly J, “National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council submission to the 48
Productivity Commission Inquiry into Access to Justice Arrangements” (NADRAC, November 
2013); Carmody, n 16, p 462; Cummins, n 42, [15.4.1], [15.5.1], [15.5.2]; Wood, n 7, [12.123].
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will say ‘when we get the order’. I mean it’s inflammatory to the parent and 
inflammatory to me as well.’  49!
The authors noted that 
!
The idea of ‘family group meetings’ is to bring about consensus regarding how the 
child is to be cared for and protected, with maximum family involvement in those 
decisions. In practice, however, this form of decision-making may not be 
collaborative. While many of the decisions made by child protection officers are 
subject to judicial review, or merits review by the relevant tribunal, in reality, review 
of any kind is rarely sought. Parents and children are often unaware of their rights to 
appeal or contest a decision, and are often in practice unable to navigate the 
relevant systems.  50!
The authors’ synthesis of the sum of the lawyers’ accounts was blunt: 
!
generally the lawyers in this study described child protection decision-making 
processes as being non-collaborative, highly adversarial and sometimes coercive in 
nature.  51!
!
Medical reports 
!
Written reports hold some advantages over oral evidence given in court, since they are 
accessible, in indisputable form, to various participants in legal disputes, regardless of 
whether a case reaches court.  Another important reason why courts might prefer expert 52
evidence in report form is to minimize the imposition placed on busy professionals; 
continuing frustration with court scheduling may lead some to abandon forensic work 
entirely.  Another key reason for the preference of written reports in some jurisdictions is 53
simply to avoid the time and expense, to the parties and the court, which oral evidence 
 Walsh and Douglas, n 44, pp 194-197.49
 Walsh and Douglas, n 45, p 628.50
 Walsh and Douglas, n 44, p 197.51
 Freckelton I and Selby H, Expert Evidence: Law, Practice, Procedure and Advocacy (5th ed, 52
Thomson Reuters, 2013) p 284.
 Henderson E and Seymour F, “Expert witnesses under examination in the New Zealand criminal 53
and family courts” (Law Foundation of New Zealand, 2013).
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would otherwise entail.  The advent of “expert certificates” in uniform Evidence Act 54
jurisdictions reduces the need to call expert witnesses.  55
!
The proper construction of a forensic medical report has proved difficult to precisely define, 
in light of the wide range of bases (history, examination test results, scientific studies, 
clinical experience) on which its content typically rests.  A 2012 article by Australian 56
forensic paediatricians,  on standards for reports on physical injuries to young children, 57
represents significant progress in this regard. 
!
The definitive contribution of a doctor to an investigation by a child protection agency in a 
case of suspected child abuse is most often their written report. This is also often the case 
in the minority of those investigated cases which lead to a contested court hearing.  On 58
the subject of a tribunal’s decision-making, Evatt J, dissenting, in R v War Pensions 
Entitlement Appeal Tribunal [1933] 50 CLR 228, recorded several conclusions which 
remain highly pertinent today: 
!
(1) That the decision of the Tribunal was affected, adversely to the appellant, by the 
report of the two doctors. 
(2) That owing to their non-attendance before the Tribunal it is impossible to tell 
whether or to what extent the opinion of these two doctors was affected by the “full 
summary” of other medical opinions relating to many irrelevant matters and given at 
different times during a period of many years. 
(3) That this “full summary” was prepared, not by the Appeal Tribunal, but by the 
litigant before it… which of course was committed to an opinion adverse to the 
applicant and which should not have been the channel of communication between 
the independent tribunal and the two doctors. 
(4) That, in the circumstances already set out, it was quite impossible for the 
applicant’s representative to present his case without being afforded a reasonable 
 Grant G and Studdert DM, “The injury brokers: An empirical profile of medical expert witnesses 54
in personal injury litigation” (2013) 36 Melbourne University Law Review 831, p 862.
 Evidence Act 1995 (Cth); Freckelton and Selby, n 52, p 295.55
 Freckelton and Selby, n 52, p 278.56
 Skellern C and Donald TG, “Defining standards for medico-legal reports in forensic evaluation of 57
suspicious childhood injury” (2012) 19 Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine 267.
 See Crawford J, “Working with affidavit evidence in care proceedings in the Children’s 58
Court” (2004) December Children’s Law News.
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opportunity, either by questioning or by other means, of discovering upon what 
assumed basis of fact or opinion the report really proceeded. [255] !
Child protection workers face invidious obligations, and do so in a setting of heavy 
workloads and increasing numbers of notifications. The roles which they must adopt, often 
consecutively or concurrently in the same case, may be deeply conflicted, entailing 
therapeutic, investigative and forensic/prosecutorial aspects. In this context, the problem of 
poor collection, preparation, and presentation of evidence central to a child protection 
investigation or proceedings, is a potentially serious one. It is liable to be seriously 
compounded in cases where clinicians do not meticulously manage the informal or 
documented opinions which they provide, from the time of their first involvement in a case.  
!
As noted in the civil jurisdiction, 
!
resolving differences of medical opinion on the basis of written reports in the 
absence of oral evidence creates challenges for decision-makers. It limits 
opportunity for the decision-maker to probe key statements or witness credibility and 
forecloses opportunities for experts to challenge each other.  59!
In TR v Department of Family and Community Services [2013] NSWDC 236, the presence 
of significant injuries to an infant was disputed. The court was left to decide the matter on 
the basis of medical reports which clearly did not contain all the relevant medical findings 
and opinions, despite the involvement in the case of several highly qualified medical 
specialists, and the use of sophisticated medical investigations to this end.  60
!
Affidavits provided by the child protection agency in contested child protection hearings 
have been criticised by the court in several matters for containing allegations without 
 Grant and Studdert, n 54, p 862. 59
See also Howes LM et al, “Forensic scientists’ conclusions: How readable are they for non-
scientist report-users?” (2013) 231 Forensic Science International 102.
 See also Re Peter and Ors [2002] NSWSC 679 at [67].60
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evidence to support those allegations.  These include matters involving allegations of 61
physical abuse.  62
!
Judicial criticism of the affidavit evidence of child protection workers has included 
descriptions of it as “wilfully inadequate” and “positively misleading”.  In 2008 a magistrate 63
of the Children’s Court of Victoria observed that: 
!
It is not uncommon for Departmental reports to be written to achieve an outcome 
and for material which does not support that outcome to be omitted from the reports. 
I could give dozens of examples of that over the past 5 years.  64!
“Quality of Evidence in the Children’s Court” warranted its own section in the previously 
discussed study of the views of lawyers practicing in child protection in Queensland:  65
!
The lawyers said that it was common for child protection offers to ‘exaggerate weak 
material’ which was prejudicial to parents. They said that it was common for material 
to be admitted which was ‘full of hearsay’, ‘full of innuendo’, and ‘full of opinion 
which can’t be backed up’. Indeed, they provided many examples of situations in 
which child protection officers had adduced evidence which was misleading or 
incorrect. … 
Many participants said that child protection officers relied on unsubstantiated 
notifications, criminal charges that have resulted in acquittals and ‘histories’ of 
alcohol or drug abuse where the person may have been clean for some time, to 
prove their case. (p 198) !
One lawyer pointed to the expectation of a more rigorous standard of evidence, in 
proceedings before the Family Court of Australia (p 199). 
!
 Department of Child Safety v SJ & MB [2009] QChCM 1; Re Georgia and Luke (No 2) [2008] 61
NSWSC 1387; In the Matters of IP, LP, RP and BP (Children’s Court of NSW, Mitchell CM, 20 
November 2001).
 Dept Child Safety v SB & Ors [2010] QChCM 1 at [35]; TW, DOHS and P, F & R children [2009] 62
VChC 6, p 3.
 IP v Department of Communities and SC [2009] QChC 2 at [6].63
 DOHS v Ms B & Mr G [2008] VChC 1, p 25.64
 Walsh and Douglas, n 44.65
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The issue of medical reports in child protection investigations and proceedings will be 
taken up further in Chapter 6. 
!
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5.3 “Attempts to reach the truth”: Child protection proceedings in the United  
 Kingdom         
!
“…it’s funny, in England I understand that it’s regarded as a great honour to 
do child safety style work, in Australia it’s definitely the leftover dregs…” 
(Magistrate informant 2) 
!
* * * * * 
!
Family justice is a prominent and established part of the overall justice system in the 
United Kingdom. In family justice most of the same judges, in the same Courts, hear both 
“private” (e.g. divorce) and “public” family law cases.  The Family Division of the High 66
Court of England and Wales comprises its own superior court and is one of only three 
Divisions of the High Court (Fig 10). 
!
“Care proceedings”, public family proceedings, are similar to the Australian state “child 
protection proceedings” thus far discussed. A “local authority” corresponds to an Australian 
state child protection agency. 
!
Many judges specialise in family law, to varying degrees, a feature of the system 
embodied in “Designated Family Judges” and “Nominated Care Judges”. Many lawyers 
also hold specialised knowledge and experience in the area, such that they are able to 
assist generalist judges in some instances.  67
!
Official Law Reports of proceedings in cases which would today be called family justice 
cases (both private and public), have been published since 1865, initially in volumes of 
“Law Reports, Probate”, or similar. Most such judgments published in the 19th century 
were of decisions regarding divorce, or disposition of family assets (i.e. private family law).  
As early as 1864, however, judgments were published in proceedings in which the main 
issue of concern was a child’s welfare.  
!
!
 Judicial Office for England and Wales (2015).66
 Re X [2009] EWHC 1728 (Fam) at [13].67
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Figure 10. The structure of the courts of the United Kingdom (Tribunals omitted) 
Public family proceedings are heard in all courts shown, except the Crown Court.  68
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!
 Judicial Office of England and Wales (2015).68
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Judgments in two separate cases, relating to a very modern concern- a parent’s failure to 
immunise their child- were published in 1864 and 1870.  In Re Goldsworthy (1876) 2 QBD 69
75, the Queen’s Bench Divisional Court made comment on the novel circumstance of a 
“Court of common law”, rather than the “Divorce Court”, deciding the custody of a child: 
!
…the issue in the Divorce Court is not the same, and… the inquiry into the proper 
custody of the children there is merely a collateral one… [85] !
The Court held that the father’s (then) “natural right” to his child should be interfered with, 
after receiving evidence of what would today be termed his alcoholism and frequent 
perpetration of domestic violence. A judgment reported in 1883  recorded the same 70
Court’s order that a girl aged 9 years be sent to reside at a “certified industrial school”, as 
she had been found living with her mother in a brothel. 
!
A child whose case is subject to care proceedings will almost always be legally 
represented in court, under s 41(3) of the Children Act 1989 (UK). They have, until recent 
years, always also been allocated a “children’s guardian” (previously known as a “guardian 
ad litem”).  This is an experienced social worker whose function is to safeguard the 71
interests of the child in proceedings; they are given wide powers of investigation under s 
42 of the Act. “One of the guardian’s many functions is to protect the child he or she 
represents against poor social work practice”.  72
!
Parents who contest care orders have until recently had ready access to either private or 
Legal Aid practitioners, for their own representation in proceedings. Recent cuts to public 
funding have limited access to both publicly funded legal representation, and children’s 
guardians. 
!
!
!
!
 Pilcher v Stafford (1864) 122 ER 651; Allen v Worthy (1870) LR 5 QB 163.69
 Hiscocks v Jermonson (1883) 10 QBD 360.70
 Wall N, A Handbook for Expert Witnesses in Children Act Cases (2nd ed, Jordan Publishing, 71
2007) Appendix 10.
 Wall, n 71, p 195.72
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The Family Justice Council 
!
In 2004 the Family Justice Council (FJC), a public, non-statutory, non-departmental, 
advisory body, was established.  The Council’s role is to “promote an inter-disciplinary 73
approach to family justice and to monitor the system”. The Council membership always 
includes “persons with experience in and knowledge of” health care, and a person similarly 
experienced in “social care”, along with judges and lawyers. The current 10-person 
membership of its Executive Committee includes a paediatrician and a child psychologist. 
!
In 2013 the FJC conducted consultation for the delineation of “Standards for Expert 
Witnesses in the Family Courts”.  It provided a response  to the Ministry of Justice’s 74 75
2006 consultation on the separate representation on children, and a response  to the 76
General Medical Council’s consultation for guidelines on the role of doctors in child 
protection. 
!
The FJC has also published substantial material on the issue of “Family Group 
Conferences” (FGCs). These have only come into modest use in England and Wales over 
the last decade, although the frequency of their use is increasing. In its response to a 2006 
government review of care proceedings, the FJC noted that 
!
There is a suggestion in the review that care proceedings are initiated too soon and 
in some cases where they are not necessary at all. …it is important that proceedings 
are not seen in a negative light. We recognise the advantages of pre-proceedings 
protocols in civil proceedings, but there are a number of significant differences 
between civil proceedings and care proceedings. … 
Care proceedings are not intrinsically ‘bad’ and to be avoided wherever possible. 
They provide an essential framework where there is disagreement between parents 
and the local authority concerning the immediate or long terms for the child. In some 
cases there may be a difference of view about the history; in others there may be a 
difference of view about the kind of assessment which is appropriate. … 
 Family Justice Council, “Family Justice Council” (Judicial Office of England and Wales, 2015).73
 Family Justice Council and Ministry of Justice, “Standards for expert witnesses in the family 74
courts in England and Wales: Consultation Paper” (16 May 2013).
 Family Justice Council, “FJC response to the DCA Consultation Paper on separate 75
representation of children” (December 2006).
 Family Justice Council, “FJC response: GMC call for evidence on doctors’ roles and 76
responsibilities in child protection” (September 2010).
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It is rare for care judges to see cases where the evidence at the start is such that the 
judge could seriously question why the case had ever been brought to court. 
The consequences of any increased pressure upon local authorities not to institute 
proceedings must be carefully considered. There is potential, at worst, for children to 
remain in frankly dangerous households. … 
The Council is also concerned by the fate of children who are subjected to S20 
‘voluntary’ accommodation, instead of becoming the subject of care proceedings. So 
often the accommodation is not in any sense voluntary, but the parents do not 
protest simply because the Local Authority has indicated that it will otherwise issue 
proceedings.  77!
Practice guidance  on the appropriate process for Family Group Conferences, published 78
by the Family Rights Group in 2011, was prominently endorsed by the FJC. These 
conferences, although extrajudicial, have arisen in an environment where the family courts 
maintain a strong presence. Convenors are properly qualified and independent. On paper 
at least, they are a very different process to that which has evolved in Queensland. Far 
from commandeering the meetings, the local authority must await an invitation from the 
independent convenor (p 9). 
!
The FJC has also taken on the oversight of a scheme which had already been operating in 
the Family Division of the High Court, the “mini pupillage” scheme.  Specialist Registrars- 79
doctors who are training in a specialty (especially those training in paediatrics)- are given 
an opportunity to sit with a judge during family proceedings. Primarily they attend hearings 
where medical witnesses gives evidence. 
!
!
Judicial leadership 
!
A feature of the family justice system in the United Kingdom is its stewardship by the 
senior judges who sit in the Family Division of the High Court of England and Wales. In 
2009 Wall LJ reflected on the conception of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK): 
!
 Family Justice Council, “FJC response to Review of the Child Care Proceedings System in 77
England and Wales” (September 2006) [23]-[26].
 Family Rights Group, “Family Group Conferences in the court arena” (FRG, September 2011).78
 Family Justice Council, “Mini Pupillage Scheme” (Judicial Office of England and Wales, 2015).79
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The first and most important point I wish to make is that even when the CPR were 
but a gleam in Lord Woolf’s eye, the Family Division was putting into practice most 
of the reforms relating to experts now considered standard- including discussions 
between and meetings of experts, agreements between experts- the 
encouragement of attitudes of cooperation rather than confrontation- attempts to 
reach the truth by inquisitorial rather than adversarial means.  80!
This boast is borne out by case law.  81
!
Judges of the family justice system have shown little ambivalence or insecurity as to 
whether care proceedings should be described as “adversarial”. In the Handbook for 
Expert Witnesses in Children Act Cases,  the first of three cardinal principles governing 82
family proceedings is that “The proceedings are non-adversarial”: 
!
the welfare of the children who are subject of the proceedings… is the court’s 
paramount consideration and the views and aspirations of the other parties to the 
proceedings are relevant only insofar as they reflect on the welfare of the children 
involved. (p 17) !
In In the Matter of C [2012] EWCA Civ 1489, the current President of the Family Division, 
Lord Justice Munby, painted a similar picture: 
!
It is important to recognise the nature of the proceedings… These were family 
proceedings, not ordinary civil proceedings where the function of the judge is in 
large part to act as the umpire determining the competing cases put before him by 
the litigants. …they are family proceedings, where it is fundamental that the judge 
has an essentially inquisitorial role, his duty being to further the welfare of the 
children which is, by statute, his paramount consideration. …for this reason a judge 
exercising the family jurisdiction has a much broader discretion than he would in the 
civil jurisdiction… [14] !
 Wall N, “Family law update: The use of experts in Family cases: Experts and the media: Baby P” 80
(Speech to Annual Bond Solon Expert Witness Conference, 6 November 2009).
 Re M [1993] EWHC 1 (Fam); Re G [1994] EWHC Fam 3; Re C [1994] EWHC Fam 4. 81
Woolf H, Access to Justice: Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the Civil Justice System in 
England and Wales (HM Stationery Office, July 1996) Ch 13.
 Wall, n 71.82
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Yet this is not the inquisitorial procedure of French criminal justice, under which only eight 
convictions have been overturned since 1945.  The FJC, in the passage quoted above, 83
argued that care proceedings “provide an essential framework where there is 
disagreement between parents and the local authority… there may be a difference of view 
about the history… there may be a difference of view about the kind of assessment which 
is appropriate.”  The Chapter of the Handbook, quoted above, continues: 84
!
The phrase ‘non-adversarial’ should not be misunderstood. Of course there will be 
issues of fact in family proceedings which the court will have to decide on the 
balance of probabilities in the normal way. Most expert evidence goes to factual 
issues… Was this a non-accidental injury? If it was, what was the likely timing and 
mechanism of injury?  85!
At least two factors probably help explain the relative confidence with which the judiciary in 
the United Kingdom declare the non-adversarial, quasi-inquisitorial nature of care 
proceedings there, in comparison to the anxiety which the question generates in Australia. 
One is the seniority of the judges who hear the matters in which this question is arguably 
most live- cases of suspected child physical abuse involving complex disputed medical 
evidence. 
!
Another possible, and perhaps more profound reason, is that judges of the Family Division 
have little reason to fear that loose talk about non-adversarial, inquisitorial procedure will 
lead to the assumption of their decision-making powers by other stakeholders in the 
system. The proper function and integrity of the adversarial aspect of fact-finding in care 
proceedings has not (until recent years) been seriously threatened by a lack of uniform 
access to legal and non-legal representation for children and for parents, as it is in 
Australian states. With the adversarial element of proceedings functioning adequately, and 
taken as a given, “total judicial control” can be exercised over the use of expert evidence.  86
!
 “Paris court admits miscarriage of justice in murder case”, France24 (20 December 2012). 83
See also Brants C, “Wrongful convictions and inquisitorial process: The case of the 
Netherlands” (2012) 80 University of Cincinnati Law Review 1069.
 Family Justice Council, n 77.84
 Wall, n 71, p 18.85
 Butler-Sloss, n 22, p 432; Re G [1994] EWHC Fam 3.86
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One remarkable product of judicial leadership in United Kingdom family justice is the 
Family Drug and Alcohol Court (FDAC), situated in London. FDAC was first piloted in 
2008, based on a model of courts pioneered in the United States. Its distinctive features 
include judicial continuity, a “therapeutic jurisprudence” problem-solving approach, and a 
specialist multi-disciplinary team working with parents and the Court. Although the Court’s 
process is undoubtedly less harsh and more individualised to families which come before 
it, it could be described as an essentially coercive process. Parents are cajoled by the 
same judge throughout proceedings to make difficult decisions and take difficult actions 
which will greatly benefit their children. A strength of the FDAC model is “the role of the 
judge… in promoting a problem-solving approach to the resolution of care proceedings, 
backed by the power to decide sanctions”.  The charismatic judge credited with 87
establishing FDAC, Justice Nicholas Crichton, likens the process to Weight Watchers, 
“with the judge as the scales”.  88
!
The approach works. A 2014 evaluation of FDAC found that a higher proportion of parents 
of children whose cases were heard before FDAC had ceased misusing a substance by 
the end of proceedings than in the comparison group, of standard care proceedings.  The 89
proportion of “FDAC mothers” who ceased misusing a substance and were subsequently 
reunited with their children was higher than that of “comparison mothers”. 
!
While listing the ways in which senior judges of the Family Division have strived to improve 
their justice system for the benefit of the children who become caught in it, it should be 
kept in mind that the reality on the ground does not always match lofty ideals. Many 
instances are reported where the principles laid down in statutes, or in the authority of a 
superior court, have not been followed in practice.  President Wall in 2011 commented on 90
one such principle: “I can say things until I am blue in the face.”  The family justice system 91
of the United Kingdom can no doubt be significantly improved.  A continuing problem over 92
 Harwin J et al, “Changing lifestyles, keeping children safe: an evaluation of the first Family Drug 87
and Alcohol Court in care proceedings” (Brunel University London, May 2014) p 92.
 Rix J, “Why I’m a families man”, The Guardian (1 February 2012).88
 Harwin et al, n 87.89
 As described in W [2009] EWCA Civ 644.90
 Wall N, see: “Family Justice Council 5th Annual Debate” (December 2011) 1.47:19.91
 See Norgrove D, Family Justice Review: Final Report (November 2011).92
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the last 20 years is the protracted nature of proceedings, and the long delays in their 
resolution.  93
!
Yet the single-minded application of senior judges of the Family Division, to improving the 
lot of vulnerable children and families, which comes through in their judgments and 
publications, cannot be dismissed. In the care proceedings W [2009] EWCA Civ 644, Wall 
LJ strongly deplored the fact that the appellant was required to conduct his own defence 
without the benefit of legal advice or representation: 
!
what those who control the court’s purse strings simply do not- or will not- 
understand is that competent legal representation not only saves time…but that it 
also saves money. I am in no doubt at all that if the appellant had been legally 
represented before the judge in the care proceedings;  
(a) the hearing would not have overrun so grossly;  
(b) the result would have been much more likely to be perceived by all to have been 
fair; and  
(c) the cost to the public and the parties in terms of both money and stress would 
have been substantially less. [25] !
Similarly, in a speech to a conference of expert witnesses in 2009, Wall LJ commented on 
the case of Baby P, outlined earlier: 
!
What the case has done, of course, is to demonstrate the absurdity of the 
government’s massive hike in the fees charged to local authorities to take care 
proceedings (the argument being that care proceedings should be self-funding) and 
to result in an equally substantial increase in the number of cases coming before the 
court. … 
[A proposed amendment to restrict the use of children’s guardians] is, in my 
judgment, a wholly retrograde step. Everyone who practices in the field knows the 
importance of the role of the guardian in getting to know the child and acting as the 
child’s protection against social work excesses and the rigours of the system. This is 
a change strongly to be resisted. I am very strongly opposed to this amendment, 
and invite you to oppose it also.  94!
 Butler-Sloss, n 22; Norgrove, n 92.93
 Wall, n 80, [55], [56].94
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Lord Justice Wall was appointed President of the Family Division in 2010. He had been 
nominated by the appointments panel on a previous occasion. “Jack Straw, the Justice 
Secretary, originally challenged his appointment. Lord Justice Wall has been an outspoken 
critic of some government policies, including the funding of family courts.”  95
!
!
Cases of suspected child physical abuse in United Kingdom family courts: 
Oldham Metropolitan Borough Council v GW, PW, KPW (a child) [2007] EWHC 136 (Fam) 
!
The error and intransigence of a medical witness led to great and unnecessary suffering 
for a family in the course of these care proceedings. An infant boy of 13 days age, “K”, was 
brought to hospital in November 2004, having seizures. He was found on magnetic 
resonance imaging (MRI) to have an abnormality in the white matter of the left side of his 
brain. The reporting paediatric neuroradiologist, Dr Forbes, described the changes as a 
“white matter tear” which raised the possibility of non-accidental injury. In his subsequent 
written opinion, Forbes stated that the changes were “pathognomonic” of non-accidental 
injury. A skeletal survey was negative. For reasons unexplained the infant’s eyes were not 
examined until four months after his presentation to hospital; the examination was normal 
at that time. K was placed in the care of his paternal grandmother. 
!
From the early stages of the case the infant’s father had sought permission from the 
County Court to instruct a second paediatric neuroradiologist, with particular regard to 
interpretation of the MRI scan. The application was initially refused by the County Court, 
due to concerns that disruption to timetabling would prolong proceedings. 
!
Ultimately the Court of Appeal (Civ) allowed the parents’ appeal,  and the instruction of a 96
second paediatric neuroradiologist, Dr Stoodley, in July 2005. Stoodley disagreed with 
Forbes; his opinion was that the changes seen in the child’s brain were “indicative of 
hypoxia/ischaemia resulting from an event antenatally or intrapartum”, and that several 
facets of the case did not fit the pattern normally seen in non-accidental head injury. 
Forbes did not accept this, and an at times bad-tempered debate ensued between the two 
radiologists, via correspondence and in an experts’ meeting. 
 Bennett R, “Judge in charge of family courts criticises ‘arrogant social workers’”, The Times (13 95
April 2010).
 W v Oldham MBC [2005] EWCA Civ 1247.96
Chapter 5
Seven months after the introduction of Stoodley’s evidence, the Court gave new 
instructions to a third paediatric neuroradiologist, and a paediatrician new to the case. 
Their opinions further discounted the possibility of non-accidental head injury as the cause 
of K’s presentation.  
!
The new medical evidence was that the changes seen on K’s brain imaging were most 
likely due to a period of profound asphyxia (lack of oxygen or blood flow to the brain) in 
utero, lasting between 10 and 25 minutes, occurring days or weeks before his birth. One 
basis of that opinion was a case series, published in 2002,  which included 4 children who 97
had signs on brain imaging which were similar to K’s and were attributed to natural cause, 
and who followed a similar clinical course. Justice Ryder accurately described the issues 
in question as “at the cutting edge of medical knowledge”. K was returned to his parents, 
aged 12 months. 
!
Ryder J’s judgment opened with the following declaration: 
!
At the outset of this judgment I must emphasise three very important and essential 
facts that I find and that are now agreed by all involved: 
i) K has never been a victim of non accidental injury 
ii) The care of K by his parents is and has always been exemplary 
iii) K's parents and relatives acted promptly and appropriately in obtaining medical 
treatment for him. 
In the reading of complex medical materials these essential facts may become 
obscured. They should not be forgotten. This is not a case where there is ‘no smoke 
without fire’, this is a case where a family court and the expert who advised it got it 
wrong. [2] !
The judgment also recorded that 
!
On finding herself pregnant during the course of proceedings the mother decided to 
terminate that pregnancy, unable to face the inevitable separation from her baby that 
would have followed from such serious findings. [76] !
Among several important issues addressed in the judgment, Ryder J noted that the County 
Court had initially relied on the opinions of Forbes, another radiologist, two paediatricians, 
 Krageloh-Mann I et al, “Bilateral lesions of the thalamus and basal ganglia: Origin and 97
outcome” (2002) 44 Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology 477.
Chapter 5
and a paediatric neurologist. Despite this, and despite four of these specialists attending 
an experts’ meeting to record an agreed opinion, “The apparent medical consensus… was 
not a real consensus at all in that it depended on the opinions of Dr Forbes being 
correct” [48]. 
!
In first allowing the appeal, Wall LJ had noted that the only error made by the County Court 
judge (although a critical one) was her reliance on the evidence of a single expert: 
!
Cases in the family justice system involving the deaths of, or serious injuries to 
children are heard by experienced, specially selected and qualified judges. One of 
the reasons, in my judgment, why the family justice system has not been the subject 
of the criticism to which the criminal justice system has recently been exposed,  
is that family judges rarely decide cases on the evidence of a single expert.  98!
Ryder J was also asked to consider certain aspects of the evidence provided by Forbes. It 
will be recalled that paediatrician Professor Roy Meadow’s name had been erased from 
the medical register for flawed expert evidence given in a criminal trial a year earlier. For 
someone potentially facing professional disciplinary action, Forbes remained remarkably 
unaffected by the High Court’s authority or requests. For the re-hearing, court time was 
made available by triple listing all High Court sittings. Despite this, Ryder J noted that 
!
I have never before had to threaten a witness summons against an eminent 
practitioner simply to ensure that the evidence in an urgent case could be heard. … 
the heightened emotions thereby created did nothing to instil in the innocent parents 
any confidence that they would ever see justice done. [62] !
Against this backdrop, Ryder J’s comments on Forbes’s actions are striking in their 
mildness. In part this is explained by the impression which the judge formed as to what 
concerns might have influenced Forbes’s thinking: 
!
Dr Forbes did what he would have done if there had not been any court 
proceedings. Knowing of the extreme risk that K would have been subjected to if he 
had been cared for by a perpetrator of [non-accidental head injury], he analysed the 
diagnostic information and came to a conclusion based upon the balance of risks 
that existed. He assumed the role of child protection that every clinician has to 
undertake… I got the distinct impression on more than one occasion that Dr Forbes 
 W v Oldham MBC [2005] EWCA Civ 1247 at [4].98
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was defending a child who had potentially been seriously injured and who needed 
protection. [88] !
Ryder J may well have also shared the oft-stated view of Wall LJ, that “experts in family 
proceedings… are a precious and scarce resource”.  It is a view well removed from 99
Justice Sperling’s proposal, in Australia, that “breach of a duty of objectivity” in expert 
evidence be made a species of professional misconduct.  100
!
The case represents an instance of the quasi-inquisitorial approach promoted in this 
jurisdiction. Only the adversarial element retained in the system- the ability of one 
desperate party to appeal, and then to instruct their own expert witness- allowed the child 
and family justice in the end. And only the inquisitorial action of the judge, instructing fresh 
experts, resolved the typically adversarial impasse which ensued. 
!
Following on from the overview of child protection proceedings in Australian states 
provided in earlier Sections, a number of questions arise from a close reading of this 
judgment. The first, and perhaps most troubling, is what might have transpired if an infant 
born in Australia, to parents whose care was exemplary, had suffered a similar 
unexplained and unnoted prenatal insult, resulting in seizures in the second week of life, 
and unexplained abnormalities on MRI brain. Would the infant have become a subject 
child in a child protection investigation, or proceedings? If so, would the statutory child 
protection system or justice system here have ultimately reached the truth? 
!
Another question which this matter appears to raise, and also to answer, is whether the 
purported incommensurability between medical opinion and judicial understanding is as 
intractable as is sometimes suggested. The experts’ disagreement, and its resolution with 
the introduction of new experts and new evidence, is laid out in the judgment with sufficient 
lucidity that a medical reader can easily apprehend the central issues. Ryder J did not 
need to complete medical training in paediatric neuroradiology to understand the medical 
issues, well enough to intelligibly recount them. 
!
 W v Oldham MBC [2005] EWCA Civ 1247 at [35].99
 Sperling HD, “Expert evidence: The problem of bias and other things” (2000) 4 Judicial Review 100
429, p 438.
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Finally, the question which seems answered most emphatically is whether a family justice 
system which universally rigorously tests medical evidence in the most serious cases of 
injury to a young child should be feared by medical witnesses, in the lingering aftermath of 
Meadow’s disgrace. No evidence exists that it should; it was the criminal justice and 
professional regulatory systems of the United Kingdom which constructed Meadow’s 
purgatory. 
!
An important recent study of expert witnesses in child abuse cases (both criminal and 
family) in New Zealand,  reported that several experts preferred appearing in the Family 101
Court, where a single expert is appointed by the court. In this way the expert is spared 
partisan pressure; some experts even suggested that the system be adopted in the 
criminal jurisdiction. Australian state child protection jurisdictions do not routinely operate a 
system of a court-appointed expert witness, to the exclusion of experts called by the 
parties. This profoundly sad and complex case must give pause for thought in that regard. 
!
!
A Local Authority v S [2009] EWHC 2115 (Fam) 
!
The decision handed down in this matter also addressed a large volume of complex and 
contradictory medical evidence given during care proceedings. The application for a care 
order related to the 3 year old sister of an infant boy, who had been brought to hospital 
critically ill, at 3 months of age. The boy died two days later. The classic features of non-
accidental head injury were present: subdural haemorrhage (bleeding between the brain 
and skull), retinal haemorrhages, and encephalopathy (depressed mental state)- the “triad” 
outlined in Chapter 1. No soft tissue or skeletal injuries were evident. Ten medical 
witnesses gave evidence. The opinion of seven of these was that the most likely cause of 
the findings, and the infant’s death, was non-accidental head injury.  
!
Two medical witnesses called by the deceased infant’s mother, Drs Marta Cohen and 
Waney Squier, gave evidence that the child’s subdural and retinal haemorrhages had in 
fact been caused by hypoxia in the absence of trauma- part of the “unified hypothesis” of 
“Geddes III”. 
!
 Henderson and Seymour, n 53.101
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To decide the matter the Court needed to resolve the dispute between the medical experts, 
and to do this Justice King set herself the following task: 
!
In the context of the evidence given by Drs Cohen and Squier I have to consider 
whether their respective beliefs in: 
(i) Geddes III 
(ii) That trauma may only be regarded as likely causation where there is a triad plus 
additional external injury (or alternatively a witness) 
has led to their conviction in respect of [Shaken Baby Syndrome] overwhelming their 
forensic analysis of the case. [204] !
it seems to me there are three areas which the court should consider in relation to 
each of Drs Cohen and Squier in order to determine that issue namely: 
(i) Their use of research material; 
(ii) Their willingness to defer to the experts in another field and as part of that their 
acceptance of the importance of confining their respective opinion to their own 
expertise and; 
(iii) The importance in any forensic examination of factual accuracy and in this case, 
in particular: (a) head circumference; 
  (b) matter in the airways and; 
  (c) evidence of heart failure at post mortem. [205] !
Cohen had published a study  that year which she said provided support for the theory 102
that hypoxia causes subdural haemorrhage. King J identified several serious flaws in the 
study’s methodology, and in its applicability to cases of serious infant head injury. The 
most notable flaw was the inclusion of cases of foetuses, and of newborns only up to 2 
weeks age (a period in which subdural haemorrhages sustained at birth would still be 
relatively common). 
!
In addition to this, during oral evidence it emerged that Cohen had copied an incorrect 
figure for the deceased infant’s head circumference from the report of one of the other 
experts, and had not derived it herself from the medical records. She had nevertheless 
presented that figure as significant support for her opinion that the infant’s death was not 
caused by trauma. On further cross-examination Cohen said that she did not know 
whether she had received, let alone read, the child’s medical records. 
 Cohen M and Scheimberg I, “Evidence of occurrence of intradural and subdural hemorrhage in 102
the perinatal and neonatal period in the context of hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy” (2009) 12 
Pediatric and Developmental Pathology 169.
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Squier in her evidence had referred to cases from the published literature, as confirming 
her theory that natural causes can lead to subdural and retinal haemorrhage. In reality the 
cases had been reported by the authors of the case reports as cases of trauma from 
shaking. King J’s concern was heightened when Squier stated that she would readily write 
up the very case being decided by the court, that of the infant whose death had led to the 
hearing, as another example of subdural haemorrhage of natural cause. This constitutes 
the same type of circular reasoning for which Colin Paterson was criticised by the same 
court in 1994.  103
!
Squier, like Cohen, had copied the incorrect head circumference from the report of one of 
the other witnesses, and used that wrong figure to argue her position. She had also 
referred to “milk and vomit” being found in the infant’s airway, an account which was not 
true. 
!
Both witnesses had also emphatically presented opinions on questions well outside their 
respective areas of expertise, even in the face of contradictory opinions from other experts 
far better qualified to comment. Several other errors, misrepresentations, and instances of 
fallacious reasoning in the evidence of Cohen and Squier were catalogued by the Court. 
!
King J in conclusion echoed the words used by President Butler-Sloss   in a 2004 104
decision: 
!
Dr Squier and Dr Cohen… have each fallen into that category of expert… namely 
the expert who has developed a scientific prejudice. [285] !
Under the heading “Conclusions as to subdural haemorrhage and hypoxia”, King J also 
recorded that 
!
The overwhelming preponderance of evidence in this case is to the effect that, as of 
today, medical opinion is that hypoxia does not lead to subdural haemorrhages and 
retinal haemorrhages of the type found in [the deceased infant] [286] !!
 Re AB [1994] EWHC Fam 5.103
 Re LU and LB [2004] EWCA Civ 567.104
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and the reflection that 
!
The tragedy of shaking or shaking impact injuries or deaths is that they can be the 
result of a momentary loss of control. So often the consequences are wholly 
disproportionate to what was a fleeting loss of temper. I am satisfied that the mother 
had such a loss of control that evening… 
It is to be hoped that [the father] will reflect on this judgment and the evidence that 
he gave to the court about the crucial period around [the infant’s] collapse and come 
to understand that, much as he may love his wife, his first priority must now be to his 
surviving child… [295] !
The analysis of the medical issues in the judgment in A Local Authority v S was as clear 
and sophisticated as that in Oldham MBC v GW. The medical issues, articulated by 
medical experts and then reflected for a legal purpose, are as coherently and meaningfully 
set out in the later judgment as they are in the earlier decision. 
!
The respective findings recorded by the Court of Appeal (Crim) in R v Harris and Others 
[2005] EWCA Crim 1980, and by the Family Division of the High Court in A Local Authority 
v S, on similar medical issues, can be compared. The Court of Appeal (Crim) held that 
!
the unified hypothesis can no longer be regarded as a credible or alternative cause 
of the triad of injuries. [65] !
The Family Division of the High Court held that: 
!
hypoxia does not lead to subdural haemorrhages and retinal haemorrhages… [286] !
These similar statements are not identical; the finding made by the Family Division was  
more absolute, about a theory relating to a more fundamental biological mechanism. This 
might appear curious, since family proceedings are decided on the balance of 
probabilities. In part this difference might have simply represented the different facts which 
were agreed on or disputed in each respective matter. But it is also likely that the different 
objective being pursued within the different jurisdictions called for different responses. 
!
The “unified hypothesis” comprised the following elements: injury to the neck (not 
necessarily requiring great force), with neurological injury and consequent apnoea, which 
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in turn caused hypoxia and brain swelling, which in turn caused subdural bleeding.  The 105
Court of Appeal (Crim) ensured that neither Geddes’s publications nor her appearance as 
a witness should on their own determine the verdict in a criminal trial again. The Court of 
Appeal (Crim) did not need to concern itself at that point with the more fundamental 
biological question of whether hypoxia alone can cause subdural or retinal haemorrhage. 
!
For the Family Division of the High Court, however, provisionally answering that 
fundamental question might have taken on a significance particular to that jurisdiction. The 
importance of addressing such a question is captured in the words of Lord Justice Wall, 
that the Family Division’s approach to expert evidence reflects the Court’s single-minded 
“attempts to reach the truth”.  In this matter, King J recorded very clearly why the Court’s 106
finding of fact was so unequivocal. The surviving child, subject of those proceedings, 
needed her father to understand and accept the reality of the act which her mother had 
committed, an act which was tragic and not evil. 
!
A similar impression might be made of King J’s intention in so bluntly naming Cohen and 
Squier’s contortions of reasoning as scientific prejudice. A criminal court might hesitate to 
criticise an individual expert in as specific terms as this, in a setting of the competing 
interests of empowered adults. In the setting of family justice however, the court’s 
paramount consideration is the best interests of the child whose injury has led to legal 
proceedings. That consideration might also extend to the best interests of children at risk 
of injury in the future, should such flawed expert evidence continue to be received 
unchecked.
 Geddes JF et al, “Dural haemorrhage in non-traumatic infant deaths: does it explain the 105
bleeding in ‘shaken baby syndrome’?” (2003) 29 Neuropathology and Applied Neurobiology 14.
 Wall, n 80, [2].106
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6.1 Methods 
!
!
The qualitative data collection component of this project comprised semi-structured 
interviews with 7 magistrates and 6 paediatricians. 
!
Recruitment of interview subjects 
!
Ethics approval for this project was received from the University of Queensland in 2012. 
Permission was also sought and granted for the interviews of magistrates by a Research 
Officer of the Queensland Department of Justice and Attorney-General, the Chief 
Magistrate, and the Children’s Court Magistrate. 
!
A major consideration in the recruitment of both magistrates or paediatricians for interview 
was geography. This project was not externally funded, excepting one year of Australian 
Postgraduate Award scholarship for the author’s initial PhD candidature (after which he 
changed to part-time enrolment, for which scholarships are not provided). Thus all 
interviews were conducted in Brisbane. Consideration was given to conducting interviews 
of participants at a greater distance, by telephone or videoconference, but this did not 
prove necessary. 
!
Information about the project was provided to the Children’s Court Magistrate, who 
disseminated it during a regular magistrates’ meeting which involved most magistrates 
from across the state. Magistrates at that meeting were asked to contact the author if they 
were willing to participate. Four magistrates did so and were subsequently interviewed. 
!
Several more magistrates were identified in discussion with legal practitioners working in 
child protection law, as likely to have an interest in the issues to be examined in this 
project. These legal practitioners were known to the author through membership of the 
Child Protection Practitioner’s Association of Queensland. These magistrates were 
individually emailed by the author; four replied and also indicated their willingness to be 
interviewed. One of these magistrates was however unable to participate due to overseas 
leave. 
!
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Paediatricians interviewed were individually approached by the author. Two paediatricians 
who agreed to participate could not be interviewed as they were on leave over the relevant 
period. Only paediatricians with significant experience of having assessed injuries to 
young children in a child protection capacity, and who had given expert evidence in court, 
in any jurisdiction, were approached. No prospect existed for the “blind” recruitment of 
paediatricians to be interviewed for the project, since the author had worked previously in 
child protection in Brisbane and the Gold Coast. The author had thus discussed aspects of 
the project with several paediatricians. Some of these informal but in depth discussions 
had partly informed the identification of relevant areas of enquiry, both for the initial and for 
the final study design. Interviewing these paediatricians was considered not appropriate. 
None of the paediatricians interviewed had discussed any of the issues discussed in 
interview with the author on any previous occasion. 
!
In the research plan, a minimum of four interviews of magistrates and four of 
paediatricians was considered necessary to provide meaningful data. After initial 
approaches, most magistrates and paediatricians quickly agreed to participate. Ultimately 
seven magistrates and six paediatricians were interviewed. The limitation on conducting 
more interviews than this was simply the challenge in organising mutually suitable times to 
meet, in a timeframe which still allowed completion of the candidature to the University’s 
requirements. Interviews last about one hour; interviews of magistrates yielded an average 
of 7112 words of transcript for analysis; interviews of paediatricians an average of 6747 
words. 
!
All interviews were conducted solely by the thesis author, in the period from May to 
November 2013. All participants were provided with a Participant Information Sheet and 
Participant Consent Form (Appendix A) in line with the University’s requirements; the 
author holds all signed consent forms. 
!
Audio files of each interview were transcribed by a professional medical typist. Each of 
these transcripts was then deidentified by the author. Only deidentified documents were 
seen by any other individual, including the research supervisors. The purpose of 
deidentification was to encourage the free expression of opinion by participants, on issues 
on which their colleagues may not all hold a uniform view. For this reason, for a small 
number of more sensitive quotes in the following Sections, the numbered “identity” of a 
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participant is omitted, in case perusal of other quotes from the same numbered participant 
elsewhere would allow their identification by a colleague. 
!
!
Magistrates 
!
The seven magistrates interviewed included the current Children’s Court Magistrate and a 
previous Children’s Court Magistrate. One magistrate worked in north Queensland; two 
worked in regional centres a few hours from Brisbane. These magistrates kindly agreed to 
be interviewed while in Brisbane on unrelated business. The years of experience of 
magistrates interviewed ranged from under two years to over twenty years. 
!
Due to the “self-selection” nature of magistrate participant recruitment, it is almost certain 
that the magistrates interviewed held stronger beliefs and opinions on the legal resolution 
of cases of suspected physical child abuse, and their importance, than many of their 
peers. 
!
!
Paediatricians 
!
Of the six paediatricians interviewed, one worked in the child protection unit of the Mater 
Children’s Hospital, and one in the Child Advocacy Unit of the Royal Children’s Hospital 
(these hospitals were merged in late 2014 into a single facility, the Lady Cilento Children’s 
Hospital). One paediatrician interviewed had previously worked in one of those tertiary 
child protection units for several years, but did not at the time of interview. Two 
paediatricians worked in a child protection role in an outer metropolitan hospital. One had 
worked in that role in an outer metropolitan hospital for several years up to the recent past, 
but did not at the time of interview. One paediatrician had worked in child protection for 
several years in Queensland up until a few years ago, and now continued working in that 
capacity in another state. 
!
!
!
!
!
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Methodology 
!
The approach taken to extracting meaning from the transcripts of interviews in this project 
is best described as thematic analysis, as described in previous studies conducted on the 
legal system and child abuse, by Henderson and Seymour,  Bromfield and Holzer,  and 1 2
Higgins.  Thematic analysis is described as an appropriate approach for studies which are 3
exploratory, where at the outset little is known about the specific issues examined. This 
description fits this project well. 
!
In taking this approach, the author was mindful of the relatively brief history of the social 
scientific study of legal issues. This is to be distinguished from the contribution of social 
scientific expertise to the administration of justice, especially in children’s law, as 
welcomed by the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court of England and Wales in 
1967.  The application of social scientific methods to the legal system itself appears to be 4
a younger and less well established enterprise. 
!
The methodology used in the 1999 and 2001 surveys of Australian judges and 
magistrates, on their perspectives on expert evidence  was roundly criticised by legal/5
social science scholar Gary Edmond, in 2005.  Criticisms included: 6
!
• The study’s focus on the opinions of judges: “All other perspectives were 
marginalised” (p 96); “Perhaps the most fundamental weakness, of a general 
methodological order, relates to the privileging of judicial perspectives along with their 
conversion into an accurate account of legal practice. While it may be interesting to know 
 Henderson E and Seymour F, “Expert witnesses under examination in the New Zealand criminal 1
and family courts” (Law Foundation of New Zealand, 2013).
 Bromfield L and Holzer P, A national approach for child protection: project report (Australian 2
Institute of Family Studies, December 2008).
 Higgins DJ, “Cooperation and coordination: An evaluation of the Family Court of Australia’s 3
Magellan case-management model” (Family Court of Australia, October 2007).
 DPP v A&BC Chewing Gum [1968] 1 QB 159.4
 Freckelton I, Reddy P and Selby H, Australian Judicial Perspectives on Expert Evidence: An 5
Empirical Study (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 1999); Freckelton I, Reddy P and 
Selby H, Australian Magistrates’ Perspectives on Expert Evidence: A Comparative Study 
(Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, 2001).
 Edmond G, “Judging surveys: Experts, empirical evidence and law reform” (2005) 33 Federal 6
Law Review 95.
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what judges think about a range of issues, it is not appropriate, politically or 
methodologically, to simply substitute judicial opinions for reality” (p 109); 
• The inability to meaningfully compare or assess data elicited from different questions, a 
consequence of study design (p 99); 
• Theoretical assumptions as to the meaning of “bias”: “the most revealing dimension in 
the treatment of bias is the fact that judges were actually asked about it” (p 104); 
• Failure to consider the influence of professional ideologies and institutional 
commitments: “The survey gives little… sociological insight into reasons why social 
groups might classify something as a problem or why different groups might classify 
different things as problematic” (p 108). 
!
In conclusion, Edmond argued that : 
!
It may be that other kinds of research, such as ethnography, 
ethnomethodology and open-ended interviews would be required to augment 
or generate a more meaningful and reliable appreciation of the roles played 
by experts (and judges) in contemporary litigation. (p 133) 
!
This project may also have violated a similar range of principles of social scientific 
research, not least in the privileging of the views of paediatricians and magistrates. It is 
proposed that in the case of wider publication of these findings in the academic literature, 
the deidentified transcripts of each interview will also be made available (perhaps on 
request), if participants consent to this. This would best allow this project to be subjected 
to rigorous social scientific examination. 
!
!
Annotations 
!
Throughout this Chapter, participants are identified as “M”, a magistrate, or “P”, a 
paediatrician, followed by a number unique to that participant. The number which appears 
after the stroke is the page number of the transcript from which the quote is taken. 
!
Thus “(M3/5)” refers to a quote from Magistrate 3, from page 5 of the transcript. 
!
!
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6.2 Medical reports 
!
!
All the factors discussed in this thesis to this point, in relation to medical knowledge, to 
expert opinion provided for legal purposes, and to the unique child protection jurisdiction, 
make for a complex interface between systems and professionals in cases of suspected 
physical abuse. In other medico-legal settings, such as criminal trials, the interdisciplinary 
interface is often embodied in the appearance of an expert in court, giving oral evidence. 
In child protection jurisdictions in Australia, the bridge across the interdisciplinary divides is 
more often a written medical report provided to child protection officers in the course of an 
investigation. This may occur at a point in time long before it can be known whether the 
case will culminate in a court hearing. 
!
One paediatrician described the potential limitation of written reports in comparison to live, 
interactive discussion of medical opinions: 
!
[Lawyers and judicial officers] go in with a legal knowledge of something but not a 
medical knowledge, other than what they glean from your report etc., and they 
haven’t allowed you, potentially, to flesh it out. That’s probably one’s own fault 
because you haven’t put it in your report, but how much can you put in your report? 
When you’re talking through something you can think a lot more. (P2/8) !
A magistrate interviewed described the situation whereby an initial medical opinion- such 
as one contained in a written report- might evolve if the author is subsequently involved in 
active discussion: 
!
...often when they will negate any, or what they consider all, the possible other ways 
of reading this evidence, yet they will think they’ve negated everything else, but then 
someone comes in and says, ‘but what about this’? … It makes it a little less 
strong… So they haven’t thought of everything if someone can come up with two 
other possibilities. (M1/8) !
!
!
!
!
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Incorporation of the content of medical reports into other documentary evidence 
!
Magistrates interviewed stated that the content of medical reports are sometimes referred 
to, quoted in part, or “summarised” by the child protection agency, in affidavits or in oral 
evidence, without the report being seen in its entirety by the Court, or by a legal 
representatives for the child or parent (M6/5). One magistrate stated that medical opinions 
which they received were “usually” contained in evidence provided by the child protection 
agency (M1/1), rather than seen in their original report form. Another stated that “slabs of 
[medical] reports may be quoted” within the evidence submitted by the agency (M2/1). 
!
One magistrate pointed to the child protection agency’s sometimes biased selection of 
material which supports their position while omitting that which does not: “We’re getting 
this a lot” (M5/11). This warning was given regarding the material which the child protection 
agency provides to a doctor, which will form a basis of the doctor’s opinion. It would apply 
equally to the agency’s interpretation of the medical opinion when this is in turn presented 
to the Court. 
!
Another magistrate said: !
…what sometimes happens is that they will exhibit their report and summarise it. … 
They might pick out and highlight those parts of the report that support their point of 
view and not necessarily draw attention to or highlight those matters which are 
positive… (M6/5) !
A paediatrician interviewed described an instance in which a meaning was attributed to an 
observation he had recorded which he never intended the observation to have. In a non-
forensic clinical letter, which he had dictated after seeing a child in medical outpatients, he 
had noted that the child was the “chirpiest” that he had seen her. This statement was 
presented to the Court by one of the parties as evidence that the child would be better off 
in the living situation in which they were at the time of that outpatient appointment. This 
was a meaning which the paediatrician had not intended to impart, and which he felt could 
not reasonably be inferred from his letter. This account recalls the proposal, queried in 
Chapter 1, that paediatricians should try to interpret the behaviour of others, for forensic 
purposes- this paediatrician was unwilling to in that context. The paediatrician in that 
instance tried to correct the apparent misinterpretation, but was unsure of the success of 
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his efforts in this regard. He described the episode as “an example of probably trying to 
misuse a medical witness” (P1/2). 
!
!
Reports containing opinions of limited reliability 
!
Several comments and accounts given by both magistrates and paediatricians indicated 
that medical reports provided for child protection investigations sometimes contain 
unreliable opinions (P1/7; P3/4; P3/5). It cannot be inferred from these findings in this 
project that this is a systemic problem, merely that it does occur. One magistrate (M4/1) 
described a case in which a doctor had provided an opinion, contained in the same 
statement/report, for the police and the child protection investigations. In the criminal trial 
for grievous bodily harm the doctor “just went to water; didn’t live up to what they had 
really put in their statement, completely changed the facts”; subsequently the child’s 
parents were acquitted of grievous bodily harm. The child protection agency subsequently 
sought the transcript of the doctor’s oral evidence given in the criminal trial, to inform their 
own actions in light of the changed medical opinion.  
!
Another magistrate (M7/6) recounted a case in which a psychiatrist had provided a report 
containing their opinion that a child’s father was inherently violent, based in part on an 
episode in which the father was alleged to have assaulted the child’s mother. 
Subsequently the evidence of a neighbour who had witnessed the episode confirmed the 
father’s version of it, that he had acted protectively of his daughter, by restraining her 
intoxicated mother. 
!
A paediatrician interviewed identified a discrepancy between the validity of forensic 
opinions sometimes provided by general paediatricians, and those provided by 
paediatricians with extensive child protection experience. This paediatrician went on to 
acknowledge that their own ability to formulate a truly expert opinion early in their career, 
soon after having completed specialty training, would at that time have also been very 
limited. 
!
!
!
!
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Uncertain and unforeseen consequences arising from medical reports 
!
Magistrates and paediatricians interviewed described instances where a medical report 
was put to a use for which it may not have been intended by its author, and with which its 
author might not be comfortable, were they to learn of it. Chapter 5 included discussion of 
problems with “family group meetings” conducted by the child protection agency, where 
principles of natural justice are not always observed. Those concerns are augmented by 
two separate observations made my magistrates interviewed. The first was that the 
existence of a medical report which appears to support the child protection agency’s 
position, itself makes the chance that parents receive Legal Aid representation much less 
likely. The second was that the point in proceedings at which parents are currently most 
likely to vigorously contest an application is very early in proceedings. 
!
The allocation of Legal Aid representation in Queensland is based partly on the merits of 
the case which they are asked to take on (in addition to the customary means test). In the 
context of harsh funding constraints, this approach is not surprising. The existence of a 
medical report which purportedly supports the agency’s case is, in reality, likely to result in 
an assessment by Legal Aid that a parent is not likely to succeed in having an application 
dismissed; this in turn leads to the parent not receiving Legal Aid. Given the relative lack of 
testing of medical evidence in this setting, these decisions made by Legal Aid are rationally 
based. It can also be seen however that this belief would be self-reinforcing, if parents are 
never legally represented in the face of any medical report which purportedly damages 
their case. One magistrate provided this account: 
!
…the process is a long one in getting even to the point where directions are made 
for preparation for trial, the evidence has been disclosed and although it hasn’t been 
what we would call tested by the respondent party, and that’s usually the parents, it’s 
commonly… it’s presented in a form by that stage that looks cogent and persuasive, 
and Legal Aid requires to be supplied with, as I understand it, whatever expert 
evidence is by then available… and so one would have to put up a remarkable 
argument in the face of that evidence to persuade Legal Aid to grant aid, because 
it’s not only means tested, Legal Aid, but merit tested as well. (M2/1) !
Magistrates interviewed also described the usual process of a child protection investigation 
and intervention, and why in the current context the opportunity for a parent to dispute an 
intervention is generally most practical very early in the process (M2/2; M5/3; M6/2). If the 
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parents take this opportunity, this is when medical evidence might come under the most 
regular and significant scrutiny. Early in the life of an application for a child protection order 
(often within two weeks and usually within two months), the Court will often be required to 
decide the temporary custody of the child over the course of proceedings; specifically the 
child may be held in the temporary custody of the child protection agency for that period. 
One reason that parents might pursue this early opportunity to contest an application is the 
“very long time” (M2/3) which an application takes to come to trial. 
!
One magistrate identified another reason for their own scrupulous examination of the 
evidence at a very early stage. It is however a reason which an unrepresented parent is 
unlikely to be aware of: 
!
[Managing the child protection list] involves making decisions about interim matters. 
Very often you will make the decision at first instance whether to place the child in 
care. And that can often be the most pivotal because once a child is removed from 
the parents, it’s a lot harder for the parents to get the child back. (M6/2) !
This observation is lent credence by the lack of representation of parents in most matters, 
systemic problems in the conduct of extrajudicial family group meetings, and the relative 
lack of testing of medical evidence in this setting, discussed earlier. 
!
The same magistrate observed that “almost invariably” at this stage the child protection 
agency asks that the child be placed in the agency’s custody. The magistrate’s own efforts, 
however, to hear from the parents at that early stage (for example by ordering the 
immediate attendance of both parties at Court, even on a weekend) “has made a 
difference in some cases”. Once a child is removed it becomes much more difficult for the 
parents to prove their capacity to care for the child, in the magistrate’s experience. The 
presumption that temporary custody would be granted to the child protection agency at an 
early stage appeared to be entrenched in that Court’s local area. In one case a 
psychologist had complained of the difficulty of conducting a social assessment of a family, 
because the child had remained in the care of the parent. The magistrate found this 
complaint curious; it might be expected that a person’s parenting capacity would be best 
assessed whilst they have care of their child. The complaint was felt to reflect the fact that 
the psychologist was so used to conducting assessments of children who had been placed 
in (nominally temporary) care that any other circumstance was unfamiliar to them. 
!
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One of the magistrates interviewed who had experience as the Children’s Court Magistrate 
made this general comment regarding medical documents: 
!
I think it’s a big part of the issue of training for professional people as to where their 
reports and their enquires are going to end. I’m not suggesting that they should be 
writing reports fearful of any conclusion or where it might end up, but in fact that’s 
what happens. It’s a real training issue isn’t it? (M5/11) !
One paediatrician interviewed held a more negative overall view of the current practice of 
the child protection agency than other paediatricians interviewed. Comments made by this 
paediatrician on this question were accordingly more critical and specific: !
I’m absolutely certain that Child Safety would present to families, the way police 
present to families, inappropriate summaries of the evidence before them. The 
difference is that the police ethical model includes interrogation as a legitimate part 
of police practice. Interrogation by its nature involves sharing of mistruths and 
misdirections to the person of interest. Neither Health’s nor Child Safety’s underlying 
ethical parameters allow that. This is one of the contaminations that arises from 
Child Safety officers being in close proximity to the police, not understanding the 
difference in law, and the second being the unfettered powers of Child Safety. (P3/5) !
A related issue was the indefinite retention of medical reports and other documents by the 
child protection agency, described by magistrates. These records may be produced in 
proceedings years later, even when the initial investigation which generated the medical 
report did not result in a substantiation of harm. 
!
My experience with DOCS is that you give them something and it never goes away. 
The affidavits, the material they file with the Court, even goes into... you know ‘the 
mother has a child protection history, …there were allegations the mother was 
sexually abused by her uncles’. So they go through the whole child protection 
notification of both parents as though that should bolster their application. (M4/1) !
…what you will sometimes find is that there is a subsequent application for an Order 
and the previous injury that wasn’t substantiated at the time is used to support the 
application in light of what has occurred subsequently. (M6/8) !
Paediatricians interviewed identified a risk, when composing a report, that they might 
exclusively or overwhelmingly include findings and conclusions favourable to one party’s 
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case, neglecting to include other important information, such as information which conflicts 
with that party’s case, or even the conspicuous absence of evidence to support it. One 
paediatrician commented that providing a balanced report in this regard “is a learnt skill”, 
but that “exchange of information needs to be carefully done from the beginning. Those 
important negatives are as important as the positive findings” (P5/10). 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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6.3 Legal representation of children in child protection proceedings 
!
!
In Queensland, the Children’s Court may order that a child be represented if the court 
considers this necessary. Under s 110(2) of the Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) the Court 
“must consider” this, if an application for an order is contested by the child’s parents, or the 
child opposes it. In reality, however, lawyers have reported that the Court, and particularly 
the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, are “often reluctant to appoint a 
representative for the child”.  7
!
Whether a subject child will benefit from legal representation is not a question which many 
medical practitioners would have previously contemplated. It is not a straightforward 
question for the legal profession.  Legal representation of a child may be by a “separate 8
representative”, who must act in the child’s best interests. In contrast, a “direct 
representative” acts under instructions from the (generally older) child. Even within the role 
of “separate representative”, lawyers disagree on whether the role is best served by the 
lawyer getting to know the child, or whether they should generally work at arm’s length, 
relying on the reports of others to inform their understanding of the child’s best interests. 
!
This situation, although complex, is hardly one which is foreign to paediatricians. “The 
main ethical principle of all paediatric activities is the demand to do everything in the ‘best 
interests’ of children.”  Although most paediatricians would state that ultimately the child is 9
their patient, and not the child’s parents, the reality of both routine and difficult decision-
making in paediatric medicine is often not as simple as this.  Nevertheless, it appears 10
likely that most paediatricians would strongly support the widespread legal representation 
of subject children in child protection matters, due to the same ethical considerations 
which apply in clinical practice. 
!
 Walsh T and Douglas H, “Lawyers, advocacy and child protection” (2011) 35 Melbourne 7
University Law Review 621, p 637.
 Monahan G, “Autonomy vs beneficence: Ethics and the representation of children and young 8
people in legal proceedings” (2008) 8 QUT Law and Justice Journal 392.
 Kurz R, Gill D and Mjones S, “Ethical issues in the daily medical care of children” (2006) 165 9
European Journal of Pediatrics  83, p 83.
 Levetown M, “Communication with children and families: From everyday interactions to skill in 10
conveying distressing information” (2008) 121 Pediatrics e1441.
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A number of paediatricians interviewed voiced this view: 
!
Q. …how would you say the lack of universal child representation compares to that 
lack of parent legal representation? … 
I think the concerns probably relate to the fact that, you know, both parents have 
their own agenda and child safety have their own agenda and it’s not always going 
to be in the best interests of the child, so you want to know someone that doesn’t 
have a different agenda is going to be there to make sure the rights of the child are 
going to remembered in the actual zoo fest, as it can become, but they’ve got 
different agendas and parents obviously have a lot of emotional connectivity to it 
and may not be seeing things the way they actually are anyway. (P6/5) !
Q….are you aware how often a child, in a child protection case does get their own 
legal representation? 
No, but I think it should be all the time. (P2/14) !
One paediatrician recounted a Family Court of Australia matter in which he had initially 
been instructed by the solicitor representing the child, but at the last minute was asked to 
appear for the mother instead, to which he agreed. This led to a far more difficult court 
experience for the paediatrician, and one in which he felt his expertise was not put to the 
court’s assistance: 
!
So, all of a sudden I became not a children’s witness, but a witness for the mother. 
So then you’re open slather. And so they actually didn’t ask me anything on my 
clinical expertise at all. … We had allowed ourselves, is probably a good way to put 
it, to appear as if we were biased in favour of the mother. 
… 
Q. …can you say for the record in what ways, why [appearing for the child] would 
likely have been different?  
Ah I think much more respectful, and they actually ask you on your clinical opinion. !
This was indeed the favourable impression which another paediatrician had, of the 
advocacy of the child’s representative in a child protection matter in which she gave 
evidence. (P6/11) 
!
A particular contribution made by lawyers in child protection proceedings was noted by 
Walsh and Douglas in the 2011 paper cited in Chapter 5.  This is the support which 11
 Walsh, n 7, p 640.11
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lawyers can provide to magistrates in their decision-making, by presenting the evidence of 
parents, and views of children, in an admissible and reliable form. These observations 
were made in the context of a lack of specialisation of the magistracy in Queensland, and 
the legacy of adversarial procedure in which judicial intervention into proceedings is 
limited. 
!
One magistrate interviewed, with fewer years of experience in that role than others 
interviewed, described her own learning curve in this regard: 
!
I find it very helpful to be able to order the separate representative to get involved as 
well. That’s what I really... particularly when you can just see a lot of allegations 
because they’re fighting over the kid… 
Q. Again, you probably wouldn’t know how many other Magistrates do that, often or 
not? 
No, we really do it at the recommendation of either the Department or lawyers. I’m 
just starting to figure out what their role is and how helpful they can be and so I’m 
just starting to realise and initiate myself. Sadly this is where if I don’t trust the 
Department, I’ll order a separate rep. It would be interesting to see statistically how 
often the separate rep finds a decision against what the Department was 
recommending. (M4/6) !
This account also appears to support the observation made by lawyers, referred to above, 
that the ordering of separate representation for the child by the Children’s Court is 
currently far from routine. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Chapter 6
6.4 Testing of medical evidence 
!
!
Many comments made by magistrates and paediatricians interviewed indicated that 
medical opinions in cases of suspected physical child abuse, provided for a child 
protection investigation or proceedings, were only rarely closely scrutinised or tested 
(M1/1; M2/2; M2/3; M3/2; M3/5; M5/3; M6/1; M6/6). 
!
This circumstance was most starkly illustrated by the account given by one magistrate of a 
matter in which a doctor had provided a statement for the prosecution in a criminal trial for 
grievous bodily harm, and also a report for the related child protection investigation. At trial 
the doctor retreated from his written opinion, to the point where the child protection agency 
sought the transcript of the evidence he gave in the criminal trial, as they could no longer 
rely on the report which he had earlier provided for their own decisions. 
!
Their report, when they started to be cross examined about it, their various different 
hypotheticals and scenarios... The doctor, quite properly I imagine, had to concede 
at the trial, ‘Well it could have been this, it could have been that’. 
Q. So this was at the criminal trial, that they were cross examined? 
Yes. I’m not sure which way it’s going to go in the child protection hearing. 
Q. Do you think if there had been no criminal trial for whatever reason, that that 
medical report would’ve come under the same scrutiny, in a child protection case? 
No way. That prosecutor walked in there so confident and cocky…(because I spoke 
to the judge during the trial and he was like ‘Oh I can’t believe the poor prosecutor, 
on the stand…’) …and I think even in examination in chief… they started to shy 
away from the things they had said in their report. 
Q. This is in the criminal trial? 
Yes. 
Q. I may not understand the system, but does that not mean, if there is a case of 
suspicious injury, if there’s not a criminal trial that results from it, that any medical 
evidence given will be subject to much less scrutiny? 
Yes, much less scrutiny. 
Q. But is that not a setup where DOCS, even without being sure that the injury was 
inflicted, would be able to use that medical report to get consent where without that 
medical report they wouldn’t? 
Yes, that’s very true. It wouldn’t be subject to the same scrutiny. (M4/9) !
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One magistrate interviewed commented that the closest the magistrate had seen to the 
testing of medical evidence in a child protection matter was when solicitors had made 
submissions that “the parents oppose the conclusions of the expert and that they assert 
that indeed they were not the cause of the injuries, and that they know nothing about the 
origins of the injuries and that they certainly disclaim any responsibility, and that the expert 
must be wrong” (M2/3). The magistrate had never been faced with conflicting medical 
reports on the cause of a child’s injury, which required a hearing or other measures to 
resolve the issue. 
!
One of the magistrates who had experience as the Children’s Court Magistrate noted that 
if a doctor is cross-examined in a child protection matter, most often “they’re being cross 
examined by a parent who is totally overwhelmed”. 
!
Another magistrate had heard a child protection matter in which opposing medical opinions 
given by two paediatricians regarding bruises to an infant of a few months of age were 
considered. In the days before the infant’s bruises were brought to medical attention, the 
infant had been a passenger in a motor vehicle accident, during which they had remained 
strapped into their safety capsule. One paediatrician concluded that the infant could have 
sustained the bruises during that accident; the other did not believe this was possible. The 
magistrate’s deliberations were complicated by the fact that at trial one party relied solely 
on the written report of one paediatrician, while the other paediatrician gave oral evidence 
by telephone. 
!
…we only heard evidence from one of the doctors, the other was just his report, and 
then the other doctor was pulling apart his report but he wasn’t there to defend it. … 
In reality we had one doctor who could be cross-examined and one who couldn’t 
and that doctor that was cross-examined did give careful and well constructed 
evidence, as has almost every doctor I’ve ever seen before the Court. (M1/2) !
This might be called “asymmetric” presentation and testing of medical evidence. The 
magistrate observed that the presentation and examination of expert evidence in this 
manner may not have been appropriate for a criminal trial. In that matter the magistrate 
had been able to make a decision on the risk of harm to the infant which did not rely solely 
on the medical evidence. 
!
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Several comments made by magistrates appeared to indicate an approach to medical 
evidence in child protection proceedings which began from a less sceptical position than 
would be expected of a lawyer who was representing either party, were they to examine 
the same evidence; or the starting point of near-incredulity which judicial officers in 
criminal trials, and personal injury suits, might more often adopt. !
To me if you’ve got a child who is at a doctor’s, who is at a paediatrician’s, we’ve 
already got some serious issues with parenting, unless the paediatrician says ‘This 
is completely normal…’ Once you’ve got a paediatrician’s report or any involvement 
by a doctor, we’re in a different category of child protection… (M4/2) !
Completely independent umpire, you’ve got some well qualified paediatrician who 
says this is their opinion and any parent who was responsible for that would back 
down very quickly or come to the party. (M4/10) !
Doctors are in a different category, especially the specialists, and in a different 
category to a lot of other people that give evidence, because they’re clever. And all 
of this stuff… none of it’s going to come as a surprise to them, and other people it 
might, but not the medically trained professionals. (M5/7) !
Generally speaking I think that the medical evidence in terms of physical medical 
evidence as opposed to psychiatric tends to be less controversial, although perhaps 
less so in terms of where there is a serious physical injury the parents might want to 
cross examine as to cause. (M6/1) !
The statements of paediatricians interviewed indicated that they expected their medical 
opinion to be questioned or attacked far less often in child protection proceedings than in a 
criminal case. This would largely reflect the lower likelihood that any case of suspected 
child abuse would culminate in a full child protection court hearing, compared to the higher 
chance that a criminal trial would eventuate. Paediatricians also reported, however, their 
general impression that even in cases where their opinion was disputed in a child 
protection matter, that process was likely to be less vigorous or hostile than cross-
examination in a criminal trial. (P5/1) 
!
Q. Do you have a clear reason in your own mind to write it with the criminal court in 
mind? Is it just that that’s where your evidence...? 
I suppose that’s where you have to be the most careful about what you say I 
suppose. 
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… 
Q. Coming back to your comment about writing reports with criminal court in mind, 
when you say you have to most careful composing them for that jurisdiction, can you 
expand on that? 
Obviously you need to have some rigour around the way you phrase your 
interpretations about physical findings, about sexual examination findings, that will 
stand up to some scrutiny in the courts, so essentially you have to take some 
conservative view that can be backed up by the literature, and not you going out on 
a limb based on your own experience. When it comes down to it, the literature is 
surprisingly thin when you come down to definitive statements that you can make 
about certain physical findings. So that’s the reason why I said I tailor it more for the 
criminal court, I’m really just referring to the level of rigour as far as the ability to 
back up what you’re saying. 
Q. Sure, because if one day you had an off day and were not as careful as you 
usually are, what consequences would you be worried about? 
Because your reports form the basis of your evidence, you don’t want to be picked 
up by defence lawyers about certain statements you made and whether you can 
back up what you’re saying from literature etc. (P1/1) !
Several paediatricians also pointed to the different standards of proof required in the child 
protection jurisdiction (balance of probabilities) and in criminal law (beyond reasonable 
doubt) (P1/2; P3/2; P4/2). This provided context for how one approach taken in expressing 
their opinion, which suits one jurisdiction, may subtly differ from the approach they would 
take in the other jurisdiction. In response to the question of why, in the paediatrician’s 
opinion, paediatricians were called to give oral evidence in child protection proceedings 
less frequently than in criminal cases, one paediatrician replied: 
!
I think it’s less common because you usually provide a report. Say for example, it’s 
around a child with head injuries or thought to be inflicted injuries. We would provide 
a detailed report, similar content to what I would provide a criminal court but maybe 
not identical because it’s around the balance of probabilities rather than beyond 
reasonable doubt. I’m often more comfortable, in that type of a case, to be able to 
fairly clearly state words to the effect on the balance of probability, whereas in 
criminal court each point would be disputed in detail and each point or injury or 
whatever would be analysed separately. … I would suspect that the level of proof 
required for the different court means that a written report is more likely to be 
accepted, would be my views. (P4/2) !
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This detailed explanation is worth noting. One interpretation of this statement is that the 
paediatrician might be happy, for example, recording their conclusion that “On balance it is 
most likely that the bruises and fractured humerus found in this 3 month old infant were 
inflicted by an adult and were not sustained accidentally”, in a report provided to child 
protection workers or for child protection proceedings. In contrast, in a statement provided 
to police or for criminal proceedings, they might avoid recording any categorical statement 
which directly addressed the criminal law threshold of reasonable doubt, such as “The 
fracture of the humerus was definitely inflicted by an adult”, or “I am certain that this child 
has suffered physical abuse”. In documents provided for either jurisdiction, a paediatrician 
might include many more specific observations, such as “The fracture to the humerus was 
caused by a significant twisting force, of a type not associated with usual infant handling.” 
The paediatrician’s ability to include an overarching conclusion regarding cause of injury in 
the report for a child protection investigation, but inability to include a definitive opinion or 
opinions in documents provided to police, in itself leads to a doctor more often being called 
to give oral evidence in a criminal court, where examining or cross-examining counsel may 
themselves want to “connect the dots” which the expert witness must not. 
!
This is one interpretation of the paediatrician’s answer in interview. Taking two distinct 
approaches when assisting investigators and courts in different jurisdictions appears 
completely legitimate if it entails differences of the sort outlined above. If, however, a more 
general comment was made that a written report, without oral evidence, will suffice for a 
child protection case, but not for a criminal case, because of different thresholds for proof 
in either jurisdiction, then a different interpretation of that assertion might be made, 
especially by non-medical readers. A potential interpretation arises, that decisions based 
only on the balance of probabilities in child protection investigations are therefore less 
important, and can be based on a medical opinion which is less diligently arrived at, which 
may be less reliable, and which requires less testing of its reliability, than a medical opinion 
given on the same case for a police investigation. No paediatrician interviewed proposed 
this, and it is unlikely that many paediatricians would. It might however represent an 
assumption which other stakeholders could make, and which medical witnesses should 
guard against. 
!
!
!
!
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6.5 Briefing 
!
!
The authors of the landmark 2013 examination of expert witnesses in child abuse cases 
(predominantly criminal) in New Zealand commented that they “did not anticipate that 
briefing would become a major focus of this study.”  “Briefing” here refers to the time 12
spent between a member of the legal team and an expert witness, in preparation for the 
expert’s oral evidence at trial. In that study it was the experts interviewed who regarded 
this as a key issue and recurrently introduced it. The experts saw the time and effort which 
lawyers put into briefing as highly significant to the success of the expert’s participation in 
proceedings; “success” here meaning that the witness’s evidence actually assisted the 
court’s decision-making. Judges in the same study said that it was obvious to them when 
insufficient briefing had taken place. The interviews for this project were conducted before 
the thesis author knew of Henderson and Seymour’s 2013 study.  
!
Paediatricians interviewed for this project did not introduce this issue into discussion. 
Several did report that briefing was uniformly very brief, often lasting “five or ten 
minutes” (P4/9). A number provided strong opinions on this circumstance: 
!
Q. Well, bringing me to another question… before all of the cases you’ve given 
evidence in… 
No is the answer to your question. Does someone sit down with you and go through 
it? I’ve been working in child protection… since 1979 and on only one occasion has 
a lawyer sat down with me. 
Q. And what do you think of that? 
“Well, it says it all, doesn’t it? (P2/7) !
I think there’s an inappropriate lack of communication. Having said that I don’t think 
the answer is just do a lot more, then you end up with a really expensive and 
inefficient model. (P3/8) !
Definitely from my point of view, watching from the outside, so the Child Safety court 
person, it often seems to be a last minute surfing of the file to gather the evidence 
with no one with any expert knowledge within their service of the needs of the child, 
the family, the risks to the child, the evidence behind the risk. (P5/5) !
 Henderson and Seymour, n 1, p 131.12
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In contrast to Henderson and Seymour’s study however, a number of magistrates 
interviewed for this thesis raised the issue as a potentially important one: 
!
Crown law is engaged at the absolute end of the matter, and then the lawyers come 
on board, but it’s only to speak at the trial. 
Q. Yeah I was told sometimes they don’t receive any material till a week or less 
before… 
Oh that wouldn’t surprise me, that’s the appearance you get, and it’s all very formal, 
and I suspect sometimes that the good work of the advocates earlier… no I probably 
shouldn’t draw any, have any opinion about that. !
That brings me to a point which I think needs to be made, and that is, I was 
previously a solicitor and often commissioning expert reports for family law matters 
or criminal matters, and generally as the legal representative preparing the matter 
you would direct a series of questions to the expert and at least indicate to the 
expert where they might direct their enquiries and on what issues they should 
express an opinion. And of course your letter of instruction to the expert is required 
to be, is at least liable to be produced in the, to give context to the report. Now, 
that’s all very appropriate. … 
…because Crown Law is involved right at the end and is not involved in the 
commissioning, I suspect that the assistance you gain in giving your reports is 
completely absent, from the situation in other types of litigation. And I’m probably 
saying something that’s really obvious, it hasn’t occurred to me before. And it could 
be quite significant. You don’t get any, when I say feedback, I mean, it’s not really 
feedback but any direction in the preparation of your report. Maybe that’s great and 
means that they’re really pure and undirected, but maybe not. I don’t know. You 
know, they would just be putting into a report everything you know, and you, trying to 
imagine what the opinion is that you have to give. Is that what it is? Sometimes you 
might be asked some more direct questions but I would think less often, or not. It 
may be less useful in court to the party relying on them, ultimately that barrister 
standing there in court who’s had nothing to do with commissioning it, than they 
would be if a legal mind, an experienced legal mind, were turning their mind to what 
they required in the report when it’s being commissioned. (M2/6) !
!
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In contrast, Lord Justice Wall’s handbook for expert witnesses in care proceedings in the 
United Kingdom  contains the following Chapters, all directly related to the preparation by 13
lawyers of expert witnesses for care proceedings there: 
!
• Chapter 8: Preliminary enquiries of the expert 
• Chapter 9: The nature of the brief given by the Court 
• Chapter 10: The letter of instruction 
• Chapter 14: Pre-hearing conferences with counsel and/or with the solicitor who has 
commissioned the expert report 
• Chapter 15: Joint instructions !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
 Wall N, A Handbook for Expert Witnesses in Children Act Cases (2nd ed, Jordan Publishing, 13
2007).
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6.6 Observations regarding child protection law and criminal justice 
!
!
The Supreme Court of New South Wales in 1993 observed that 
!
One could not imagine a more serious decision affecting people than a decision as 
to who was to have custody of their children.  14!
Both magistrates and paediatricians interviewed commented on the importance of the 
process and outcomes of child protection proceedings. 
!
Well the consequences for a child about whom an order is made resulting in the 
removal from its family are… very very significant, and of course there’s the issue of 
loss on part of the parents… however it is of absolutely vital importance that in an 
appropriate case the orders are made. (M2/3) !
Q. ...how important do you consider the decisions about residence or anything else 
that are made in the children’s court? 
The most important, agonising, difficult work I do every week. It keeps me awake at 
night worrying about whether I could have done it better, could I have spoken better 
to that parent to get them more engaged, could I have done it better? Sometimes I 
just cry because I think it’s so awful. Sometimes I cry in court when I make the 
orders. (M3/3) !
It would have to be up there as one of the most important. You are making decisions 
that will determine people’s lives… Not just children’s lives but decisions that are 
going to affect parents and how those children are going to turn out, the long term 
consequences for these children. It’s probably the most important decision you can 
make. I can sentence someone to three years imprisonment but they will be out in 
three years. I can take someone’s child off them for eighteen years and the effect 
that that’s going to have upon that child and the parents of that child is enormous. 
It’s a life sentence. (M4/13)  15!
 Talbot v Community Services [1993] 30 NSWLR 487 at [492G] (Young J).14
 Here the magistrate echoed the words of Lord Justice Wall: “On the one hand, returning an 15
abused child to abusive parents is, sometimes, quite literally a matter of life and death: on the 
other, parents who lose their children frequently talk of being given a ‘life sentence’. The stakes 
simply could not be higher…”: Wall, n 13, ix.
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I have been doing this for almost four years and I said when a baby dies on my 
watch I’ll give it away and that hasn’t happened yet, I’m pleased to say. But you are 
aware that that is always the worse case scenario is that a child will be injured or 
killed. (M6/3) !
…those rules and approaches sort of get ingrained and when they’re interfered with 
you tend to react and say ‘Hang on that’s not the way to deal with an issue as 
important as this’. (M7/1) !
Several magistrates interviewed commented on the lack of prominence or prestige 
associated with child protection practice within the legal profession in Australia: 
!
It’s been a long time that nobody has really taken a great deal of interest in 
Children’s Court matters. They were… public law, they call it in England, has not 
really been an area of great interest to practitioners. (M1/4) !
It’s a jurisdiction that is not liked by magistrates, and I think because some have to 
deal with it irregularly and very few of us have a profound experience of child 
protection because all of us who do it apart from [the Children’s Court Magistrate]… 
have to mix it in with the rest of our jurisdiction, and it’s always a sad and 
unsatisfying jurisdiction. (M2/4) !
Look to be honest, I feel that our child protection litigation here is quite unevolved. 
…I think we should be looking to the overseas systems. But we’re not, we don’t look 
to the other states, in this state we don’t look to the other states, we don’t look to 
overseas practice, and I would be surprised if there weren’t a lot of people saying it’s 
a really unsatisfactory kind of bumble. 
… 
I think this is a jurisdiction which is not very evolved. Probably because, oh it’s got a 
whole lot of reasons including that very few matters go to trial, so we don’t get the, 
there’s not the consistency of practice developed, there’s very little jurisprudence. 
There are no appeals, and I’ve…hardly any appeals. Child Safety never appeals, in 
fact I had a chat to some Child Safety Officers once…where they said that they 
simply can’t get the funding to appeal even if they strenuously disagree with the 
result of the decision, and this is a terrible terrible lack in our jurisdiction because an 
Appeal Court scrutinising what was done at our level, and our level’s where all the 
decisions are made, results in phenomenal guidance, and massive objectivity 
applied to our decision-making, some rigour being introduced. There’s no rigour. 
(M2/7-8) !
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…our Children’s Court system is not given high priority. It’s seen as the girls’ 
jurisdiction and somehow it’s some soft option for us as the warm fuzzy women of 
the world. (M3/3) !
On two occasions, a participant interviewed was asked a question regarding the 
importance of the outcome of child protection proceedings and the importance of the 
outcome of a criminal trial, and provided an initial answer which appeared to adopt the 
perspective of an adult facing both criminal charges and the threat of child protection 
proceedings. As discussed at the start of this Chapter, participants in this project were 
likely to be more engaged with issues discussed, and a child’s perspective on those 
issues, than a randomly selected peer. Within the group of professionals interviewed, the 
individual magistrate and paediatrician quoted below did not seem any less engaged with 
the issues or their importance in the lives of vulnerable children than their peers who were 
interviewed; if anything the opposite might have been true. It is very unlikely that the 
exchanges quoted below reflect a practice by individuals which disregards the perspective 
of an injured child whose case comes before them. It appears much more likely that the 
individuals quoted had pondered the significance of their professional actions even more 
often and more profoundly than some of their peers, but that their reflections arose from 
the real-life cases which they had actual experience of, to the almost total exclusion of 
others: criminal trials. This point will be taken up further in Chapter 7. 
!
One paediatrician interviewed provided this response: 
!
Q. Are you able to comment on what you think of the importance of the outcome of 
trials in criminal trials versus contested orders in the children’s court? 
Well I guess, by way of anecdote I suppose, a lot of the cases where I’ve given 
some evidence for the court have been sexual abuse cases and I guess there is one 
that sticks in my mind because it was one where, you know, as with a typical pre- 
pubertal sexual abuse case, there were no positive finding on the examination. … I 
guess I’m probably mostly used to working with clients who are say, you know, 
socio-economically marginalised to some degree, whether that’s cultural or 
economic. This was one that actually had gone to trial and I walked into the court 
and seeing the father there sitting in the dock pretty much looked not too dissimilar 
from me, it sort of drove it home the consequences of this kind of case and I just did 
my bit and fortunately the ultimate outcome, I don’t think, had a lot to do with my 
evidence. But I think it just drove home the importance of giving sound evidence and 
some of those episodes of the past where physical findings and genital findings 
have been over-interpreted and potentially people have been locked away for things 
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they weren’t necessarily guilty of. It does sort of bring it home to you when the 
defendant’s kind of sitting there looking at you. So I guess in that sense you’re quite 
aware of the importance because the rest of their life essentially could be on the 
line, where they’re going to have a criminal record etc. !
One answer given by a magistrate was as follows: 
!
Q. …would you have any comment on the significance of the outcome in a criminal 
trial versus a hearing for a child protection order. 
Well the worst outcome for a parent in a child protection proceeding is a loss of 
parental rights, as I’ve indicated. Whereas the outcome in a criminal proceeding is 
imprisonment for potentially a long time, and that will necessarily entail loss of 
parental rights, so the consequences are much more severe. !
!
Direct communication on difficult issues 
!
Two magistrate interviewed outlined the importance which they place on communicating 
openly and directly with adult family members, in child protection proceedings, especially 
on issues which might be sensitive or difficult, such as an adult’s action which has harmed 
the child. This is of course not an approach which would be appropriate in a criminal trial. It 
is closely related to the issue of adults acknowledging their own past actions and the 
actions of others, including harmful actions, for the benefit of the child into the future. !
…if there’s blunt force trauma you have to be right up with people about it. ‘This 
child has sustained injuries for which a person who is not a child is responsible for, 
now who would that be. This child was in your care.’ I don’t think there’s any point in 
pulling it. You have to say it how it is. And then you say ‘well that’s happened, we 
know that’s happened, so what are you going to do about it? Don’t tell me all the 
negatives, just tell me what the positive is. I’ll start with the positives. First, you’re 
the mother, secondly, you’re the father. You are going to be the father and the 
mother at the beginning, the middle and the end. You will always be the mother, you 
will always be the father at the beginning, the middle and the end. You are the most 
important person in the child’s life, so what are you going to do? (M3/2) !
Q. … Would you go so far as to say that we should consider providing the same 
report as written directly to the parents? 
Yes and there’s obviously a difficulty in that because parents or parties may not be 
able to understand it, but it also has the reverse effect in that it may well neutralise a 
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lot of disharmony and discontent on behalf of the parents when they actually realise 
why a decision has been made. That will also require, as is always the case, that the 
practitioner providing the report sets out the basis for the reasoning, in other words ‘I 
spoke to so and so and she told me this’. If you get that wrong the parents will be 
rightly upset. If you’ve misunderstood anything, that can be a basis for confusion but 
it needs to be known why a decision has been made. And often one of the things 
Child Safety is continuously criticised for is their secrecy. They won’t tell us why the 
children are there. That varies with offices, officers as well as offices, often when a 
situation is known and there is no secrecy and it is disclosed, the parents accept it 
all and know what they’ve got to work on, know what they have to overcome. 
(M7/12) 
Chapter 7: Discussion 
!
!
7.1 Child protection law in Australia: The “poor little sister” 
!
7.2 Future medical research directions 
!
!
Outline of Chapter 
!
In cases of suspected child physical abuse, the glare of the criminal justice system is 
reflected onto the medical practice of child protection. The imperatives of criminal justice, 
especially the need for diligent caution against the danger of serious injustice, may disturb 
or even conflict with the imperatives of child protection practice and its strict focus on the 
child’s best interests. No easy resolution is available when separate professional and 
ethical obligations seem to pull in different directions. For doctors who work with children, 
interdisciplinary understanding and collaboration with both legal and social science 
professionals is likely to provide more immediate assistance, and more profound long-term 
individual and institutional strength, than ties with merely one or the other group. 
!
Research into all types of physical injuries to young children is urgently needed for both 
clinical and forensic purposes; improved understanding of inflicted head injury in infants 
warrants particular attention. To this end, both the meticulous examination of corroborated 
accidental injuries, and the laying down of foundational biomechanical understanding, 
show promise for the future. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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7.1 Child protection law in Australia: The “poor little sister”  1
!
“…you don’t want to be picked up by defence lawyers about certain 
statements you made and whether you can back up what you’re saying from 
literature etc.”  (Paediatrician informant 1) 
!
* * * * * 
!
Paediatricians and forensic pathologists 
!
A 2014 article by Australian forensic paediatricians, published in the Journal of Forensic 
and Legal Medicine, discussed the relevance of the Goudge Inquiry to the practice of child 
protection/forensic paediatrics.  The Goudge Inquiry  was an inquiry into the practice of 2 3
pediatric forensic pathology in Ontario, Canada, which examined allegations that flawed 
forensic pathology evidence had led to many unjust convictions of individuals for serious 
offences against children; it found worrying deficits in forensic pathology practice and 
oversight there. 
!
The discussion covers situations in which a paediatrician may feel tempted to assist a child 
protection investigation early in its course, in a manner which may lead to serious 
problems later: 
!
Child protection legislation in many jurisdictions holds the interests of the child as 
paramount; this provides guidance to judicial officers in their decision-making. This 
is equivalent to the courts reaching their findings in ‘the best interests of the child’. 
However, at a clinical level, the best interests of the child must not influence the 
nature or strength of the forensic paediatric opinion. Specifically, at the clinical level 
the opinion must reflect the clinical assessment only and it is inappropriate for the 
 Magistrate informant 2, p 8 of transcript.1
 Skellern C and Donald TG, “The relevance of the Goudge inquiry to the practice of child 2
protection/forensic paediatrics” (2014) 27 Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine 35.
 Goudge ST, Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology in Ontario: Report, (Queen’s Printer for 3
Ontario, 2008). 
See also Goudge ST, “Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine Oration: The inquiry into pediatric 
forensic pathology in Ontario, Canada: Some reflections” (2009) 35 Monash University Law 
Review 212; Ranson D, “Forensic experts and miscarriages of justice: The inquiry into pediatric 
forensic pathology in Ontario” (2009) 17 Journal of Law and Medicine 22.
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forensic paediatrician to allow their opinion to be influenced by what they consider 
‘the child's best interests’. Child protection legislation contains provisions ensuring 
safety of a child remains paramount whilst the matters of concern are assessed. 
Therefore, statutory child protection authorities must understand not to expect or 
rely on forensic medical opinion to provide definitive conclusions and instead they 
must rely on their own assessment and response, which is of the most importance 
at the early stages of an investigation of a suspicious injury.  4!
The primary concern raised by this possibility is of disruption to a police investigation, and 
the injustices which might result from medical evidence which misleads a criminal court. 
This continues a focus primarily on forensic medical issues relevant to criminal law, which 
is evident in past forensic paediatric articles. 
!
For example, a 2008 article  included discussion of one Australian case, the criminal 5
matter R v Matthey [2007] VSC 398. An important principle for expert witnesses in criminal 
trials was enunciated: 
!
In criminal jurisdictions, an expert witness cannot take the decision of guilt or 
innocence, nor can his or her evidence appear to decide this question for the jury. 
This is referred to as the ultimate issue and is the province of the jury. Experts must 
not trespass into their domain. (p 741) !
As it transpired, the ultimate issue rule of evidence was formally abolished in Victoria soon 
after the article was published; in 2008 the Victorian version of the “uniform Evidence Acts” 
was enacted.  The principle is nonetheless an important one for an expert witness in 6
criminal proceedings to be conscious of. 
!
It is however less important, and rarely if ever observed, in child protection jurisdictions, 
where the court is not bound by the rules of evidence. Experts in social science swear to 
 Skellern and Donald, n 2, p 37.4
 Skellern C, “Medical experts and the law: Safeguarding children, the public and the 5
profession” (2008) 44 Journal of Paediatrics and Child Health 736.
 Evidence Act 2008 (Vic).6
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the issue (or do so in effect) in a manner approaching the routine, in child protection 
proceedings throughout the country.  7
!
In at least one child protection matter, SS v Department of Human Services (NSW) [2010] 
NSWDC 279, opinion evidence given by a paediatrician, on the ultimate question to be 
decided by a state Children’s Court, has been admitted with approval: 
!
‘It is highly concerning that [the infant] has significant unexplained injuries, which are 
indicative of inflicted head injury on more than one occasion (most probably due to 
shaking). …  
[The infant] should not be discharged from this hospital into the care of either or both 
of his parents without a clear understanding of how his injuries have been caused 
and by whom. The person(s) causing his injuries should not be considered as 
potential carer(s) without significant intervention to address the circumstances which 
led to him being injured.’ [37], [38] !
A 2011 forensic paediatric article,  cited in earlier Chapters, closes with the following 8
recommendation: 
!
Given that at the time of writing a medico-legal opinion it is not known which legal 
jurisdiction may use the opinion, it should always be expressed objectively and be 
constructed for high-level criminal jurisdiction trials. (p 774) !
The basis for the latter contention, that doctors who provide an opinion on a child’s injury 
should first cast their eyes toward a Court of Criminal Appeal, is not set out. It is open to 
question. 
!
!
 MXS v Department of Family and Human Services (NSW) [2012] NSWDC 63 at [74]; ASW & 7
ECW v Department of Communities [2011] QChC 023 at [32]; Re Hamilton (Children’s Court of 
NSW, Marien SC P, 16 July 2010) at [27]; Department of Community Services v Simons and Evans 
[2010] NSWLC 31 at [17]; Department of Child Safety v SJ & MB [2009] QChCM 1 at [85]; In the 
Matters of Julian and Allan (Children’s Court of NSW, Crawford CM, 28 April 2006) at [55]; Re 
Nellie [2004] NSWLC 8.
 Skellern C and Donald TG, “Suspicious childhood injury: Formulation of forensic opinion” (2011) 8
47 Journal of Paediatrics and Child Health 771.
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Returning to the 2014 forensic paediatric article which reflects on the Goudge Inquiry,  this 9
also includes the proposition that 
!
the forensic medical opinion cannot specifically state that ‘abuse has occurred’ or is 
confirmed. The best forensic medical practitioners can do is state the ‘medical 
diagnosis’ (e.g. fractured femur), consider any relevant medical conditions that 
would predispose the child to the injury, and assert that there has not been an 
adequate explanation provided. Therefore, the possibility that it has been inflicted 
remains a serious consideration. The final decision as to whether or not the 
evidence supports that the injury has been inflicted is made by the Court, whatever 
the jurisdiction. (p 36) !
Yet medical witnesses have expressed precisely these inferences- that an injury has been 
inflicted, or that it was caused by abuse- in several child protection matters heard in 
Children’s Courts in Australia, to the Court’s unqualified approval. Medical specialists of all 
stripes have opined from the witness box that physical findings in a critically ill child were 
most likely caused by “inflicted injury”, “non accidental injury”, “abusive head trauma”, or 
“by shaking” (Tab 12). In all these matters the Court welcomed these opinions as providing 
it important assistance (a situation still fraught with peril for an expert witness in a criminal 
court). 
!
Also of note in the passage quoted above, from the 2014 forensic paediatric article, is the 
contention that a medical witness who gives opinion evidence that “an injury was inflicted” 
is not following best forensic medical practice. In articles published in 2011  and 2012  by 10 11
the same authors, paediatricians were advised that the assessment of an injury to a child 
should conclude in its allocation to one of four categories. One was the category: 
!
The injury has been caused by another person and is therefore most likely 
inflicted.  12!
 Skellern and Donald, n 2.9
 Skellern and Donald, n 8.10
 Skellern C and Donald TG, “Defining standards for medico-legal reports in forensic evaluation of 11
suspicious childhood injury” (2012) 19 Journal of Forensic and Legal Medicine 267.
 Skellern and Donald, n 11, p 268.12
Table 12. “NAI evidence”: Medical evidence admitted in a child protection matter, that an infant’s head injury indicated “non-
accidental” or “inflicted” injury, or “shaking”
Case Medical specialist Evidence given
SS v Department of 
Human Services 
(NSW) 
[2010] NSWDC 279
Paediatrician “The constellation of [particular history and pathology findings] all indicated that an 
inflicted head injury was the most likely cause of [the infant’s] clinical presentation.”
at [35]
Ophthalmologist
“…it is extremely likely that [the infant’s] brain injury was caused by non-accidental 
means, that is, by abusive head trauma. … He referred to literature based on independent 
research that supports a conclusion that [the infant’s] retinal haemorrhages indicate a 
96% probability of abusive head trauma.”
at [46]
Consensus 
medical opinion
“…the consensus opinion was that there was an inflicted head injury on more than one 
occasion within the previous 2 to 3 weeks prior to [the infant’s] presentation at hospital. 
The most likely mechanism of the injury was by shaking.”
at [42] per 
Johstone 
DCJ
DOHS v Mr & Mrs H 
[2007] VChC 2
Ophthalmologist “…the most likely explanation for these injuries was non accidental injury” p 17
Paediatric 
radiologist
“…the presence of multiple fractures of different ages, together with the presence of intra 
cranial and retinal injury was highly suspicious of non accidental injury.”
p 17
Neurosurgeon “…these injuries were the result of what she described as ‘major force consistent with non 
accidental injury’”
p 17
Paediatrician “…the injuries suffered by [the infant] were caused by ‘significant trauma of considerable 
force and that overall, the pattern of injuries indicate non accidental injury’.”
p 17
“…these injuries were most likely non accidental injuries” p 18
Radiologist “this constellation of findings is virtually diagnostic of non accidental injury” p 18
Court summary 
of medical 
evidence
“There was a consistency in this vast array of medical evidence that the constellation of 
injuries suffered by both [twin infants]…were so extreme that those injuries were more 
likely than not non accidental injuries. In the absence of any plausible explanation from 
either of the parents…the evidence presented to this Court suggests that these injuries 
were not caused by accident.”
p 24 !
per Blashki 
M
Re Lincoln and 
Raymond 
(Children’s Court of 
NSW, 9 April 2009)
Neurosurgeon
“it is a shaking injury without impact unless proven otherwise. This is non-accidental injury 
until test results say otherwise. This is not a disease process, these are symptoms.” at [13]
Paediatric 
neurologist
"the combination of bilateral subdural haematomas and extensive bilateral retinal 
haemorrhages “suggests that traumatic brain injury secondary to shaking is the most 
likely provisional diagnosis.” at [28]
Paediatric 
ophthalmologist
“the pattern of extensive, multi-layered bilateral retinal haemorrhages is most likely the 
result of a shaking injury.”
at [29]
Paediatric 
registrar
"Her opinion, like the opinions of her colleagues, is that the overwhelming likelihood is that 
Lincoln’s injuries were caused by shaking.”
at [33] 
per Mitchell 
SCM
Medical 
specialist Evidence givenCase
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Whether or not this shift in recommended approach is in line with changes in criminal law 
over the same period, it is a step further away from current forensic medical practice in 
child protection matters. 
!
!
The question for the Children’s Court 
!
The ultimate issue to be decided in child protection proceedings differs fundamentally from 
that decided in criminal trials. The Children’s Court of New South Wales in 2009 observed 
that 
!
The question for the Children’s Court in the present case, then, is not whether Ms 
Smith or Mr Jones or, for that matter, any other person is responsible for [the 
infant’s] injuries but whether the proposals put to the court for his care and for the 
care of his brother constitute an acceptable or unacceptable risk so far as the safety, 
welfare and well-being of each of the children is concerned.  13!
The authority of the High Court of Australia, in the context of the Family Law Act, has been 
cited in this regard.  14
!
It can be seen that the question faced by the Children’s Court at the apex of the socio-
legal pyramid is the same question faced on the ground. Child protection workers who 
investigate a notification of suspected child abuse or neglect, must to some degree decide 
the same issue which a court might decide. They are of course not required to establish 
facts at the point of investigation to the same degree of certainty which a court must. But 
from the outset they must, as the court must, prioritise the child’s best interests. This 
principle means that they should seek a view of a case which is as balanced and complete 
as possible. 
!
In reality, child protection investigations as they are currently conducted are generally not 
simulacra of the deliberations of a Children’s Court. As comprehensively detailed in three 
 Re Lincoln and Raymond (Children’s Court of NSW, Mitchell SCM, 9 April 2009) at [58]. 13
See also Re Elizabeth [2011] NSWDC 245 at [56] (Letherbarrow SC DCJ); Re Anthony [2008] NSWLC 21 at 
[40] (Mitchell SCM).
 M v M [1988] 166 CLR 69.14
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recent Inquiries,  and in Chapter 5 of this thesis, the investigative process has been found 15
to be problematic. 
!
Paediatricians interviewed for this project described their inability to predict how a child 
protection agency is likely to respond in cases of suspected physical abuse, even across 
cases where the medical findings and psychosocial considerations appear similar. One of 
the most experienced paediatricians interviewed observed this apparent inconsistency to 
be most marked in cases of suspected inflicted head trauma in infants.  The ambiguity 16
inherent in both the underlying ethical question, and in the terms used to operationalise the 
state’s response to it- “significant risk of harm”, “parent able and willing to protect”- must 
play a part in producing disparate responses to apparently similar cases. 
!
The passage which opened this Chapter, quoted from the 2014 forensic paediatric 
article,  articulates the concern that a paediatrician might overstate the significance of 17
their findings at an early stage of an investigation, in an effort to have the child placed in a 
safe environment immediately, even if only for an interim period. This is a valid concern- 
some paediatricians may well do this. Some paediatricians doing this might consider it a 
“risk management approach”- managing the risk that the statutory child protection 
response to their worry will be inadequate and inscrutable; this also is a valid concern. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, an abused child may suffer further physical abuse after discharge 
from a hospital; especially an infant, vulnerable to further head injury, which on occasion 
proves lethal.  Whether a situation in which a child protection agency has assessed a 18
child protection concern and allowed a child to be taken home from a health facility is safer 
than a situation in which maltreatment was never considered by clinicians in the first place, 
is unknown.  19
 Carmody, T Taking Responsibility: A Roadmap for Queensland Child Protection (Queensland 15
Child Protection Commission of Inquiry, 2013); Cummins P, Report of the Protecting Victoria’s 
Vulnerable Children Inquiry (Department of Premier and Cabinet, January 2012); Wood J, Report 
of the Special Commission of Inquiry into Child Protection Services in NSW (State of NSW, 2008).
 Paediatrician informant 4, p 4 of transcript.16
 Skellern and Donald, n 2.17
 Jenny C et al, “Analysis of missed cases of abusive head trauma” (1999) 282 Journal of the 18
American Medical Association 621.
 See Commission for Children and Young People and Child Guardian, “An investigation into the 19
adequacy of the actions of certain government agencies in relation to service provision to a subject 
child” (March 2011).
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The imperatives and preoccupations of the criminal justice system present a challenge to 
the established professional and ethical frameworks within which most paediatricians 
practice. The wrongful conviction and imprisonment of an innocent parent will cause their 
child or children immeasurable harm. The principle of non-malfeasance in medical ethics 
extends to cases in which a doctor considers an action which may harm an individual who 
is not their patient.  It is difficult to imagine a greater horror for a parent than their child 20
dying or sustaining serious injury, after which the parent himself or herself is wrongly 
denounced and punished for causing that death or injury. No clinicians in Australia boast of 
increasing criminal prosecution rates,  or frame quality improvement and professional 21
development in these terms.  This prudence is to be applauded. 22
!
A police investigation differs fundamentally from a child protection investigation. Police 
officers are under little obligation to seek exculpatory evidence on behalf of a suspect. 
Criminal law is predicated on the premise that an adult accused of committing a crime is 
capable of obtaining and presenting evidence for themselves. In a 2008 review of the 
criminal justice system in Queensland,  a retired judge of the Supreme Court of 23
Queensland noted that 
!
The view has been expressed to me from a number of sources that there is a 
pervasive police culture that ‘it’s not our job to help the defence’ and ‘the defence is 
under no reciprocal obligation so why should we have to disclose’. That there is 
such a culture cannot be lightly dismissed given the frequency with which the 
perception was raised and the importance of disclosure in founding a fair trial. (p 93) !
Any loose statement made in writing by a doctor about a child’s injury may well be taken 
up by police, and in turn the prosecuting authority. If so, the use to which it might be put is 
entirely foreseeable. 
!
 Post SG, “Huntington’s Disease: prenatal screening for late onset disease” (1992) 18 Journal of 20
Medical Ethics 75.
 Miller A and Rubin D, “The contribution of children’s advocacy centers to felony prosecutions of 21
child sexual abuse” (2009) 33 Child Abuse and Neglect 12.
 Moreno JA, “Editorial: What do pediatric healthcare experts really need to know about Daubert 22
and the rules of evidence?” (2013) 43 Pediatric Radiology 135.
 Moynihan M, Review of the civil and criminal justice system in Queensland (Department of 23
Justice and Attorney-General, 2008).
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The threshold of proof in criminal proceedings- beyond reasonable doubt- itself carries a 
potentially distorting effect on an expert’s formulation of an opinion on a child’s injury (the 
same opinion which a Children’s Court will rely on for assistance). The most ethically 
scrupulous and impartial police officer is presumably liable to the same biases, including 
partisanship, which expert witnesses often are. This may have a knock-on effect. In the 
judgment of the criminal matter R v Matthey [2007] VSC 398 the following telling account 
was recorded, regarding the evidence given by two dentists on the findings on the face of 
one of the deceased children: 
!
[Dentist 1] indicated in cross-examination that she had never been told the findings 
of the pathologist… (or rather lack of them) in the area of the child’s face. Nor had 
she been told of the findings of the three odontologists who viewed the body. !
[Dentist 2] was not told of the latter findings and, by contrast, he claimed to have 
been told by… the chief police investigator in this matter, “that the Forensic 
Pathologist performing the autopsy had flagged bruises and indentations in the oral 
area as worthy of further investigation”. He had never been informed that the 
pathologist had found no such thing. In these circumstances, [Dentist 2] agreed that 
he had been misled… Moreover, he agreed that the information provided must have 
influenced his thinking as he looked at the photographs and he conceded the 
difficulties of dimension, colouration and reflection in photographs… [141]-[142] !
These circumstances may in some cases place a paediatrician in a difficult bind. A 
perhaps idealistic argument could be made that the appropriate medical opinion for a 
doctor to provide, verbally or in writing, to child protection workers at an early stage of an 
investigation (as at any stage), is one which is as definitive as the opinion which the 
clinician actually holds at that time. Pursuit of the child’s best interests should in fact 
galvanise a clinician into best ensuring that their opinion is soundly based and objective, 
since such an opinion should best promote the child’s best interests. But will it?  
!
One possible approach to this difficult bind is based on a broad view of child protection 
practice. This is an approach by which clinicians endeavour to better understand and 
engage with the child protection system itself, especially that part of it which is currently 
charged by the public (through its representatives) with overseeing the whole: the 
Children’s Courts. 
!
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A better understanding of the child protection system in entirety and in vivo should better 
allow a clinician navigate a bewildering and bureaucratic system, in order to advocate for a 
possibly abused child. In the bigger picture, and in the long run, it might also light the way 
to improvements to the system itself, through interdisciplinary understanding, 
collaboration, and old-fashioned paediatric advocacy. Interdisciplinary collaboration in this 
context need not refer only to medical-social science collaboration;  it could also refer to 24
medical-legal-social science collaboration. The road to closer alignment of the responses 
made to the clinical/therapeutic, child protection, and criminal justice issues which arise in 
cases of suspected child abuse, appears difficult and obscured. But it is one worth taking. 
!
It is outside the scope of this thesis to argue whether child protection concerns should be 
placed above, below, beside, or outside concerns of criminal justice, in cases of suspected 
child abuse. In any case this construction of the question risks confecting hypothetical 
conflicts between competing demands which in reality are rarely manifested. The sum of 
the findings and analysis presented in this thesis leads to a conclusion which is simpler 
and more certain. The legal definition of the word “forensic” is: 
!
“Of relevance to courts or court processes”   25!
Its definition does not confine its use to issues of criminal justice. Forensic paediatric 
practice encompasses both a criminal forensic role and a child protection forensic role. 
!
This is not a semantic quibble; the forensic underpinning of child protection practice is not 
a mere accident of history. The public, through its political representatives, grants ultimate 
authority for intervention by the state, in cases of suspected child abuse, to courts of law 
and the judiciary. This system has been preserved despite vehement arguments that the 
authority of state Children’s Courts should instead be assumed by tribunals composed of 
non-legal experts.  It remains intact, in the wake of recent comprehensive inquiries into 26
the child protection systems of the three most populous states. 
!
 Smith A, “Editorial: Child protection and child health: A shared future” (2008) 44 Journal of 24
Paediatrics and Child Health 85.
 Australian Law Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 2010).25
 Brouwer GE, “Own Motion Investigation into the Department of Human Services Child Protection 26
Program” (Ombudsman Victoria, 2009).
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Where there are both criminal and care proceedings under the Children Act 1989 
!
One model of an approach to cases of suspected child abuse which involve both criminal 
justice and child protection issues may be noted, in a setting previously examined. The title 
of this subsection, above, is also the title of Chapter 16 of A Handbook for Expert 
Witnesses in Children Act Cases,  written by Lord Justice Nicholas Wall, past President of 27
the Family Division of the High Court of England and Wales. Clinicians who assess an 
injury to a child in that jurisdiction are encouraged to look straight toward its High Court, 
both Criminal and Family Divisions. 
!
Under s 98(2) of the Children Act 1989 (UK), a statement or admission made in care 
proceedings is not admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings against the person 
making it, or his or her spouse or partner (except for the offence of perjury). The main 
purpose of this section is to encourage frankness on the part of parents regarding past 
events, accounts which may be crucial to the deliberations of a family court. It is a 
reflection of the importance placed by the family justice system there on the 
acknowledgement by adults of their own actions and those of other adults in a child’s life, 
including the acknowledgement of wrongdoing. It has led to a remarkable series of 
decisions there. 
!
In In re C  [1997] Fam 76, the Court of Appeal (Civ) considered a case in which the father 
of a child, in the course of care proceedings, admitted causing injury to a younger sibling 
which resulted in her death. The local authority informed the police of this, and the police 
applied for disclosure of the relevant statements, the medical reports and evidence, and 
transcripts of the evidence and judgment. The judge only gave leave for disclosure of the 
medical evidence, not of the father’s admission. The judge was the same Justice Wall who 
would later pen the handbook for expert witnesses. The police appealed the decision and 
the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that 
!
if the father is guilty of the unlawful killing of a child, then C's best interests and the 
best interests of other children are served by him being prosecuted and convicted 
and punished. No benefit would accrue to C and other children as a result of the 
evidence not being disclosed and she would be caused no harm by disclosure. This 
 Wall N, A Handbook for Expert Witnesses in Children Act Cases (2nd ed, Jordan Publishing, 27
2007).
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last matter was not one which was considered by the judge when he carried out his 
balancing exercise. 
Confidentiality and the importance of frankness militate against disclosure. In 
coming to his conclusion, the judge placed great emphasis on the importance of 
encouraging frankness. He was right to do so. 
If the admission was true, this was a very grave crime involving the killing of a small 
child. In those circumstances, the public interest in the administration of justice, by 
proper investigation and the prosecution of a crime of such gravity, are very weighty 
factors indeed favouring disclosure. [86C] !
In my view, on the facts of this case, the judge was wrong to hold that the public 
interest in encouraging frankness predominated over the other factors which I have 
identified. [87G] !
The Court of Appeal also noted that the admission itself, and possibly any further 
admission based on the original admission, would in any case be inadmissible in future 
criminal proceedings. 
!
Six years later, in A Chief Constable v A County Council & Ors [2002] EWHC 2198 (Fam), 
Wall J handed down judgment in a decision where the issues were similar. 
!
This case raises in an acute and unusual form the well recognised tension in care 
proceedings between, on the one hand, the desirability of encouraging frankness on 
the part of parents suspected of killing or injuring their children and, on the other, the 
public interest in the prosecution of serious crime and the punishment of offenders, 
including the public interest in convicting those who have been guilty of violent or 
sexual offences against children. [1] !
Wall J followed the authority established by the Court of Appeal (Civ), when it had 
overturned his own decision. 
!
on the facts of this particular case, and… on an application of the principles laid 
down in In re C, this is a case in which the public interest in the prosecution of 
serious crime and the punishment of offenders prevails over the desirability of 
encouraging frankness on the part of parents suspected of killing or injuring their 
children. [43] !
A zealous proponent of family justice might argue that the Court of Appeal in In re C relied 
on a point of questionable logic in its judgment: “No benefit would accrue to C and other 
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children as a result of the evidence not being disclosed…”  [emphasis added]. One 28
group of children whose best interests might especially be protected by the promotion of 
frankness in care proceedings are the siblings of children who suffer physical abuse, in 
future cases. It may be assumed that the best interests of the child “C” (sibling of a lethally 
injured infant), whose care arrangements were being decided in those proceedings, were 
best promoted by the father’s frankness in acknowledging what he had previously done to 
her sibling. If the father or his lawyer had known of past matters in which such an 
admission made in care proceedings was ultimately released to the police, the father may 
well never have made it, leaving C at risk. 
!
Whether or not this criticism is valid, there is no self-evident, uncontroversial resolution of 
the question. The Court of Appeal held that the public interest in a police authority being 
properly informed of a serious crime against a child outweighed the apparent benefit to the 
child’s sibling, or other children, gained by keeping the police in the dark. It was no doubt a 
difficult decision, but there may not have been three individuals better placed to make it 
than the bench of the Court of Appeal. The three judges included at least one whose 
customary seat was in the criminal courts. As was the case in the appeals in R v Clark 
[2000] EWCA Crim 54, R v Cannings [2004] EWCA Crim 01, and General Medical Council 
v Meadow [2006] EWCA Civ 1390, all three had experience in hearing appeals from 
criminal, family and civil proceedings, since that is the structure of the High Court of 
England and Wales. 
!
A Chief Constable v A County Council & Ors entailed competing jurisdictional demands 
which played out in a manner of particular interest to Australian paediatricians.  Care 29
proceedings had been instituted in relation to a child whose two younger siblings had both 
died in infancy; the evidence pointed to the mother being responsible for both deaths. A 
paediatrician was instructed by the court to provide a paediatric overview, for the 
“causation hearing” on the infants’ deaths. The mother only agreed to be interviewed if the 
paediatrician met four conditions, which included that he would not reveal her answers to 
any non-party to the care proceedings without the permission of the family court judge, 
and that he would limit his conclusions to issues relevant to proceedings under the 
 In re C [1997] Fam 76 at [86C].28
 See also Wall, n 25, pp 43-44.29
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Children Act. The mother’s lawyers were clearly trying to protect her from possible criminal 
prosecution. 
!
The police succeeded in their appeal to obtain all the medical evidence given in the care 
proceedings, but did so in the face of strong opposition from the paediatrician himself. 
Professor Timothy David, an eminent paediatrician who has published widely on child 
protection paediatric practice,  argued that granting disclosure of his evidence to police 30
would hamper the work of paediatricians instructed to investigate future cases of 
suspected child abuse, and inhibit the proper diagnosis of injuries to children. David 
argued that since the decision in In re C, a presumption had developed in favour of 
disclosing incriminating information from care proceedings to the police, and that this 
!
operated against the interests of children by placing a greater value on the 
prosecution and conviction of offenders than on the welfare of survivors of abuse 
and their siblings. [39] !
Wall J disagreed that such a presumption operated. Wall J also noted that in A Chief 
Constable v A County Council & Ors he was a “first instance judge”, and that 
!
The simple fact of the matter is that In Re C, and the decisions of the Court of 
Appeal which follow it are binding on me. [62] !
Later in the judgment, Wall J turned his attention to the legal advice which the mother had 
received. 
!
Like Professor David, I strongly deprecate legal advice given to parents not to agree 
to be interviewed by an expert witness… He describes it as a perversion of the 
system because it gives priority to protection of the adult over the interests of the 
child. Whilst I would not use such strong language, I agree with the sentiment 
behind it. [93] !
 David TJ, “Avoidable pitfalls when writing medical reports for court proceedings in cases of 30
suspected child abuse” (2004) 89 Archives of Disease in Childhood 799 ; David TJ et al, “Pretrial 
liaison between doctors in alleged child abuse” (1998) 79 Archives of Disease in Childhood 205.
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In his Handbook, Wall LJ advises experts faced with a dilemma like that faced by 
Professor David to seek advice from their professional body, and/or from the Family 
Justice Council.  31
!
In at least one instance, a family court judge has criticised the decision of the Crown to 
prosecute a parent who had allegedly abused their children. In Re S [1992] FCR 31, 
Thorpe J made it clear 
!
that the welfare of the children should be to the fore when deciding whether to 
prosecute an abusing mother. In this case the adverse consequences of the 
decisions to prosecute were easy to discern, first because the children’s future had 
been in limbo for 2 years and secondly because, inevitably, the issues in the criminal 
trial had concentrated expert opinion on criminal responsibility with a resulting 
polarisation of view. The mother was inhibited from acknowledgements of fault that 
were a necessary foundation for therapeutic work, and the antagonism engendered 
by the impending criminal trial led to the local authority abandoning a scheme of 
family therapy with a view to rehabilitation. !
Currently, “…in practice it is often (although not invariably) the case in England that 
prosecuting authorities wait for the conclusion of the fact finding part of the care 
proceedings before making a decision whether to charge a parent.”  32
!
In 2004 a “Family-Criminal Interface Committee” was established by the Solicitor-General, 
and President Butler-Sloss of the Family Division of the High Court of England and Wales, 
“…to take an ‘overview’ role in coordinating all work currently being undertaken in England 
and Wales to improve the interface between the family and criminal jurisdictions”.  This 33
led to the publication in 2007 of Related Family and Criminal Proceedings: A Good 
Practice Guide, written primarily for specialist criminal or family lawyers who lack 
experience in the other jurisdiction. It contains extensive discussion regarding expert 
reports and evidence. 
!
 Wall, n 25, Ch 11.14.31
 Scriven P and Hanson T, “The Interplay between Criminal and Family Proceedings” (2010) 14 32
Jersey and Guernsey Law Review, [14].
 Hall A (ed), Related Family and Criminal Proceedings: A Good Practice Guide (Law Society 33
Publishing, 2007) Appendix 3.
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In 2013 the Protocol and Good Practice Model  for disclosure of information in cases of 34
alleged child abuse and “linked” criminal and care directions hearings, was published. The 
signatories to the protocol were the Senior Presiding Judge of the realm, the President of 
the Family Division, and the Director of Public Prosecutions. One of its objectives is 
!
to facilitate timely and consistent disclosure of information and documents from the 
Family Justice System to the police and/or the CPS [Crown Prosecution Service]. 
[3.5] !
The Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld), and the Children and Young Persons (Care and 
Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) contain bare provisions that the child protection jurisdictions of 
the respective Children’s Courts are not affected by pending criminal proceedings against 
any party to child protection proceedings. Under the Queensland legislation, evidence of 
anything said or done at a family group meeting, or recorded in a case plan, is 
inadmissible in criminal proceedings.  Otherwise these statutes are silent on this issue, as 35
is Victorian legislation. 
!
All these illustrations are a step removed from the predicament described, of an Australian 
paediatrician assessing an injury to a child, early in the course of parallel investigations. 
They can only provide indirect guidance to a doctor in this situation; perhaps only 
confirmation that these are important issues which have troubled doctors, lawyers and 
judges before. The point is well made that efforts to secure a child’s immediate safety, 
made through the medium of a paediatrician’s documented opinion on a child’s injuries, 
carry serious risks. The risk of a future miscarriage of criminal justice is one which not all 
paediatricians will be accustomed to integrating into their practice. 
!
A concern which is separate to any concerns of criminal justice is that any distortion of the 
medical interpretation of a child’s injuries, or the subsequent conclusions voiced or 
documented by a medical specialist in this circumstance, risks seriously misleading the 
child’s family members as to the truth of what has happened. In many cases it is those 
individuals and their actions, and not the outcome of criminal proceedings, which hold the 
best hope for the best future life possible for the injured child and their siblings. To mislead 
 Protocol and Good Practice Model: Disclosure of information in cases of alleged child abuse and 34
linked criminal and care directions hearings (2013).
 ss 51YA, 51YB.35
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those individuals would be essentially to commit the wrong for which Colin Paterson was 
severely criticised,  in reverse. This is a view onto the problem which many paediatricians 36
may find sits more naturally with their established clinical practice, and ethical framework. 
!
!
Looking ahead 
!
One magistrate interviewed for this project outlined how heavily she would rely on the 
prospect of substantial positive change flowing from the recent Child Protection 
Commission of Inquiry in Queensland: !
Q. Have you taken much interest in the report of the Commission of Inquiry? 
No, I’m over that. Okay because you know I’m on my fifth inquiry into child 
protection issues and what’s new?  37!
If the child protection system is to be significantly improved for the small proportion of 
children caught in it, where the quality and usefulness of a medical opinion might play a 
significant role in determining their future, it does seem unwise to wait for government to 
achieve this. 
!
Several issues have emerged in this thesis which by their nature suggest that stronger 
links between clinicians who work with children, and legal professionals who work in child 
protection or children’s law generally, could yield benefits for children and their families. 
“Legal professionals” here includes solicitors, advocates, magistrates and judges. These 
include the following issues: 
!
• Concerns raised in this thesis regarding medical reports provided to either police or the 
child protection agency; whether these really do carry future risks, and if so what 
response might be appropriate. 
• Legal and/or guardian representation of children during the course of investigations or 
proceedings. 
• Briefing of expert witnesses. 
 AB, Re [1994] EWHC Fam 5.36
 Magistrate informant 3, p 7 of transcript.37
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• Cases in which, as discussed in this Section, a clinician might feel pressure from both 
criminal justice and child protection concerns. 
• Loftier aspirations, such as the establishment of a Family Drug Treatment Court, of the 
sort currently being piloted in Victoria.  38
!
One of the paediatricians interviewed, like various officials quoted in Chapter 5, argued for 
more or all child protection decision-making to be assumed by specialist tribunals of non-
legal experts, with adequate judicial oversight. Other paediatricians, whose experience is 
of apparent inconsistency and unpredictability of decision-making in cases of seriously 
injured children, might baulk at this proposal. The model of a family drug treatment court 
appears to address both sides of concerns. The objective of proceedings is explicitly 
problem-solving, in the child’s best interests, and real-life experience is that such courts 
generally lack the hostility common to standard adversarial proceedings. Proceedings are 
still however managed by a senior experienced specialist judicial officer, thus greatly 
addressing the risk of “child protection injustices” which might otherwise worry clinicians. 
!
The final issue which warrants discussion in any proposal for increased medical-legal 
interdisciplinary collaboration is that of the testing of medical evidence in child protection 
investigations and proceedings. This is a thorny question. Paediatricians interviewed 
described instances in their experience of other clinicians or medical witnesses having 
provided opinions on injuries to children which may not have been soundly based. But 
several also outlined how unpleasant the experience often is, of having their own evidence 
tested, within the system of adversarial fact-finding which operates. 
!
In addition, one of the greatest difficulties which medical witnesses encounter in their 
forensic role is the imposition on their working time, especially in time wasted waiting 
outside court, or having their appearance scheduled or rescheduled at the last minute. 
This concern was prominently voiced both by paediatricians interviewed for this project, 
and experts interviewed for Henderson and Seymour’s 2013 study.  The most expert 39
experts are likely to be those whose clinical working time is most valuable. This problem 
 Children’s Court of Victoria, “Family Drug Treatment Court” (10 September 2014). 38
See also Levine G, “A study of Family Drug Treatment Courts in the United States and the United 
Kingdom” (Churchill Trust, 9 July 2012).
 Henderson E and Seymour F, “Expert witnesses under examination in the New Zealand criminal 39
and family courts” (Law Foundation of New Zealand, 2013) Ch 3.5.
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does not suggest an easy solution, since the clinical work of experts, and court 
proceedings, are both very important activities. Enhanced medical-legal interdisciplinary 
communication and collaboration offers promise in answering these particular questions: 
!
• Does the number or gravity of child protection matters where decisions are being made 
based on unreliable medical evidence present a serious problem?, and 
• If so, is there a way to address this problem, without increasing the disruption to clinical 
practice experienced by experts? 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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7.2 Future medical research directions 
!
“And I said well as you would have seen in [the] report, there’s been studies 
in England that have looked at subdurals in babies that are present at birth 
and been followed up and although they’re small numbers they have been 
shown to be gone. So they wanted to stop straight away and say ‘Well we 
need to look at those articles, we may need to adjourn and do this tomorrow”. 
(Paediatrician informant 6) 
!
* * * * * 
!
Swans of all colours 
!
Detecting abuse as the cause of a young child’s injury is difficult, and very often cannot be 
determined with certainty. Analysis of the most certain, or more correctly the least 
uncertain, “confirmed” cases of physical abuse has yielded important findings which assist 
clinicians assess future cases. An example is the classic metaphyseal lesion.  Like any 40
medical sign it is fallible if relied on exclusively or too heavily. But its value has stood the 
test of time. In contrast, the spiral morphology of a long bone fracture in a young child was 
once considered strong evidence of abuse as the fracture’s cause, due to its high 
prevalence in cases of “confirmed” abuse (generally cases of children found to have 
dozens of unexplained serious injuries of differing ages). Today this finding on its own is no 
longer regarded as helpful in a clinician’s assessment of suspected abuse.  Any injury 41
must be compared to the explanatory mechanism given in the history, to be meaningful to 
this exercise. 
!
Researchers undertaking clinical observational studies have learnt from the limitations of 
past attempts. Meaningful conclusions can be drawn from this line of enquiry, when 
 Kleinman PK, “The metaphyseal lesion in abused infants: A radiologic-histopathologic 40
study” (1986) 146 American Journal of Roentgenology 895.
 Scherl SA et al, “Accidental and nonaccidental femur fractures in children” (2000) 376 Clinical 41
Orthopaedics and Related Research 96.
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studies are prospective and carefully designed, with standardised interpretation of clinical 
data, and strict, explicit, a priori criteria for case classification.  42
!
New techniques are being devised to assist the detection of inflicted injury in children. For 
example the sensitivity and specificity of “multiplex assessment” of biochemical markers in 
blood, in the detection of traumatic brain injury, now approach figures which suggest that 
its use in clinical practice may not be far off.  Bedside ultrasound has been used to detect 43
a femoral fracture in one infant and a periosteal haematoma (blood under a bone’s 
covering of periosteum) in another, in cases where the diagnosis of trauma may have 
otherwise been delayed or missed.  A challenge posed by novel methods such as these is 44
the risk that in the early stages of their use, positive findings are given more significance 
than can be supported by valid data. This was the error into which the paediatricians 
responsible for the Cleveland crisis fell, in their reliance on “reflex anal dilatation” as a sign 
of child sexual abuse. It is also the error of researchers and clinicians of past years who 
labelled the Classic Metaphyseal Lesion as “pathognomonic” of abuse. 
!
Medical researchers follow a natural instinct when focusing on cases of (probable) disease 
in order to better understand that disease. The study of normal lymphocyte (a type of white 
blood cell) replication in normal subjects can only yield so much information relevant to the 
treatment of childhood leukaemia; recent improvements in patient survival have instead 
been achieved through large-scale clinical trials of treatments of children with leukaemia. 
Yet physical child abuse is not a disease in the way that leukaemia is, and research 
methods which increase knowledge in other areas of medicine are not always suited to the 
understanding of injuries to children.  
!
The “white swans” of inductive reasoning were described in Chapter 1. Over the short 
history of medical child abuse research, “black swan” case reports of accidental 
mechanisms leading to unusual injuries to children have repeatedly halted a potential slide 
into easy dogma, whereby a particular injury might otherwise be considered 
 Hymel KP et al, “Mechanisms, clinical presentations, injuries, and outcomes from inflicted versus 42
noninflicted head trauma during infancy: Results of a prospective, multicentered, comparative 
study” (2007) 119 Pediatrics 922.
 Berger RP et al, “Multiplex assessment of serum biomarker concentrations in well-appearing 43
children with inflicted traumatic brain injury” (2009) 65 Pediatric Research 97.
 Warkentine FH, “The use of ultrasound to detect occult or unsuspected fractures in child 44
abuse” (2014) 30 Pediatric Emergency Care 43.
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pathognomonic of abuse. Examples include a spiral fracture of an infant’s humerus caused 
by a young sibling turning them over from prone,  retinal haemorrhages being caused by 45
unusual household accidents,  and posterior rib fractures in infants occurring more often 46
following cardiorespiratory resuscitation, after the adoption of a new, more compressive, 
technique of administering chest compressions.  In all these examples most cases 47
differed from the routine, since the circumstances in which the injuries were sustained 
enabled clinicians to be nearly certain of their accidental (or at least unintentional) cause. 
In one case the injury mechanism was fortuitously caught on video, in another the 
mechanism was witnessed by friends visiting the family, in others the infants were closely 
monitored by hospital staff from the time of injury up to the discovery of the rib fractures, 
since they were critically ill. 
!
The author is not aware of any systemic attempt to gather and collate data on cases such 
as these, where an unusual injury to a young child can be confirmed as having been 
sustained accidentally. In the era of the ubiquitous smartphone the time appears ripe. 
Cases of confirmed significant accidental injury are likely to still be a small minority of all 
injuries to children seen in emergency departments, but it is the validity of the inferences 
which can be drawn from such cases, and not their frequency, which would distinguish 
such reports from the problematic case series previously typical of the field. 
!
“Citizen science” is a term used to describe scientific research projects led by scientists 
but accepting or seeking observations from members of the general public.  In the 48
modern era, research incorporating citizen science in areas of environmental science have 
been most prominently successful; for example a few hundred lay participants might 
monitor House Finches for signs of avian conjunctivitis.  More recently, researchers in the 49
 Hymel KP and Jenny C, “Abusive spiral fractures of the humerus: A videotaped 45
exception” (1996) 150 Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine 226.
 Christian CW et al, “Retinal hemorrhages caused by accidental household trauma” (1999) 135 46
Journal of Pediatrics 125.
 Reyes JA et al, “Increased incidence of CPR-related rib fractures in infants- Is it related to 47
changes in CPR technique?” (2011) 82 Resuscitation 545.
 Scientific American, “Citizen Science”.48
 Bonney R et al, “Citizen science: A developing tool for expanding science knowledge and 49
scientific literacy” (2009) 59 BioScience 977.
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areas of astronomy,  neuroscience, and genetics  have adopted similar approaches. The 50 51
related literature could provide important guidance in the design of any research into 
corroborated accidental injuries to children. 
!
The presentation of case details to clinician readers would need to remain case-specific.  52
The collective reporting of prevalences of outcomes following a uniform intervention in a 
large number of patients is an exquisitely effective tool in many areas of medical research. 
But the collective reporting of findings across several cases of suspected physical child 
abuse has proven singularly unhelpful to date. 
!
Data gathered and presented in this way could, on analysis, assist the clinical assessment 
of injuries to children in at least two ways. As has been previously demonstrated, a report 
of a confirmed accidental mechanism of an unusual injury is likely to moderate any over-
dogmatic assumptions which might otherwise be made regarding the likelihood of abuse 
when an injury of that type is encountered. 
!
Second, and perhaps more importantly, collection of data in this manner would almost 
certainly improve the practical understanding of both medical researchers and clinicians, of 
the physical properties of the body of a human child at different ages, and of 
biomechanical principles as they are manifested in real life. Clinicians provided with 
specific details of specific unusual cases would be able to incorporate that quasi-
experiential knowledge into the sum of their own clinical experience. Experiential 
understanding of this sort, although not always formal and organised, and not always 
reducible to clinical practice guidelines or decision rules, forms a large part of the 
knowledge base on which expert clinicians rely in their daily practice. It has also often 
been recognised by courts of law as the type of experience which underpins the true 
 Raddick MJ et al, “Citizen science: Status and research directions for the coming decade” (2009) 50
AGB Stars and Related Phenomenastro 2010: The Astronomy and Astrophysics Decadal Survey 
46P.
 Choudhury S et al, “Big data, open science and the brain: Lessons learned from 51
genomics” (2014) 8 Frontiers in Human Neuroscience Article 239.
 Jefferson T, “Editorial: More cases, doctor? Yes please!” (2008) 1 Cases Journal.52
 R v Millar 1989 CarswellOnt 99, 71 CR (3d) 78 at [109]; Re A and D [2001] EWHC Fam 9 at [41]; 53
Butler-Sloss E, “Expert witnesses, courts and the law” (2002) 95 Journal of the Royal Society of 
Medicine 431, p 432.
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expertise on which courts must sometimes rely,  in contrast to the stale experience of an 53
eminent but semi-retired doctor, or forensic medical experience.  54
!
!
Building blocks of knowledge 
!
In 2002 President Butler-Sloss of the Family Division of the High Court of England and 
Wales identified the urgent need for more research on injuries to children.  The specific 55
area which Butler-Sloss P identified was physical injury to children and particularly to 
babies; especially inflicted head injury. Other important areas of potential enquiry 
mentioned were the dating of healing fractures and bruises, and SIDS. 
!
It is an irony of history that at the time these words were being published, Geddes’s 
formative “unified hypothesis” was gaining credence and attention in courts of the United 
Kingdom and abroad, as it did in Butler-Sloss P’s article itself. Although Geddes's specific 
theory no longer holds sway, it appears to have germinated a rich field of expert evidence 
of dubious reliability. In 2014 Dr Waney Squier, the neuropathologist whose expert 
evidence given in A Local Authority v S [2009] EWHC 2115 (Fam) was discussed in 
Chapter 5, gave evidence on possible causes of subdural haemorrhages found in infants, 
in two separate cases. One was a criminal appeal, Younas v Her Majesty’s Advocate 
[2014] HCJAC 114, the other an appeal from family proceedings, G [2014] EWCA Civ 
1365. The accounts given of her evidence, in the judgments in these matters, have a 
terribly familiar ring. 
!
In the latter case, counsel for the local authority sought to counter Squier’s credentials as 
an expert witness by reference to A Local Authority v S. Macur LJ commented: 
!
I am not persuaded that the judgment in that case, fairly interpreted, would permit 
outright dismissal of Dr Squier’s views in all subsequent cases as being incredible… 
[22] 
 Freckelton I, Reddy P and Selby H, Australian Magistrates’ Perspectives on Expert Evidence: A 54
Comparative Study (Australian Institute of Judicial Administration 2001) Ch 4.14.
 Butler-Sloss, n 48.55
Chapter 7
Indeed it is not the role of a court of law to prohibit the calling of an individual as an expert 
witness in any future case, however deficient their evidence might have seemed in one 
case. Judicial comment on proposed systems of accreditation of expert witnesses by the 
courts is almost universally negative.   56
!
It may be noted that Squier did not advance the hypothesis that hypoxia had caused the 
infant’s subdural haemorrhage in either 2014 case. King J’s emphatic conclusion on this 
question, recorded in A Local Authority v S, will be recalled. In addition, two important 
scientific studies published since that matter have addressed the question.  In neither 57
study was any association found between hypoxia in infants and subdural haemorrhage. 
Squier did however, in her evidence in one case,  speculate on the role which 58
“choking” (without hypoxia) might have played, just as she did in A Local Authority v S. In 
the other case  she raised cerebral venous thrombosis as a topic worthy of discussion. 59
!
The impression given by this brief historical account is that clinical and pathologic research 
in the area of head injury, subdural haemorrhage, and retinal haemorrhage in infants, will 
not in the next few years provide the depth of understanding hoped for by the courts, as 
important as clinical/pathologic research is for the improved management of medical 
conditions (including the care of infants who have suffered serious head injury). The 
impression given is of a sort of junk science “whack-a-mole”, where one poorly founded 
hypothesis withers under the sustained scrutiny of a superior court, or through the 
laborious application of the scientific method, only to spring up again in a slightly different 
guise. 
!
For this reason, medical and scientific researchers must continue the parallel pursuit of a 
biomechanical understanding of the properties of living infant tissue. The question of 
 Abadee AR, “The expert witness in the new millennium” (Speech to General Surgeons Australia 56
2nd Annual Scientific Meeting, 2 September 2000); Williams GN, “Accreditation and accountability 
of experts” (Paper to Medico-Legal Conference, 5 August 2000). 
See also Hartshorne J and Miola J, “Expert evidence: difficulties and solutions in prosecutions for 
infant harm” (2010) 30 Legal Studies 279.
 Hurley M et al, “Is there a causal relationship between the hypoxia–ischaemia associated with 57
cardiorespiratory arrest and subdural haematomas? An observational study” (2010) 83 British 
Journal of Radiology 736; Kelly P et al, “Subdural hemorrhage and hypoxia in infants with 
congenital heart disease” (2014) 134 Pediatrics e773.
 Younas v Her Majesty’s Advocate [2014] HCJAC 114.58
 G [2014] EWCA Civ 1365.59
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whether or how easily shaking of an infant alone can cause serious brain injury has been 
discussed. Another “missing piece”, the absence of which has been noted,  is why the 60
back-and-forth shaking of an infant, which might be expected to swing the infant’s head in 
an arc centred around a point at the base of the neck, external to the head, creates brain 
injuries with an overall pattern and microscopic appearance which indicate that the brain 
rotated around its own centre of gravity. 
!
Studies using anthropomorphic devices,  animal studies,  or computer simulation 61 62
models  will help solve these puzzles. Research programmes in these fields are currently 63
small scale, but sceptics should heed the words of Duhaime, in 2008: 
!
For those who have been waiting for a model of an infant that correctly predicts all 
injuries, the wait isn’t over yet. … But for those who are interested, this paper gives 
a glimpse into the steps that get us closer.  64!
Florey and Fleming would not have discovered Penicillin if not for the previous work of 
Koch and Pasteur. In some ways the scientific understanding of inflicted injuries to children 
has to date involved attempts to leapfrog over the basic science understanding on which 
other fields of medical science are grounded. It falls to the current generation of scientific 
researchers to “go back and begin at the beginning”.  65
!
A final question to consider in this medico-legal thesis might be the specific objective of 
such research. Should its aim be to produce such deep and detailed understanding that 
clinicians can diagnose inflicted injury “beyond reasonable doubt”? Or merely to allow 
clinicians to establish the cause of injury on the balance of probabilities? The author’s 
 Wilkins B, “Head injury- abuse or accident?” (1997) 76 Archives of Disease in Childhood 393.60
 Coats B and Margulies SS, “Potential for head injuries in infants from low-height falls” 2 Journal 61
of Neurosurgery- Pediatrics 321.
 Ibrahim NG et al, “Physiological and pathological responses to head rotations in toddler 62
piglets” (2010) 27 Journal of Neurotrauma 1021.
 Couper Z and Albermani F, “Mechanical response of infant brain to manually inflicted 63
shaking” (2010) 224 Proceedings of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Part H: Journal of 
Engineering in Medicine 1.
 Duhaime A and Dodge CP, “Editorial: Closer but not there yet: models in child injury 64
research” (2008) 2 Journal of Neurosurgery- Pediatrics 320. 
 Magistrate informant 3, p 11 of transcript.65
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opinion on this question is based on his new medical, and still newer legal understanding, 
gained through the completion of this thesis. The primary aim of such research should be 
to allow a clinician to advise the family members of seriously injured young children, of 
how the clinician believes the child’s injury was sustained, with as much certainty as the 
clinical facts at hand allow, but with more accuracy and certainty than was possible before 
the research was conducted. Achieving this aim will assist both criminal and Children’s 
courts in their decision-making. This aim aligns with best forensic child protection practice, 
with the customary practice of medicine, and with the child’s own best interests.
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similarly or differently in the Children's Court.  The magistrate will also be invited to discuss the 
rationale for evidence being handled similarly or differently between the two jurisdictions. !
The interviews will be audio recorded and these records transcribed into deidentified form by the 
student researcher; only these deidentified transcripts will be seen by individuals other than the 
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